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ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to understand better how the
Congress of the United States worked to establish the proper
size and form of the Peace Establishment of the United
States between 1821 and 1855.

Central to this study is an

attempt to determine if partisan or sectional attitudes were
key factors in how Congress viewed the Regular Army.
The research in this study is centered on the primary
materials generated by the Congresses under study.

The

debates and speeches conducted in Congress as found in the
contemporary reports of the day, the Journals of the House
and Senate, and the reports and documents produced by the
two Houses during the period are key sources

Roll call

votes are analyzed when available in an attempt to determine
if there were any party or sectional differences in the
voting patterns.

Since only a few roll calls were taken and

recorded on the issue, each vote is treated separately.
In an attempt to clarify the sectional issue, a three
region model is used.

A state is placed in its traditional

North or South region unless it bordered a frontier area.
States bordering a territory are placed in the Frontier
region.

Districts which have differing characteristics than

Vll

their parent states have been moved into the region with
which they share the most in common.
The conclusions of the research show that party and
section played no significant role in the debates to find
the proper size of the Peace Establishment between 1821 and
1855.

With only the most minor exceptions, no party or

section disagreed with the decisions of the Congress on the
eight individual issues studied.

At most, one party or

section supported the change to a greater or lesser degree
than the rest of the Congress.

The general trend to

increase of the Regular Army between 1821 and 1855 occurred
in response to the great increase in the size of the country
and the need to have a military presence far beyond the
settled frontier.

v m

INTRODUCTION

The Army of the early American republic, born out of a
desire to forge a new nation, was both cherished and
distrusted.

Americans deemed the Continental Army necessary

to secure their immediate liberty but it was also feared as
a possible threat to their future liberty.

A fear of the

power of a standing army, long a factor in American
politics, was to be an object of debate well into the
nineteenth century.

Those in favor of a large standing army

argued that such a force was needed for the protection of
the country from possible adversaries and saw little chance
that the Army would threaten the people's liberties.

A

great many people, however, felt that a standing army was a
danger and argued that it would be best to keep any such
organization small.
This study shows how one segment of the political
culture dealt with the Army; specifically, how the Congress
of the United States Congress acted to control the size and
form of the Army between 1821 and 1855.

Congressmen had to

consider not only the national needs for Army expansion or
contraction but also the local interests of their
constituents.

The debates on this issue, traced through a

1

2

generation of American politics, highlight key aspects of
the relationship between the Congress and the Army.

An

understanding of such a relationship is intriguing, since
the defense of the country is the most basic of the national
interests.
The time period covered in this study was easily
determined.

It starts with Congress reducing the Army in

1821 during the first attempt to fix the proper size of the
standing peacetime Army.

The study ends in 1855 with the

last of a series of increases that saw the strength of the
peacetime Army nearly triple over thirty years.1

The period

from 1821 to 1855, with the brief exception of the Mexican
War years, is a homogeneous one.

The concerns of the nation

and the Congress during the period were to field a viable
and cost-effective peacetime military establishment.
There is no single work which deals exclusively with
how the Congress viewed and acted towards the Army in the
period.

However, a variety of primary and secondary sources

discuss the relationship in varying detail.
Among secondary sources Russell F. Weigley's History of
the United States Army most nearly retains the designation
of being a standard work.

Other general works, including

1-The increase was from 5,773 in 1821 to 15,911 in 1855.
Unless otherwise noted all strength figures in this study
will be taken from Russell F. Weigley, History of the United
States Army (New York: MacMillain Co, 1967), 566-7.
Weigley's figures are used because he includes the
volunteers and militia called to duty as well as the Regular
Army. For a selected listing of such figures from 1789 to
1861 see Appendix 1.
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Oliver Spaulding's The United States Army in War and Peace,
William Addleman Ganoe's The History of the United States
Army, and Emory Upton's The Military Policy of the United
States. remain useful, if somewhat dated, guides.2

Other

useful secondary works include Warren Hassler's With Sword
and Shield:

American Military Affairs, Colonial Times to

the Present, and Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski's For the
Common Defense:

A Military History of the United States of

America.3
Some very good monographs discuss certain events
involving the Army and shed light upon Congressional
attitudes toward the Army.

Foremost among these are Francis

Paul Prucha's illuminating works The Sword of the Republic;
The United States Army on the Frontier and Broadax and
Bayonet, John K. Mahon's History of the Second Seminole War,
and Edgar Bruce Wesley's Guarding the Frontier:

A Study of

Frontier Defense from 1815-1825.4
201iver Lyman Spaulding, The United Stats Army in War
and Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934); William
Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New
York: D. Appleman and Company, 1924); Emory Upton, The
Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1904; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
3Warren W. Hassler, With Sword and Shield: American
Military Affairs: Colonial Times to the Present (Ames:
Iowa University Press, 1982); Allan R. Millett and Peter
Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of
the United States of America (New York: The Free Press,
1984) .
^Francis Paul
United States Army
Macmillan Company,
Bayonet: The Role
Development of the

Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The
on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (Toronto: The
1969), Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and
of the United States Army in the
Northwest, 1815-1860 (Madison: The State
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An unexpected source of information concerning the
relationship between Congress and the Army can be found in
biographies of the few men of stature who were Secretary of
War before 1860.

Both John C. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis

were fierce Army advocates and information about their
activities is vital to understanding how the acts of 1821
and 1855 were passed.

The most useful books about these men

are William C. Davis's Jefferson Davis:
Hour, Hudson Strode's Jefferson Davis:

The Man and His
American Patriot,

1808-1861, and Charles M. Wiltse's John C. Calhoun:
Nationalist, 1782-1828.5

Two Ph.D. dissertations, John

Muldowny's "The Administration of Jefferson Davis as
Secretary of War," and Rodger J. Spiller's "John C. Calhoun
as Secretary of War, 1817-1825," were also very helpful in
understanding how Congress dealt with the Army and the
executive branch.6*
6
5

Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953); John K. Mahon, The
History of the Seminole War: 1835-1842 (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1967); Edgar Bruce Wesley,
Guarding the Frontier: A Study of Frontier Defense from
1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota
Press, 1973).
5William C. Davis, Jefferson Davis: The Man and His
Hour (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); Hudson Strode,
Jefferson Davis: American Patriot, 1808-1861 (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1965); Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun:
Nationalist, 1782-1828 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1944).
6Rodger J. Spiller, "John C. Calhoun as Secretary of
War, 1817-1825" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University,
1977); John Muldowny, "The Administration of Jefferson Davis
as Secretary of War" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1959).
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Journal articles on Army-Congressional relations are
disappointingly sparse.

Several good articles, especially

in the Calhoun and Davis periods, are available, however.
The most useful of all sources for this study are the
debates and roll call votes of the House of Representatives
and the Senate.

These treasures are published variously in

The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United
States (1789-1824), Register of the Debates in Congress
(1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873).7

A

vital guide to the confusing and often contradictory history
of the above three publications can be found in a
wonderfully researched dissertation by Elizabeth Gregory
McPherson, "The History of Reporting the Debates and
Proceedings of Congress."8
The official journals of the House and Senate cover the
same materials as the unofficial reports and are helpful in
understanding the parliamentary procedures of the two
bodies.

They provide occasional texts of proposed measures

and amendments and can also be used to double check the
accuracy of the vote totals found in the debates.

7Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress
of the United States. 18 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales &
Seaton, 1789-1824); Congress, The Register of Debates in
Congress, 14 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 18241837); Congress, Congressional Globe. 46 vols. (Washington
D. C.: Office of the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873).
8Elizabeth Gregory McPherson, "The History of Reporting
the Debates and Proceedings of Congress" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of North Carolina, 1940).
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Additional sources of information are the documents and
reports authorized by the various Congresses.

These

documents can be frustrating to work with because of their
unpredictable topics, but many important items are covered
in depth.
A great many documents concerning the Army and
Congressional attitudes towards it can be found in the
National Archives.

While often highly inconvenient to use,

many of the Record Groups (especially Record Group 107,
Letters Received by the Secretary of War) are gold mines of
information.
An excellent way to judge the reaction of informed
public opinion to changes in the strength of the Peace
Establishment is through editorials in the leading
newspapers of the day.

Though coverage of the issue is

often spotty, and almost always of a highly partisan nature,
these editorials often give insight into how the public
viewed the Army.
Vital sources for untangling the complex relationships
of the various members of Congress include the Biographical
Directory of the United States Congress; 1774-1989, and the
Congressional Quarterly's Members of Congress Since 1789.9*

^Congress, Senate, Biographical Directory of the United
States Congress; 1774-1989 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989);
Congressional Quarterly, Members of Congress Since 1789, 3rd
ed., Ed. Mary Ames Booker (Washington D. C.: Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1985.
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The methodology of this study will be to use the
primary materials produced during several different sessions
of Congress to discern what prompted members to vote for a
larger or smaller Army.

The speeches and debates of

Congress will be the primary resource used to support
conclusions reached.

When available, roll call votes will

be subjected to a statistical breakdown in an attempt to
discover if party, section, or a combination of these
factors were important determinants in how Congressmen
voted.

Other primary and secondary sources will be used to

discover additional reasons why members voted as they did.
Each effort to change the size and composition of the Army
will be examined first by itself and then compared with
other efforts to see if there was any discernable pattern
throughout the period.
The statistical method for investigating the roll call
votes in the individual sessions will be fairly simple.
Since none of the debates under study took more than four
votes to resolve, sophisticated computer analysis would not
be particularly useful.

Instead, this study will use the

votes for final passage in each House as the basis for the
statistical breakdown.

If no such vote exists a vote to

pass a bill to the other House may be used.10

Although not

all votes on an issue may be addressed, any vote which shows

10Roll call votes were not used for some final votes
because the results were not expected to be close. In such
instances votes were by voice or simply not recorded.
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a significant divergence from the vote used in the
statistical breakdown will be discussed.
The time period used in this study lends itself to a
traditional North-South division.

In the first Congress in

this study, the Sixteenth, the issue of most interest before
the two Houses was the uncompleted Missouri Compromise.

The

most important issue before the last Congress studied, the
Thirty-third, was the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

Throughout this

period the slavery issue raised tensions in Congress on many
occasions and it is possible that these tensions may have
affected the course of other issues.
Adding to a North-South view by considering a third
region, the Frontier, makes the geographic division more
useful because the unigue interests of those living on the
Frontier could cause their Congressmen to view the Army
differently than those from the East.

Using a three-region

model also improves the results from the other two sections
since the states remaining will be more homogeneous in
nature.

In this model states will be placed in their

traditional sections unless they border a territory.

States

bordering a territory will be considered Frontier states.
Since the country experienced great growth between 1821
and 1855, some states in the Frontier category would
necessarily move into the North or the South sections while
other, newer, states would take their place on the Frontier.
Appendix 2 lists which states belong to which sections
during the various years under study.

One flaw in such a

9

model is that some Representatives from non-Frontier states
might actually represent districts that had frontier
characteristics.

It is also possible to have unusually

populated districts in Frontier states that had few frontier
characteristics.

When these districts occur they will be

moved into the appropriate section.
will be affected by this concept.

One area in particular
The northern-most states

of the country (Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire) had many
characteristics of frontier states due to their proximity to
Canada.

Certain Congressional districts in these states,

especially early in the period, will often be moved to the
Frontier region.
A word also needs to be said of the parties involved in
this study.

The Democratic Party underwent much change

between 1821 and 1855 and is the only party to survive
throughout the period.

The sharp decline and eventual death

of the Federalists as a viable opposition after 1815 and the
birth of the Whigs during the 1830s were also factors
contributing to political upheaval.

Even with this

upheaval, however, it would be useful to attempt to find
similarities in the positions of the parties with regard to
the Army.
Along with the issues of section and party allegiance
there were many other issues that affected the course of the
debates on the correct size of the peace establishment of
the Army.

One recurring issue was the question of

government economy, which then, as now, was a constant

10

source of political maneuvering between the parties.
Interest in cutting the expenses associated with the Army
was highest during economic downturns, as in 1821 and 1842,
but was a concern throughout the period.

Other issues,

usually dealing with concerns over security for a portion of
the country, also had impact on the various debates.
of these were:

A few

the Black Hawk War (1832-1833), the Cherokee

removal (1832), fears over frontier security (1835-1836),
conflict with Britain over the Canadian border (1836-1838),
conflict with Mexico over Texan annexation (1835-1845), the
second Seminole War (1838-1842), post Mexican War
territorial expansion (1848-1855), and a host of other
conflicts with Indians on the plains.

The debates over the

correct size of the Army from 1821 to 1855 clearly did not
occur in a party or sectional vacuum.
The hypothesis to test in this study is fairly clear.
The author expected to see clear differentiation between the
three sections on the guestion of the appropriate size of
the Army.

The Frontier states had a clear interest in

maintaining an Army of sufficient strength to ensure order
on the sprawling Frontier.

As the Frontier grew there would

be a need for the Army to keep pace.

It would be a matter

of importance to the settler to have some recourse if
affairs with the local Indian population became unfriendly.
The Army would be available if it was not neglected.
The case for the South and North does not seem as clear
cut.

Since both regions are defined in the negative (i.e.,

11

non Frontier) it would be tempting to think they might feel
similarly towards the Army (or at least the majority of each
section old enough to be considered fully mature).

There

is, however, some evidence to suggest that the South was
more likely than the North to support a strong, professional
Army.

Such a view is stated in John Hope Franklin's

somewhat dated, but still intriguing, work The Militant
South:

1800-1861.

Franklin noted that

in the ante-bellum period, large numbers of observers,
including Southerners, made more than a passing
reference to those phases of Southern life and culture
that suggested a penchant for militancy which at times
assumed excessive proportions.il
Franklin believed that the South displayed a special love of
the military for six main reasons:

the rural Southern

environment, a high danger of Indian attack, a fear of
slaves, an old world concept of honor, and an arrogant self
satisfaction with its culture and an increasing sensitivity
towards attacks upon it.1
121
1
3 Franklin supports his first
contention by suggesting that
the growth of the South's population and the
development of its economic system did not
substantially modify the conditions of life that
prevailed from the beginning. There persisted down to
the Civil War a remarkable number of the elements of
the most rudimentary frontier existence, including long
stretches of uninhibited land, inadequate roads and
means of transportation and very few towns of
considerable size.13

11John Hope Franklin, The Militant South: 1800-1861
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), vii-viii.
12Ibid., viii-ix.
13Ibid., 20.
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Even though he did not state it explicitly, Franklin
suggested the South was, at times, more like the Frontier
than the North.
It is possible that these factors would encourage only
local military organizations and would not transfer to
national concerns.

Even if local military organizations

were important in the South, however, the interests of the
Regular Army would probably be important as well.

Franklin

agrees with such thinking by stating his belief that
Southern support for a strong Army remained solid at least
"down to the 1830's."14
Unfortunately a hypothesis supporting Franklin's
thinking about the South does not hold true.

As this study

will show, the South's interest in, and support for, the
military did not extend to increasing the Regular Army more
than the other two sections.

The South actually supported

such increases slightly less often than the North did.
The hypothesis of this paper is that there was a
tendency in the period 1821-1855 for the Frontier states to
support a strengthened Army more than the Northern or
Southern states, and that there was little difference
between North and South.

It also appears that the parties

of the period did not take opposing stands on the various
attempts to change the size and form of the Army as one
might expect.

Consistency on the topic over the entire

14ibid., 214.

13

period is problematic considering the vast changes in the
parties between 1821 and 1855.
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CHAPTER ONE
EARLY ATTEMPTS AT SIZING AN AMERICAN ARMY:
THE ARMY BEFORE 1821

Congressional oversight of the Army of the United
States had a particularly spotted record before 1789.

The

Continental Congress first authorized the muster of troops
under its own sponsorship on June 14, 1775, in an attempt to
unify the often conflicting command relationships between
the various colonial militias.

After a year's delay the

Continental Congress took the next step towards solving this
problem by creating twenty-eight uniform regiments which
were to become the mainstay of General George Washington's
Continental Army.l

This act signaled the start of

Congressional efforts to shape the size of the Army.
The Continental Congress deserves much of the blame
for the uneven performance of the Army during the
Revolution.

It waited until February 1781 to appoint a

Secretary at War and develop a War Department.2

The

creation of a War Department and Secretary was an important
step in the Congressional control of the Army and its
^-Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army
(New York: Macmillian Co., 1973), 62.
2Ibid., 48-9. The Department itself was established in
February with the appointment of Major General Benjamin
Lincoln occurring, after much political infighting, in
October. The title of the head of the department was
Secretary at War until changed to Secretary of War in 1789.
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foundation was one of the few contributions the Continental
Congress made in shaping the regular Army.
After the Revolution there was intense debate as to
whether or not an army was needed by the new country.
George Washington felt that some standing force was vital to
the security of the country.

He wrote Alexander Hamilton in

1783 that
although a large standing Army in time of peace
hath ever been considered dangerous to the
liberties of a Country, yet a few troops, under
certain circumstances, are, not only safe, but
indispensably necessary.5
Washington wanted a "regular and standing force for
garrisoning" forts and a reliable militia that could be
called out in time of war.

His final recommendation was to

employ four regiments organized much like those of the
Continental Army and totaling 2,631 men.4

In January 1784,

the Congress organized under the Articles of Confederation
authorized eighty men.5
The reasons why the United States in Congress Assembled
so sharply disagreed with the country's preeminent military
authority over the need for a standing force were not based
^Washington to Hamilton, May 2, 1784, George
Washington, The Writings of George Washington, ed. John C.
Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938),
26:374-5. Emphasis in the original.
^Ibid., 377. Washington's plan was to expand the army
in times of crisis by adding men to each company and adding
an additional flank company. Such a system would allow the
Army to expand the rank and file by nearly two thirds
without requiring any new units and few additional officers.
Washington was the first American to suggest such a concept.
5Weigley,

80.
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entirely on military matters.

Many men of high political

standing had a deep mistrust of military power because of
various abuses of civil liberties by military authorities
throughout English and American history.

As one writer

suggested, political authorities of the time were often
"fearful that liberty stood more in danger [from a standing
army] than a nation poorly defended."6

Frightened of the

effects that any standing army would have on newly won
rights, the founding fathers left the new nation with almost
no ready military power.
The political situation of the 1780's did not favor the
creation of a standing army in part because the government
of the Articles of Confederation had few strong central
powers.

Even when the Congress, concerned over conflicts

with Indians on the frontiers, passed an act in 1784 raising
the 1st American Regiment, only the area directly threatened
filled its guota.7

This inability to field an effective

regiment was just one example of the weakness of the
government, a weakness which would soon lead to a new
constitution and a new Congress.
On August 7, 1789, the newly seated First Congress
passed an act establishing "an Executive Department, to be

6Rodger J. Spiller, "Calhoun's Expansible Army: The
History of a Military Idea," The South Atlantic Quarterly 79
(Spring, 1980): 193 .
7Weigley, 82.
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denominated the Department of War."®

Within two months the

remaining men raised under the Articles of Confederation had
become the foundation of the First Infantry Regiment.
Congress had quickly moved to create a new standing army and
it was not long before these regulars were tested and found
wanting.

General Josiah Harmer led the First Regiment, and

militia from Kentucky and Pennsylvania, against the Miami
and Kickapoo tribes in 1790.

His defeat convinced the

Congress to establish a second infantry regiment.
The debate to raise a second regiment led to little
discussion and the bill passed easily, indicating that the
Congress would willingly look to Federal power in times of
crises.

Unfortunately for the Army the use of the newly

created Second Regiment was to prove as disastrous as the
prior use of the First.

General Authur St. Clair led an

insufficiently trained Second Regiment, and more Kentucky
militiamen, into a serious defeat at the hands of the
Northwest Indians in November 1791.

It was the second

defeat for American arms and when the details of the debacle
became known in Congress it led to the first real debate
over American defense policy.
The debate to increase the Army in 1792 revolved around
the central defense question of Washington's administration:*
^Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress
of the United States, 18 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales &
Seaton, 1789-1824), 1st Cong., Vol. 2, 1589. Hereafter
cited as Debates. For an excellent overview of the early
United States Army see, Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword:
The Federalists and the Creation of the Military
Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press,
1975) .
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was a standing Army needed to deal with the Indian problem
of the Northwest or could militia and volunteers be trusted
with the defense of the region?

One unnamed House member

used an argument that would reappear whenever the subject
was discussed in future Congresses by stating:
Every man who has seen militia in the field,
cannot but know that a very trifling disaster or a
slight cause of discontent is sufficient to make
them disband.9
Many Congressmen apparently believed that there was some
validity to this charge and the majority of the speeches
favored at least some additional regular regiments to
augment the militia.

When passed, the 1792 act "for making

further and more effectual provisions for the protection of
the Frontiers of the United States" authorized the
completion of the current artillery battalion, the raising
of three additional infantry regiments, and the creation of
a troop (roughly a battalion) of light dragoons (mounted
infantry).10

Since all the new regiments were to consist of

three battalions, the effect of the act was to nearly treble
the size of the military establishment of the country.
An important characteristic of the 1792 debate was that
the New England states were not in favor of the increase.11
^Debates, 2nd Cong., 347.
10Ibid., 1343. For the Senate Journal debate see
Claussen, Senate,Washington, 4:168. Richard Peters and
George Minot, eds., United States Statutes at Large 10 vols.
(Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1846-1861),
1:241. Hereafter cited as Statutes at Large.
11Theodore J. Crackel, Mr Jefferson's Army: The
Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment,
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The main reasons for this was that New England was the
section least affected by Indian difficulties at that time
and that New England had a stronger militia tradition.

Both

reasons help explain why the section might not feel the need
to upgrade the standing army.
The force provided by the 1792 increase, and a corps of
artillery and engineers voted for in 1794, was the basis for
the Legion that General "Mad Anthony" Wayne used to defeat
the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in August 1794.
The Regular Army, increased and strengthened by Congress,
had won its first victory.
During the administration of John Adams the Army was
viewed differently than it had been previously.

The French

war scare of 1797-1799 caused the Congress to see the Army's
main function as a defense against external enemies.

The

most important measures passed during these years gave the
President the authority to raise a provisional army of an
additional twelve regiments in 1798 and a further 29
regiments in 1799.12

These proposed increases in the size

of the Army did not reassure President Adams and his allies
in Congress, however.

Many Congressmen, including a great

number of Federalists, were becoming uncomfortable with the*
l
1801-1809 (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 10.
For an excellent view of the party and sectional breakdown
on this issue see Elbert Sam Baker, "Congress and Early
Federalist Military Policy: An Examination of Defense
Related Roll Calls in the Second United States Congress,
1792-1793" (M.A. thesis, University of North Dakota, 1992).
l2Pebates, 5th Cong., 1st sess., 3729, 3934; Statues at
Large, 1:568, 725.
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proposed increases to the Army.33

If all the authorizations

had been carried out the Army would have contained a
staggering 46 regiments totaling nearly 40,000 men.
President Adams took a firm stand against what he saw as an
unnecessary increase and refused to implement many of the
proposals passed by Congress.

The Federalists had split

over how far to expand the Army.
During the early part of the Jefferson Administration
the emphasis once again shifted back towards relying on the
militia as the primary means of defense.

A relaxation of

tensions towards France and Democratic-Republican control of
the Seventh Congress, a shift towards a party traditionally
mistrustful of centralized power, combined to permit Thomas
Jefferson to reduce the army in 1802.

Because most of the

authorized increases of 1798 and 1799 had not been carried
out the Army had grown only to 4,051 men in seven regiments
by 1801.I4

President Jefferson thought seven regiments were

still too many, and with little reason to fear external
invasion Congress quickly agreed.

The Army was therefore

reduced to just three regiments; two of infantry and one of
artillery.

Most of the Federalists, now out of power,

agreed with the reduction, and some, after years of trying
to increase the number of the higher ranks, even tried to
eliminate the one brigadier general who was left to the1
*
3

13Crackel, 30.
^Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 13.
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Army.

The sentiment for reducing the Army was so

overwhelming that the voting pattern showed little
differentiation between the section or party.
For several years after 1802 the strength of the Army
fluctuated little.

An attempt to increase the Army seemed

only natural, however, after the 1807 Chesapeake-Leopard
affair and the Embargo Act shortly thereafter had increased
tensions with the England and France.

The arguments during

the 1808 debate were similar to those in 1798 because of the
urgency of strengthening an Army understood to be too weak
for fighting a war. The few Congressmen who disliked the
bill did not take their position because of what the bill
contained but objected to it because they thought war
unlikely.

The bill passed easily and the resulting act "to

Raise for a Limited Time an Additional Military Force"
ensured that the country would have an additional five
regiments of infantry and one each of riflemen and light
dragoons for at least five years.15

Once again the threat

of war had trebled the army.
The most interesting aspect of the 1808 Army increase
was that the Democratic-Republicans had changed their
position on the necessity of having a large standing army.
This change was the opposite of the one undertaken by the
Federalists between 1799 and 1802.

Distrustful from the

beginning of the anti-republican attitudes an Army was
supposed, to foster, the Democratic-Republicans became much
15Pebates, 10th Cong., 1st sess., 2849 .
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less fearful of the institution once in power.

One

important reason for the change was that the President
controlled which officers served and Jefferson could ensure
that the new officers would pose no threat to the party.16
An abandonment of a principle of this sort can not fail to
change a party, however.

The historian Henry Adams

suggested that the party had "found itself poorer by the
loss of one more traditional principle" when it began to
back a larger, federally controlled, force.17
The War of 1812 necessitated large increases in the
size of the Army.

In 1811, certain that war with England

was near, Congress voted for 30,000 volunteers and a regular
army of nearly 25,000 men.

When completed, the Army would

be expanded from 10 to 24 regiments of various kinds.

Early

in the war Congress authorized the strength of the existing
regiments to be increased by 25 percent and created an
additional eight regiments.

These increases were generally

passed by a proportion of three to one, though several of
them carried by smaller percentages than the peacetime
increase of 1808.1
18
*
6

Overall the increases of 1798-99, 1808,

and 1811-14 showed that a large majority in Congress would

16Crackel, 160.
l^Henry Adams, History of the United States During the
Second Administration of Thomas Jefferson, 2 vols. (New
York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1890), 2:218; quoted in
Crackel, 2.
18Pebates, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 2229. Congress
increased the Regular Army by a further nineteen regiments
in January 1813 and by four more in March 1814.
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support an increase to the Regular Army if it appeared the
country was in danger of going to war.
After the War of 1812 was concluded the Congress was
faced with a difficult problem.

It had increased the Army

to a bewildering array of 48 infantry and rifle regiments
with many other types of formations as well.

Obviously a

cut had to be made but it was unclear how it should be done.
Three days after President James Madison submitted the
Treaty of Ghent to the Senate for its advice and consent, he
asked the Congress to provide for "an adeguate regular
force" without making any deep cuts in the Army.19

The

President, worried about problems which might arise with
Great Britain or Spain, directed his Secretary of War to ask
the Senate for the retention of at least 20,000 troops.20
The Senate, agreeing with the President, wanted the Army set
at 15,000 men.

The House, less concerned over the threat of

foreign intervention, wanted the Army reduced to only 6,000
men, its prewar strength.1
21
*
9

The hurried nature of the 1815

19Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study
of Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1973), 66.
2(1James Monroe, A Message to the Military Affairs
Committee, in The Writings of James Monroe, ed. Stanislaus
Murray Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York: AMS Press, 1969), 5:324.
2 J-Debates, 13th Cong., 3rd sess. , 287, 1266; Statutes
at Large, 3:224. For the House Journal debate see Martin P.
Claussen, ed. The Congressional Journals of the United
States, 9 vols. The Journal of the House, James Madison
Administration (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier Inc.,
1977), 9:787. For the Senate Journal debate see Martin P.
Claussen, ed. The Congressional Journals of the United
States, 9 vols. The Journal of the Senate, James Madison
Administration (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier Inc.,
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decrease did not allow for a calm reflection of how the
country's peacetime military establishment should be shaped.
Such a debate would not occur until 1821.
The voting on the 1815 reduction provided one
unexpected fact; every Southern Federalist voted for it.22
This trend is especially intriguing since the Northern
Federalists voted in much the same way as the rival
Democrat-Republicans.

Southern Federalists had previously

been amongst the most reliable of the strong government men
in Congress.

A complete acceptance of the reduction of the

Army by this group may be an indicator that the First party
system was undergoing change, if not strain, by 1815.
The relationship between Congress and the Army was an
uneven one before 1821.

On several occasions Congress voted

for far fewer men than the leaders of the Army thought
appropriate.

If the Congress showed that it was willing to

increase the Army in times of crisis (1798-99, 1808, and
1811-14), it also showed that when the crisis had passed
reduction would occur (1784, 1802, and 1815).
How the parties viewed modifications in the size of the
Army underwent significant changes in the period.

Before

1808 the Democratic-Republicans were distrustful of almost2
1977) , 8:531. The final form of the act provided for the
President to determine which types of regiments would be
most needed by the country. Eventually ten regiments (eight
infantry, one artillery and one light artillery) were formed
by merging all of the current regiments into new formations.
22James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists:
18001816 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana States University Press,
1978)
, 187.
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any standing force.

As soon as they faced their first

crisis in power, however, they rapidly moved to expand the
Army.

The Federalist support for a standing force also

became less strident after they lost power in 1800.

It is

difficult to imagine the Federalists happily reducing the
Army in 1802 if they had still controlled officer
appointments.

The best description of party attitudes in

the period is that the Democratic-Republicans favored a
larger standing army less than the Federalists, but that
both parties were more willing to increase the Army when
they controlled the government than when their opponents
controlled the government..
Among the sections only New England showed any
sustained difference from the national norm regarding the
Army.

First in 1792 and later in 1815 the section was on

the side wanting fewer troops.

In other years, however, the

region displayed little difference from the rest of the
country.
The period before 1821 saw few firm trends concerning
the differing attitudes towards the Army in the disparate
sections and parties.

Trends were rare partly because the

atmosphere of crisis which usually prevailed when the
debates occurred and partly because attitudes about the Army
were rarely considered a test of party or sectional loyalty.
Discussions about the Peace Establishment during times of
increasing party regularity and sectional tension could show
a different type of result.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS:
JOHN C. CALHOUN'S EXPANSIBLE ARMY PLAN AND ARMY REDUCTION

Any discussion of the Sixteenth Congress must quickly
recognize that the early 1820s was a time of change in
American politics.

The First American Party System

completed a slow breakup during the period.

What was taking

its place was what one historian called the "personal
politics of the early 1820s."1
The Federalist Party, having last held either House of
Congress or the Presidency in 1801, had gone two decades
with little influence in national politics.

The breakdown

of the Federalist Party was a slow process, however.

Until

1818 the party usually retained a quarter of the seats in
the House.

After the election that year Federalist strength

dropped sharply, from 65 members to a meager 27, just 15
percent of the House.2

Many writers have linked the demise

of the Federalists with their activities at Hartford in
1815, but one historian has made the case that the*
2
^-Norman K. Risjord, The Old Republicans:
Conservatism in the Age of Jackson (New York:
University Press, 1965), 229.

Southern
Columbia

2Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States. 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975),
2 :1084.
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"Federalist party in the South was not crushed by popular
revulsion against the Hartford Convention" but instead
gradually disappeared through "the voluntary decision of its
leaders."3

He further suggested that Federalists did quite

well in local elections in many places in the South in 1816
and 1817, partly because national issues were no longer of
overriding importance.4

The Federalists then were a party

in decline by 1821, failing to even run a national candidate
against Monroe in 1820, but it was also a party that
maintained a semblance of national stature.5
The Democratic Party was also undergoing change during
the Sixteenth Congress.6

Throughout the 1820s the

discipline and organization of the party declined due to the
loss of cohesion of the Federalists.7

The Democrats were,

in some ways, more a collection of interests than a unified
party by 1821 and without the threat of a strong rival
regularity decreased.

One faction of the party in

particular, the Old Republicans, acted largely independently
of the rest of the party.
3James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists;
18001816 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978),
177.
4Ibid., 175.
5Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party
System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 324.
6For the sake of brevity the Democratic-Republicans
will be called Democrats throughout this chapter even though
the former name is more accurate.
7Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties: Their
Natural History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 98.
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The Old Republicans were essentially what their name
implied, men who agreed with the earliest republican views,
namely that federal contributions to public life were
undesirable.

Numbering about thirty members in the House,

and with several influential allies in the Senate, these men
wanted to keep Congress and the federal government from
becoming more influential in American political life.89
0
1

All

the members of the group were Southern and they are often
seen as the link between the Anti-Federalists of 1788 and
the States Rights Democrats of the Jacksonian era.9

Though

small in number their cohesion allowed them to wield a
disproportionate amount of influence in a time when party
unity was on the decline.
Another key to the decline of the First American Party
System was the large turnover of Representatives in the late
teens and early twenties.

Of the 185 members of the

Fifteenth Congress, 126 (68 percent) were new members.
Turnover for the Sixteenth Congress, while not as high, was
also large.

Such turnover, in a time of lessening party

loyalties, could cause greater swings on issues in Congress
than might normally occur.
The political background of the Sixteenth Congress and
a lessening of party regularity with a great number of new
members, made policy changes likely.
8Risjord, 9.
9 Ibid., 1.
10Ibid., 182-83.

As one historian
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described the period, the "War Department and the militaryestablishment as a whole were caught up in the political
activities which inaugurated the Second American Party
S y s t e m . L u c k i l y for the Army it had its finest Secretary
of War, to date, during this time of change.
In 1817 John C. Calhoun, a young "War Hawk" Congressman
from South Carolina, took over a War Department that was "in
utter chaos."!2

Calhoun, who had first attracted attention

to himself for his nationalistic views during the War of
1812, had to deal with the reputation of the War Department
as a post held mostly by second rate men.

Presented with

this situation Calhoun "took up his duties with a zeal that
rarely had been seen in his predecessors."!2

Most of

Calhoun's policies were aimed at making the Army a strong,
professional force.

Calhoun expected that a third war with

England would break out over the Northwest frontier and he
wanted the Army better prepared than it had been in 1812.
To help ensure the Army would perform better, Calhoun
guickly settled many of the administrative problems plaguing*
l

URodger J. Spiller, "John C. Calhoun as Secretary of
War, 1817-1825" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University,
1977), 245.
l2Gerald M. Capers, John C. Calhoun-Opportunist: A
Reappraisal (Gainsville: University of Florida Press,
1960), 62.
l3Rodger J. Spiller, "Calhoun's Expansible Army: The
History of a Military Idea," The South Atlantic Quarterly 79
(Spring, 1980) : 193.
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the service and by 1818 had fought for, and won, a
reorganization of the Army staff.14
Because of his expectation of another confrontation
with Britain, Calhoun's early plans called for the majority
of the Army to be based in strong fortifications in the
Northwest and on the trans-Mississippi frontier, with small
garrisons in the forts of the rest of the country.15
Calhoun felt that it was also strategically important to
have fewer garrisons, which would allow for greater strength
and flexibility at key points along the frontier.

He

thought that it would be possible to use the waterways of
the region to speed troops to troubled areas, thereby
allowing the Army more flexibility in dealing with problems
on the Frontier.
For his ideas to work, Calhoun needed an Army
numerically strong enough to garrison the coast line and man
the larger Frontier forts.

Although having a paper strength

of over 12,000, the Army could count only 8,446 men in its
ranks in 1817.

The reasons for this shortfall were complex

and ranged from poor recruiting to desertion due to the
terrible living conditions soldiers had to endure.

Calhoun

was concerned about the shortfall of men, and it probably
did little for Calhoun's equanimity to have attempts to
14Spiller, "Secretary", x; Warren W. Hassler, With
Sword and Shield: American Military Affairs: Colonial
Times to the Present (Ames, Iowa University Press, 1982),
109-10.
15Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist,
1782-1828 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1944), 166; Capers,
64 .

31

reduce his department brought forward "almost every time
Congress met."16

Unfortunately for Calhoun, such attempts

were to be repeated until they were successful.
On March 4, 1817, the newly elected James Monroe gave
his first inaugural address to the nation.

In it he

proclaimed
Our land and naval forces should be moderate, but
adeguate to the necessary purposes--the former to
garrison and preserve our fortifications and to meet
the first invasions of a foreign foe, and, while
constituting the elements of a greater force, to
preserve the science as well as the necessary
implements of war in a state to be brought into
activity in the event of war.17
Monroe thought the need for a standing army above debate and
that such a force should be used both as a training force
and as a ready reserve to be employed until the superior
weight and resolve of the militia could be brought into play
after an invasion.

The first point seems to have enjoyed

surprising agreement by the end of the War of 1812.
Throughout the arduous battles trying to reduce the army
during Monroe's administration no member of Congress
seriously suggested that the nation did not need a standing
army.

The "old style of republican hostility to any army

had passed away" and in its place sprang an argument perhaps

16Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study
of Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis, The
University of Minnesota Press, 1973), 77-78.
17James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 20 vols. (New York:
Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1897), 2:576.

32

even tougher to settle; what would land forces "moderate,
but adequate to the necessary purposes" look like?18*
Even though the Peace Establishment of 1815 had cut
Army strength from a war-time high of over 33,000 to just
over 10,000, it had not approached the 1812 figure of 6,686.
Throughout the first two years of the Monroe administration
several bills were introduced to further reduce the Army.
In 1817 Jeremiah Mason, a Democrat from New Hampshire, spoke
for a reduction of the Army by suggesting that "in modern
warfare, national wealth is essentially national
strength."10

Mason wanted spending on the Army cut to avoid

strain upon the Treasury.

Most of the attempts to cut the

size of the Army during this time were linked to this cause.
Another effort to trim the size of the Army was
undertaken in April 1818.

Lewis Williams, a Democrat/Old

Republican from North Carolina, introduced a motion
directing the House Military Affairs Committee to inquire
into the expediency of reducing the Army.

Williams, a long

standing Army critic, tabled his own motion later in the
session because he thought cutting the Army to be
unrealistic during the First Seminole War, then going on in
Florida.20

Throughout 1818 and 1819 attempts to reduce the

18Spiller, "Expansible", 202.
10Spiller, "Secretary", 5.
20Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress
of the United States, 18 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales &
Seaton, 1789-1824), 15th Cong., 1st sess., 1766; 2nd sess.,
399, hereafter cited as Debates. Michael Stuart Fitzgerald,
"Europe and the United States Defense Establishment:
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Army continued to flounder on the same objection.

The Army

was fighting an undeclared but exhausting war in Florida,
against a clever and elusive enemy.21

Even the most

virulent critic of the Army realized that a reduction during
such a time was unlikely if not altogether undesirable.
Many Congressmen had another reason why they thought a
reduction in government expenditures would soon be
desirable.

In 1817 Congress had removed an internal tax

that had originally been raised to help pay for the War of
1812 and some Congressmen were eager to cut government
spending, even if revenues had not yet started to fall much.
By 1819 the manufacturing slowdown which had began in 1818
could be felt throughout the economy.

The Panic of 1819, at

its height as the Sixteenth Congress first convened,
occurred in large part due to overspeculation in Western
lands and the tightening of credit at the Bank of the United
States.

As the amount of money entering the treasury began

to drop sharply, more Congressmen began to worry about the
growing deficit.

Calhoun, in a rare lapse of political

judgement, thought that the War Department could ride out
any loss of treasury receipts, in part because he seriously
misjudged the drop in revenues.

He wrote a former

Congressional colleague that "many who are calculating on
our monied embarrassment [in 1821] will be disappointed."222
1
American Military Policy and Strategy, 1815-1821" (Ph. D.
diss., Purdue University, 1990), 273.
21 Risjord,

193.
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Any rumblings being heard to the contrary Calhoun marked off
as simply being the "murmers [sic] of the factions."23

When

he finally realized the depth of the problem he would
already be on the defensive about using the Army as a source
of cutting costs.
Treasury Secretary William H. Crawford disagreed with
Calhoun's estimate of the state of the nation's finances.2^
His treasury report of December 1820 (for the year 1821)
forecast a deficit of 4.8 million dollars on just over 21
million in expenditures.25

He thought that the problem was

severe enough to reguire either cutting the budget or
raising new loans to cover the deficit.

Since loans were an

anathema to American politicians at the time, and since
Crawford had Presidential aspirations, it is not surprising
that the Treasury Secretary was not favorable to the latter
course.

Crawford understood that a 10,000 man Army, the

largest peacetime army in the country's history, was the
perfect place to begin reduction efforts; there were many in
Congress who agreed.
22Calhoun to Samuel D. Ingrahm, November 6, 1820, John
C. Calhoun, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, eds. Robert L.
Merriwether, et al., 20 vols. to date (Columbia: University
of South Carolina Press, 1959-), 5:425-26.
23Ibid., 426.
2^Crawford had been Secretary of War from August 1815
to October 1816, immediately preceding Calhoun.
25Congress, American State Papers, Class XI, Finance,
(Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 1832-1861), 620.
C. Edward Skeen, "Calhoun, Crawford, and the Politics of
Retrenchment," South Carolina Historical Magazine 72 (May
1972): 146.
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To complicate the dynamics of the coming Congressional
debate a strong political motive was mixed with these
economic considerations.

In 1821 the traditional path to

the Presidency was through the Executive branch, in part
because a display of strong executive skills was thought
necessary to stand for the office.

Every President after

John Adams had served as Secretary of State before becoming
President.

Both Crawford and Calhoun thought of themselves

as potential candidates for the office by 1821 and each
thought that efficient administration of their departments
would allow them to contend with John Quincy Adams (Monroe's
Secretary of State) for the honor.26
Both Calhoun and Crawford understood that the reduction
attempt was an important issue.

Michael Fitzgerald has

written that Crawford was aligned with the Kentucky Whig
Henry Clay in an effort to form a majority against Calhoun
and the Army, using the southern Old Republicans as a
base.*
27

Charles Francis Adams (the son of John Quincy Adams

and editor of his memoirs) suggested that it was "a
coalition of all partisans of Mr. Crawford, of DeWitt
Clinton [Governor on New York], and Mr. Clay" which joined
to undermine Calhoun.2^

To make matters more difficult for

2 6Wiltse, 209-210.
27Fitzgerald, 330; Wiltse, 210. Most, but not all,
Old Republicans tended to be supportive of Crawford. Eldred
Simkins, who represented Calhoun's old seat, stayed loyal to
him while Hugh Nelson, of Virginia, was a close friend of
Monroe's and often represented his interests in the House.
See Risjord, 196.
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Calhoun, President Monroe took a neutral position on the
subject publicly, even though there is considerable evidence
that he did not support a general reduction of the Army.29
It was therefore a powerful coalition that lined up
against Calhoun and the Army in 1820.

Southern friends of

Crawford were showing "a spiteful spirit towards the War
Department almost constantly," hoping to reduce Calhoun's
popularity by putting him in the position of supporting a
large Army.*
30
9
2

At the same time many Northern Congressmen

were supporting reduction efforts from a genuine concern for
the solvency of the government.313
2 Calhoun and the Army were
increasingly isolated politically as the year moved on.
On December 28, 1819, Lewis Williams, the Representative
who had repeatedly urged Army reduction in the Fifteenth
Congress, gained the House floor and pushed through a motion
to have the Secretary of War
report to the House the aggregate amount of the
military peace establishment of the United States
actually in service for each and every year since the
year 1815, distinguishing between the number of
officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and the
number of privates.33
Though mild-sounding, this motion was the beginning of the
effort to reduce the Army in the Sixteenth Congress.
23Skeen, 149n.
29 Ibid., 142.
30Spiller, "Secretary", 256; Skeen, 142.
31Risjord, 194.
32Pebates, 16 Cong., 1st sess., 801. See also
Congress, House, House Journal. 16th Cong., 1st sess.,
Serial 30, 84. Hereafter cited as House Journal.
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For most of 1820 the effort to reduce the Army was
carried forward using various motions, documents, and
reports of the two Houses of Congress.

Just three days

after Williams had asked for his first report Calhoun sent
to the House his manpower numbers for each year from 1815 to
1819.

His report is summarized in Table l.33

TABLE 1
NUMBER OF OFFICERS, NCOS, MUSICIANS, AND PRIVATES, 1815-1819

Year

Officers

1815
1816
1817
1818
1819

638
726
640
644
641

NCOS
1,109
1,071
923
887
826

Musicians

Privates

325
356
320
306
326

7,341
7,871
6,338
5,839
6,295

Total
9,413
10,024
8,221
7,676
8,088

What Calhoun's response showed was that the number of
officers was generally steady even when the enlisted ranks
fluctuated.

Between 1815 and 1819 the total force of the

Army decreased by 14 percent while the number of officers
remained stable.

The supporters of Army reduction used this

report in an attempt to prove that the Army tended to have
too many officers.
Not all the documents coming out of Congress were
harmful to the Army's cause, however, for the Army was not
33Congress, House, Letter from the Secretary of War,
Transmitting a Report of the Aggregate Amount of the
Military Peace Establishment of the United States, 16th
Cong., 1st sess., House Document 25, Serial 32, 1.

38

without its backers.

A second document produced by the

House in January 1820 showed that the savings that Calhoun
had tried to instill in his new staff alignment were
beginning to have effect.34

The cost that the Army paid to

equip each soldier had dropped from an average of $383.60
for the years 1809 to 1811 to $336.56 in 1820.35

The

author of this report, Adjutant General Daniel Parker,
stated that due to the recent reforms it would soon be
possible to keep below the $300 per man level, or roughly
what the cost had been in 1802.
A report much more to the liking of the anti-Army
faction was House Document 107.

It showed that an

astounding 822,191 men were on the muster rolls of the
various state militias.

This horde was theoretically

assigned to 1,124 regiments, 289 brigades and 113
divisions.36

Even though the rolls were vastly out of date

(some states had not sent in returns for 15 years), and
despite the fact that the states had only a fraction of the

34Congress, House, Report of the Adjutant and Inspector
Generals; Exhibiting a Comparative View of the Army
Expenditures Before the Late War, and the Estimate
Appropriations for the Service of the Year 1820, 16th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document 53, Serial 33, passim.
35The final 1820 number in the document was $302.88.
This figure did not include some ordnance charges and
rebates that were not paid to newly recruited soldiers. The
number is therefore not totally accurate and the higher
number is used.
36Congress, House, Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting an Abstract of the Military of
the United States, 16th Cong., 1st sess., House Document
107, Serial 37, passim.
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weapons needed to arm that many men, the sheer size of the
numbers in the report seemed to suggest that cutting the
regular Army could be done safely.

It would be hard to

claim that a modest cut in the Army would be damaging to the
country's security when the republic supposedly had nearly a
million men ready to spring to its defense, though the
experience of militia in the War of 1812 gave little
indication that the militia would be useful in the defense
of the country.
Calhoun and the key officers of the Army were not
impressed with notions of a large militia or of an officer
corps that was considered too large for the Army it led.

As

early as December 1817, Major General Winfield Scott wrote
Calhoun to tell him that "the peace establishment is already
too small for the object to which it is applied or which it
is intended."37

Understanding that the Army was not going

to be increased, Scott first proposed a plan to decrease the
size of companies while increasing their number.

Scott knew

that this plan would not accomplish any reduction in the
overall size of the Army, however, and that such a plan
would not pass Congress.

In an attempt to plan the

reorganization of the Army if a cut were ordered, Scott then
proposed an alternative plan which would have reduced the
staff officers by 63 and the total force by 1,759.3^
37Major General Winfield W. Scott to Calhoun, May 10,
1817, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Record Group
107, National Archives.
33Ibid.
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For his part Calhoun seems to have readily agreed with
Scott.

He reported to Congress in 1818 that the current

strength of the army "cannot be pronounced extravagant" and
that "our present organization . . .

is probably better

adapted to the nature of our country and service than any
other."39

Unfortunately for Calhoun those favoring reducing

the Army's cost controlled the House of Representatives.
Debate on reduction occurred sporadically for several
months in early 1820, but it was unfocused, wavering between
discussions of reducing officers' pay, closing the Military
Academy, the strength of the militia, and the need to cut
the Navy as well as the Army.

On May 20, 1820, John Cocke,

a Democrat from Tennessee, offered a proposal to drastically
cut the officer corps.

The Kentucky Democrat Henry Clay

quickly tried to amend the bill to reduce the entire Army to
6,000 men.

Since the House was involved in the complex

maneuverings surrounding the Missouri question, many in
Congress had no desire to get sidetracked on the military
question at that time.

The solution was to call on Calhoun

to submit "a plan for the reduction of the Army to six
thousand officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and
privates . . . and, also what savings of the public revenue
will be produced by such an arrangement of the Army."40

-^congress, American State Papers, Class V, Military
Affairs, 7 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 18321861), 1:779.
40pebates, 16th Cong., 1st sess. , 2233.
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With Clay's deft maneuvering the motion passed 63 to 59 and
the House retreated back into the Missouri debate.41
Throughout the summer and fall of 1820 Calhoun
struggled to bring together a plan that would meet the
directives of the House, but which would not unduly hurt the
Army.

It was a daunting task.

There is some evidence that

Calhoun knew the general outline of what he was to propose
soon after Congress asked him for the plan.*
42* He then spent
much of the summer asking the senior commanders of the Army
their opinions.

What emerged from these discussions was a

surprising consensus from the nation's military leaders on
how the Army should be reduced if such an option could not
be avoided.
The first officer to report to Calhoun, Brigadier
General Edmund P. Gaines, showed a stunning lack of
political acumen by suggesting an increase of the Army by
several regiments--up to 3500 men.

When he finally

addressed reducing the Army he suggested that any reduction
"should be confined exclusively to the rank and file."4^

To

accomplish the necessary reduction by this method Gaines

4-*-Ibid. Unfortunately the roll call for this key vote
was not recorded.
42Wiltse, 224. The principles of the broad outline of
the plan he was to submit had been with Calhoun since the
1815 Congressional debate on the proper size of the peace
establishment.
43Edmund P. Gaines to Calhoun, July 27, 1820, Calhoun,
Papers. 5:293-96.
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proposed reducing the companies to forty-seven NCOs and men,
a cut of over a third.44
Major General Andrew Jackson, commander of the Southern
division, proposed a slightly different plan.

Jackson

thought it important that any cuts to the Army be such that
they could be quickly restored.

His plan called for a

reduction of the Army to 374 line officers and 6,040 men.
The force would be flexible, however, since "the body

. . .

may be filled up or reduced as the exigencies of the case
may require."45

in the event of war Jackson felt confident

that the service could quickly be filled out to 580 officers
and 11,350 men in the line, greater than the authorized
strength of the Army in 1820.

Although willing to cut some

line officers, Jackson, like Gaines, was adamantly opposed
to cutting any of the staff or senior officers.
The commander of the Northern division, Major General
Jacob Brown, also wanted to keep the number of officers from
being cut.

He explained to Calhoun that the "military

experience [of officers] is too laborious and tedious of
acquisition to be sacrificed [sic] without urgent
necessity."46

General Scott concurred with this view by*
6
4

44see Appendix 3 for a list of company strength from
1785 to 1855.
^S^ndrew Jackson to Calhoun, August 9, 1820, Ibid.,
5:317-19.
46Jacob Brown to Calhoun, October 6, 1820, Ibid.,
5:328 .
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stating in his report that "the parts the least useful [to
the Army] should be sacrificed to those more so."47
The only officer to view the reduction much differently
than his peers was the Quartermaster General, Thomas Jesup,
who felt that the line companies were poorly organized and
contained to many officers, especially in the artillery
corps.

He wanted to streamline the structure of each

company to ensure that they could be rapidly expanded in
size at the start of any future conflict.

He assumed that a

6.000 man Army, properly constructed, could guickly grow to
24.000 if the need arose.48
All of the officers polled by Calhoun for their views
on reduction thought that it would be harmful to the Army.
There was a consensus, however, that if reduction had to
occur the best place to reduce would be the rank and file.
Calhoun used these views, and his own, when delivering his
final report to Congress.
Calhoun's reply to the House motion of May 20, 1820,
was delivered to Congress on December 12, 1820.

It was,

perhaps, his most important paper while Secretary of War.
Historians have generally had deep respect for the plan, one
calling it a "brilliant conception, logically thought out,"

47Scott to Calhoun, August 20, 1820, Letters Received
by the Secretary of War, Records Group 107, National
Archives.
48Thomas S. Jesup to Calhoun, December 1, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:464.

44

while a second referred to it as "a somewhat remarkable
document, well ahead of its time."49
At the start of his paper Calhoun stated that no one,
not even its fiercest critics, wanted the Army done away
with.

Calhoun felt this to be true because although the

militia was "the great national force," it needed the help
of a regular army in some areas, especially the ability "to
create and perpetuate military skill and experience."4
505
9
1
Calhoun identified three things that had to be done if the
Regular Army was to act as a repository of military
knowledge.

First, the staff must be fully formed and in

place at all times;

second, the line should be formed so

that it could be guickly augmented to meet any threat
without relying on the creation of new regiments; and
finally the army must make every effort to keep men of
"adeguate talents and respectability" to lead the
formations.51

By this last statement Calhoun hoped to

convince Congress to keep the Army's two Major Generals and
four Brigadier Generals, even though the force he was
requesting did not call for that many General officers.
49Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The
United States Army on the Frontier. 1783-1846 (Toronto: The
Macmillian Company, 1969), 153; Oliver Lyman Spaulding, The
United Stats Army in War and Peace (New York: G. P. Putanm's
Sons, 1974), 152-3.
50John C. Calhoun, The Works of John C. Calhoun, Ed.
Richard K. Cralle. 6 vols.
(New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1856), 5:82. The plan is also located in Congress,
House, Plan for the Reduction of the Army, 16th Cong., 1st
sess., House Document 21, Serial 47.
51Calhoun, Works, 5:85.
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In his proposal to reduce the line the Secretary of War
had but one constant; the number of officers must not be
reduced.

"No position," Calhoun wrote,

connected with the organization of the peace
establishment is susceptible of being more rigidly
proved, than that the proportion of its officers to the
rank and file ought to be greater than in a war
establishment.52*
To achieve the desired reduction with his plan Calhoun would
have to cut the rank and file sharply.

His plan was to

retain all nine infantry regiments (eight line and one
rifle), and keep them at ten companies each.

He wanted to

reorganize the artillery into five battalions, removing the
distinction between the light artillery and other units.

By

advocating companies of just 64 enlisted for the artillery
regiments and 37 for the infantry he could keep all 130
companies and still be close to the House request of 6,000
(the final total in Calhoun's plan called for 6,391 rank and
file).53

Calhoun's plan would allow the rapid expansion of

the Army to over 11,500 men by simply filling out the
"skeletal" regiments and to over 19,000 with the addition of
just 258 junior officers in new regiments led by experienced
senior officers released from other duties.

52Ibid., 5:90.
52congress, House, Letter from the Secretary of War,
Enclosing a Statement of the Organization of the Army, 16th
Cong., 2nd sess., House Document 31, Serial 48, 7. The
total in the Calhoun plan does not match the total number of
men in the regiments due to personnel assigned to nonregimental duty. Company strengths for the different
regiments are listed in Appendix 3.
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While the idea of an expansible army had been discussed
for years, and had been suggested by many of the Army's
senior officers, Calhoun was the first to propose it
officially.

His closing statement made clear his feelings

about the utility of the plan:
By no propriety of language, can that arrangement be
called economical, which, in order that our military
establishment in peace should be rather less expensive,
would regardless of the purposes for which it ought to
be maintained, render it unfit to meet the dangers
incident to a state of war.54
The reaction towards Calhoun's plan was decidedly
mixed.

The senior line officers of the Army--no doubt

influenced by the thought that the plan did not reduce their
numbers, and that if Congress decided to act differently it
would be Calhoun selecting those who would be demoted or
released— were supportive.

Colonel Henry Atkinson wrote to

Colonel Thomas S. Jessup that even though he thought there
might be a small chance for a reduction it probably would
not occur because Generals Jackson and Brown both had
support in Congress from different regions (Jackson in the
South and West and Brown in the North and East), and any
reduction of the Army would force the reduction of the staff
to one Major General.55
The two generals to whom Atkinson referred liked
Calhoun's efforts.

After seeing the report Jacob Brown

said, "The report is what it should be— more I cannot say in
54Ibid., 93.
55Henry Atkinson to Thomas S. Jesup, December 27, 1820,
Calhoun, Papers. 5:516.
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its favor."56

Andrew Jackson wrote Calhoun that "it [the

plan] is calculated for peace.
on in war."57

It is a good basis to build

As has been shown, neither general was in

favor of any reduction in the Army but both suspected that
the tenor of the Congress was running against them.

Brown,

in particular, thought the Army was being unfairly
criticized by Congress, calling those who proposed reduction
as being "save six pence and spend pound gentlemen."58

As a

whole, the entire senior staff of the Army felt the same
way.
Unlike the Army, the nation's press took widely
diverging views on the Army reduction in late 1820.

The

National Intelligencer called the Army reduction issue "one
of great vital importance to the honor, to the independence,
and to the safety of the Republic."59

On November 11,

1820, the paper published an editorial pointing out that
although the shortfall in revenues was going to be less than
expected in 1821, it was still going to be high enough that
some action would have to be taken.

The editor thought that

it would be foolhardy to divest "the nation of its military
or naval armour" or to arrest construction of "its permanent

56Brown to Calhoun, December 29, 1820, Calhoun, Papers,
5:519.
57Jackson to Calhoun, January 4, 1821, Calhoun, Papers,
5:528.
58Brown to Calhoun, December 29, 1820, Calhoun, Papers,
5:519.
59National Intelligencer, January 18, 1821.
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works of defense."6°

He suggested that a revival of the

internal tax abolished in 1817 would be an excellent way to
overcome the looming shortfall.

A reestablishment of such a

tax was unlikely even to be discussed seriously in Congress,
however, due to the great distaste most Americans of the
period had for any tax directly levied by the government.
The Federalist leaning New York Post surprisingly
published several letters that were hostile to the Army
during the first few months of 1821.

One, signed by

Farrell, claimed that Calhoun's proposed Army was worth only
the command of a single brigadier and not the assortment of
generals favored by the Secretary of War.

The writer urged

deep reduction of the staffs and little severance pay to
those officers released.®1
The Richmond Enquirer took a moderate view of
reduction.

The editorial position of the paper was that

"the most efficient and only proper peace establishment of
the United States is that which employs the least force."
The editors wanted an "army of instruction for the militia,"
since the militia was the bulwark of American defense.^2
The editors then declared that such an army was what the
country already possessed in 1820.

They suggested that "the

numerical strength of the army is in conformity to the duty
we assign to it.

Our institutions would forbid it to be6
2
*
0

60Ibid., November 11, 1820.
61-New York Post. January 18, 1821.
62Richmond Enquirer, November 24, 1820.
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greater; our necessities prevent it from being less."63

jn

essence the editors of the paper agreed with many of the
pro-reduction arguments while being against reducing the
Army.

The Editors of the Enquirer did not hold the Army to

be sacred, however.

In a later editorial they stated that

although "the numerical strength of the army [was]
inadequate to the national necessities," by "judicious
management its numbers might even bear reduction and the
nation be equally well served."64

The policy of the

Richmond Enquirer was, therefore, pulled equally by concerns
of national defense and fiscal responsibility.
The National Gazette and Literary Register
(Philadelphia) supported those in favor of a strong Army.
Echoing the National Intelligencer, it declared that an
internal tax would keepthe Army strong and reduce the risk
of war.

The editors of the paper wrote that a defensive

attitude was

needed for the country and that the main

ingredient of such an attitude was the retention of a strong
military establishment.

They feared the destruction of the

Army would be more serious than any short term financial
difficulties.65

By ^he end of 1820, however, the editors

realized that the tide of opinion in Congress had turned and
that some reduction was inevitable.

In an editorial in late6
*
4
3

63Ibid.
64lbid., December 7, 1821.
65National Gazette and Literary Register, November 13,
1820.
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December they urged that the staff changes that Calhoun had
implemented in 1818 be given a chance to work.

They also

pointed out that any savings gained by reducing the officer
corps would be small when compared to the larger cuts that
could be wrung from the rank and file.66

The National

Gazette closely supported the policies of the Secretary of
War on the Army reduction issue.
Public opinion on the reduction was therefore mixed,
it alone would not be a decisive influence upon Congress.
From the very start of the Sixteenth Congress those
members who wished to prevent Army reduction were on the
defensive.

After a messy and drawn out fight, revolving

more around factional control than any other issue, the
House elected New York Democrat John W. Taylor over South
Carolina Democrat William Lowndes to be its Speaker.

This

was unfortunate for both the Army and Calhoun, since Taylor
was a Crawford supporter and favored reduction, while
Lowndes took a pro-Army position and was a close friend of
Calhoun.67
Taylor's election as Speaker was important to the
reduction debate because as Speaker he controlled committee
assignments.

His appointments to the seven member House

Committee on Military Affairs were to make the reduction
faction very happy.

Of the one Federalist and six Democrats

he appointed, Taylor selected six members who supported the
66Ibid., December 27, 1820.
67Skeen, 144.
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proposed cuts.

The only member of the committee who opposed

such a course was its chairman, Virginia Democrat Alexander
Smyth.

Smyth, who had served as the Colonel of the Rifle

Regiment from 1808 to 1812 and as the Inspector General of
the Regular Army during the early part of the War of 1812,
was not to be much help to Calhoun and the Army, however,
since he was a rather ineffectual politician and had little
influence over the other members of the committee.68

The

work Taylor had done to stack the committee was understood,
if not appreciated, by almost all in Washington.

General

Brown commented, "Mr. Speaker Taylor has done us much
mischief by carefully arranging the military and naval
comts. of the House so as to secure a majority hostile in
e a c h . T h e

forces against the Army appeared very strong

as debate on the subject began.
Other events in the House also tended to go against the
pro-army faction early in the Sixteenth Congress.

After the

motion reguiring Calhoun to submit his report was passed in
May little happened until he sent it to the House in midDecember.

One important event did occur on December 1,

1820, when Treasury Secretary Crawford submitted his yearly
report.

Crawford forecast a national debt of $2.6 million

by January 1, 1821, a change of almost $4.5 million from the
$2 million surplus in the treasury the year earlier.

Most

of this unfavorable change Crawford blamed on a loss of*
9
6
68spiller, "Secretary", 280-1.
69 Ibid., 291.
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customs duties due to the business slowdown.

Crawford

forecast a national debt of $7.5 million by 1822, indicating
a yearly deficit of almost $5 million.70
were alarmed by these figures.

Many Congressmen

The projected deficits in

1820 and 1821 combined would reach $9.5 million, a serious
problem when Crawford projected an income of only $16.5
million 1821.

Crawford's report, even though later amended

by a second report showing a more favorable treasury
balance,7^ caused attention to be focused on the reduction
issue.
On December 20, shortly before Crawford's report was
amended, the chairman of the House Military Affairs
Committee, Alexander Smyth, reported House bill 180, which
called for the Military Peace Establishment of the country
to be reduced to "6,000 Non-commissioned officers,
musicians, and privates with a due proportion of field and
company officers."72

The bill also called for the

consolidation of all artillery units, the amalgamation of
the rifle regiment with the infantry, the discharge of the
Topographical Engineers, and the reduction of senior

70Pebates. 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 489-90.
71Ibid., 690. On December 28, 1820, Crawford reported
to Congress a second time. In the second report he stated
that due to an error concerning War Department money held by
the Treasury Department the debt as of January 1, 1822 was
expected to be only $4.7 million, a difference of over $2.7
million from his first report just weeks earlier.
Supporters of the Army and Calhoun made much of the error in
the political infighting during the debates.
72Ibid., 688-9.

53

officers to one Brigadier General with a greatly reduced
staff.

The bill was straightforward on what would happen to

any men in excess of these requirements, calling for all
"supernumerary officers, non commissioned officers and
privates, to be discharged from the service."*
75
4
7

After the

bill was read twice it was sent to the Committee of the
Whole on the State of the Union, on December 28, 1820.74
The debate on reduction in the Committee of the Whole
started with a much broader scope than House bill 180
reflected.75

A resolution was presented stating that it was

"expedient that the annual expenses of the government should
be reduced."76

The resolution called for dramatic cuts in

the Navy and coastal fortifications as well as in the Army.
Reflecting the mood in the House for serious and lasting
reduction of government expenditures, the resolution also
called for all government employees to have their pay
reduced to 1809 levels, and for the closure of any

75Ibid., 688. It is an irony that Smyth, a pro-army
man, brought forth from his committee a bill so unfriendly
to the Army. With his committee firmly packed with men who
viewed the army unfavorably, however, he presented the bill
to Congress as was his duty.
74House Journal. 16th Cong., 2nd sess. , Serial 47, 94.
75Reflecting the inexact style of reporting on Congress
during the period there were at least ten speeches not
reported on during the debate over the next several weeks.
All the missing speeches are mentioned briefly in the
Debates and there is no discernable pattern based on party,
section, or position on reduction.
76Pebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 715-6.
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government offices "not immediately necessary for the public
business."77
Supporting the call for a general reduction in
government expenditures was Thomas W. Cobb, a Georgia
Democrat.

Cobb admitted that he was "one for radical

retrenchment"78 and he quickly outlined ways to cut over
three million from the federal budget.

Of this total,

however, nearly 93 percent was to come from various defense
items, including a reduction of the Army and Navy and a
cancellation of most new ship and fortress construction.
Cobb wanted to perform radical retrenchment only on the
military.

The Army was to be realigned but not along

Calhoun's plan, which Cobb complimented by suggesting it was
"the ablest, most ingenious, and upon the whole, the best
defense of a standing army in time of peace."79

Cobb's

speech is important in the debate because he couched his
desire to cut the Army in a broad context.

Though he

clearly thought the Army needed to be cut (and thought it
should be cut first) he advocated other cuts as well.

Many

who followed his speech did not ask for any cuts outside of
the Peace Establishment.
Alexander Smyth, as chairman of the House Military
Affairs Committee, was one of the few leaders in the House
trying to stave off reduction.
77Ibid., 716.
78Ibid., 725.
79Ibid., 728.
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he called "the great question"; the debate over which was
more appropriate for the defense of the country, regulars or
militia.80

Smyth clearly did not trust the militia even

although he was careful not to state so explicitly.

He

tried to persuade other members of the importance of the
Army by quoting Washington as saying, "To place any
dependence upon the militia is assuredly resting on a broken
staff."8!

He thought that militia troops were useful only

under controlled conditions which would not often occur
during a war with a European power.
Although he made a fair case for his position, Smyth
also showed in his speech that he was probably not the ideal
man to have marshalling the pro Army forces.

In a strange

statement for a Committee chairman who should have known
better, Smyth remarked that he "would not have been willing
to discharge a single soldier" had not Calhoun presented a
plan discharging part of the service.82

Surely Smyth should

have known that Calhoun had been directed by the resolution
of May 20, 1820, to provide a plan for the contraction of
the Army to 6,000 men, but there was no comprehension of
this in his speech.

It was not a good sign for the Army to

have so vital a supporter be so confused about the very
facts of the reduction effort.

80Ibid., 745.
81Ibid., 749
82 Ibid., 754.
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On January 8, 1821, a Federalist from Ohio, Philemon
Beecher, requested an end to debate on Cobb's proposal to
have a general effort at reduction.
Beecher's motion passed 82 to 49.

With very little debate
Beecher then moved that

the House take up the report from the Military Affairs
Committee (House bill 180).

When the motion passed, on a

voice vote, all reduction efforts in the House were focused
squarely on the Army.
Ironically, the first speaker after Beecher's
maneuverings was Calhoun's close friend and replacement in
the House, Eldred Simkins, another South Carolina Democrat.
Simkins started his speech by saying the time had come to
forcefully state the case for the Army.

He first lauded the

work done since 1815 to reorganize, and increase the
efficiency of, the Army, allowing it to cut expenditures by
nearly a third while adding several thousand men.83

He also

took pains to point out the apparent confusion emanating
from the Treasury Department over the size of the debt
forecast for the coming year and suggested that even the
much improved figures from Crawford's second report would
show still further improvement throughout 1821.

Simkins

suggested that since the public had not demanded a reduction
but only "fidelity and accountability in the application of
funds," and that since even the Secretary of the Treasury
thought the deficit problem was easing, it would not be
necessary to cut the Army's size.
83Ibid., 762.
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Army for short term financial reasons he deemed "penny wise
and pound foolish."®4
Echoing the thinking of Calhoun and the Army, Simkins
saw a second, more meaningful, argument for not cutting the
officers of the Army.

Since generals were "not made in a

day" Simkins feared what the loss of so many senior officers
would do to the Army.

Speaking with passion and eloguence

on the need to retain the officers who would lead men into
future battles he stated:
We may calculate the loss of dollars and cents, but who
can calculate, by what criterion can you calculate the
value of union, the waste of our moral character and
energies, and the sacrifice of our best blood.85
Simkins was determined to stop the loss of senior officers
if he could.
One argument that had not yet been heard in the debate
involved the long standing belief that any standing army was
a danger to the republic, and that the "necessary evil" any
such army represented should be kept as small as possible.
Following Simkins in debate, Jarad Williams was prepared to
make precisely that argument.
Williams, a Virginia Democrat, thought that the
government should be unobtrusive and that the best way to
accomplish this was to keep government expenses as low as
possible at all times.

Williams had only contempt for Army

officers, calling them "political grasshoppers, warmed and

84Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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animated into existence by the sunshine of the treasury."88
He also thought that the idle officers had a negative moral
effect on the nation.

Williams felt there were other

problems with the Peace Establishment as well, keeping his
greatest scorn for the notion that the state of military
science would be hurt with the release of any of the Army's
generals.

Calling such a concept "utterly fallacious,"

Williams called for the reduction of the Army senior command
to just one Brigadier General as well as deep cuts in staff
positions.87
After a day of little debate on the Army John Cuthbert
of Georgia, another Democrat, asked two guestions on January
10, to try to clarify the debate.

Cuthbert first asked "is

the military establishment proposed in this bill
sufficiently large for the wants of our country" and
secondly, if not, "are the resources of our country . . .
adequate to the support of a larger establishment?"88

He

quickly came to the center of the entire debate when he
declared that 6,000 men could not garrison the fortresses
needed to protect the country while also serving as a
"depository of military science."8^

Cuthbert was sure the

country could afford the cost of an adequate force even if
it would take time for the deficit to be addressed.
86Ibid., 769 .
87Ibid., 783 .
88Ibid., 803.
89Ibid., 810 .
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Following Cuthbert in the debate was yet another
Democrat, Charles Fisher from North Carolina.

Fisher

pointed out that "the ordinary revenues of the country are
insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of the
government."90

Since he disagreed with Cuthbert's

willingness to wait out the loss in revenues, Fisher saw but
three options to solve this problem:
taxes, or retrenchment and economy.

government loans, more
Fisher was convinced

that the public would not support new taxes and he was
egually convinced that further loans were a bad idea unless
there was an immediate threat to the country, so he favored
the retrenchment option.
Fisher had other concerns with the Army besides its
expense.

He felt that any large, professional force would

harm the militia since it would tend to divert attention
away from the citizen force.

Fisher did not think the

Regular Army alone could provide security for the country
and that it should be reduced and efforts made to diffuse
military knowledge throughout the militia and the
citizenry.91
Thomas Cobb then attempted to again broaden the debate
to cover other military items that could be reduced.

He

proposed that the Navy Department be asked to find ways to
limit the number of seamen in the service and he asked that
the Committee on Military Pensions look into reducing
90Ibid., 810-11.
91Ibid., 815.
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pensions.

The first initiative passed on a voice vote and

the second failed by a close vote of 53 to 59.

That the

issue of cutting pensions was even mentioned, and that the
resulting vote was close, shows how serious many were about
reducing the deficit.

Normally pensions, once granted by

Congress, were not the subject of further debate.
Debate on Army reduction resumed on January 11, with a
speech from Newton Cannon, a Democrat and Old Republican
from Tennessee.

Cannon gave the first overtly anti-officer

speech of the debate.

He called the reduction "a subject of

great importance" since he thought it was the people of the
nation who had to bear the burden imposed by officers who
would "elevate [themselves] too high."92

After mentioning

that he thought the Army's role was simply to man the forts
and keep munitions ready for the militia, Cannon decried the
increase of public debt to keep such an unnecessarily large
force.

Cannon was also straightforward in his view of

public debt, calling it "one of the greatest evils in any
country" and "a threat to public liberty."93

Cannon saw it

as his duty to fight the twin evils of a standing army and a
growing public debt.
After several days conducting other business, the House
returned to reduction on January 13, with an effort by
Kentucky Democrat George Robertson to set up a special
committee to look into which civil offices could be closed
92lbid., 823.
93Ibid., 829.
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to save money and to investigate if certain salaries of
government employees could be cut.

Robertson, who voted

against the final Army reduction, could have been attempting
to draw the focus away from the Army with such a resolution.
After receiving support from Thomas Culbreth, a Maryland
Democrat, the committee was established.
The last major speech on reduction was given by the
Kentucky Democrat David Trimble.

Trimble did not think the

guestion under debate should be whether the militia or
regular army could best serve the nation since he thought
both had their purposes.

He did pose three questions he

felt were important (the first two being similar to
Cuthbert's).

Trimble was not only interested in whether the

present army was necessary for service during peace and
whether the treasury could support it, he wanted to know if
a reduction to 6,000 men would lessen the strength and
security of the nation.94

Trimble made great fun of the

fact that of the 124 forts the Army had listed in its last
report to Congress 68 had garrisons of ten men or less.
Alluding to the frequent assertion that one of the main
purposes of the Army was to garrison these forts, Trimble
called such strength "just enough to lock the gates."95
Obviously closing these forts would not adversely effect the
nation's security.

Turning his attention to the lengthening

Frontier Trimble pointed out that the number of troops
94Ibid., 875.
95Ibid., 876.

62

garrisoned at interior forts had increased more than seven
times from 1809 to 1820 (from 318 to 2,235).

Trimble

rhetorically asked if these troops could not also be used on
the Frontier, thereby reducing the number needed for duty.
Overall, Trimble thought a reduction was possible because
the militia was the rightful body to handle any invasion,
that 10,000 men was too large a force to simply garrison the
Frontier, that the country could not afford the current
Army, and that a reduction would not hurt the safety of the
country.96
The day after Trimble's speech saw the start of intense
parliamentary maneuvering as both sides tried to amend House
bill 180.

The first to make a motion was the Maryland

Democrat Samuel Smith, who wanted to strike out the first
section and insert a substitute which would keep the light
artillery corps and the rifle regiment in the Army.9^

After

his proposal was voted down Smith tried another change by
proposing that the Quartermaster General be held at the rank
of Brigadier General instead of reduced to Colonel.

His

motion lost on a surprisingly close division (50 to 58), for
the amount of scorn that had been heaped on the
Quartermaster department during the debate.
Any momentum the supporters of the Army might have felt
quickly dissipated when Charles Mercer, a Virginia Democrat,
requested that the Topographical Engineers not be disbanded.
9 6 Ibid.,

885.

9 7 I b i d ., 891.
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After much debate the corps was voted down 43 to 60.

After

failing to revive the Topographical Engineers the House
quickly defeated, by voice votes, motions to give enlisted
men three months' separation pay, to restore some of the pay
cuts to certain staff officers, and to keep one extra
Adjutant General.98

Those for reducing the Army had won

these key votes easily.
On January 20, one of the few Northerners to speak
during the debate expressed his support for the bill.
Gideon Tomlinson, a Connecticut Democrat, admitted that the
House was eager to end debate but thought he needed to
remind the House that the only way not to reduce the Army
was to take from the people, either in taxes or debt passed
on to future generations.

On the debt Tomlinson was clear

about his feelings. "I for one", he declared, "cannot
consent to transmit that inheritance which was achieved by
the wisdom and valor of our predecessors to posterity
encumbered with the expense of our i m p r u d e n c e 99
Tomlinson's speech was the last of any substance on the
bill.

In its final form the bill reduced the Army from nine

regiments of infantry to five and combined the artillery
into five battalions of just twenty companies.-'-^®

The bill*
9

98ibid., 905.
99Ibid., 912.
lO^Congress, Senate, Estimate of the Comparative
Expenses of the Army, Under the Organization of the Bill
Passed by the House of Representatives and that of the
Military Committee of the Senate, 16th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Senate Document 77, Serial 43, passim.
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called for 5,190 privates and just under 6,000 enlisted
troops, one Major General, two Brigadier Generals,
reductions of other staff positions, the abandonment of the
Topographical Engineers, and the merging of the artillery
and ordnance corps.

On January 22, 1821, the House passed

bill 180 to a third reading by a vote of 109 to 47.

The

next day it received final passage, 109 to 48, and was sent
to the Senate.
There is an especially noteworthy aspect to the vote to
pass House bill 180--there is almost no differentiation
between party or section in its passage.

As Tables 2 and 3

show, each party and section not only voted in favor of the
bill's passage, but did so by astonishingly similar
percentages.

Clearly party and sectional differences did

not play a role in passage of the bill.

The one minor

regional difference, that New England was slightly more
willing to decrease the Army than the South or Frontier and
the mid-Atlantic states were slightly less willing, is a
continuation of a trend from before the period.102
Such uniformity is unexpected for several reasons.
First, the desire of the Frontier states to help reduce the

^-Olpebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess. , 936-7; House
Journal, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 160-1. Even though the
Debates and House Journal agree on the vote the raw data in
House Journal is wrong. The real tally is 109 to 48.
Appendix 2 for a list of region's to which
various states and districts belong. Tables 2 and 3 show a
swing of only a few votes in the New England and Mid
Atlantic sections or among the Federalists would bring the
corresponding percentages in line with the national vote.
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TABLE 2
HOUSE VOTE TO PASS, BY REGION

Region

Yeas

Neas

Total

New England
Mid Atlantic

25 (79%)
28 (64%)

7 (21%)
16 (36%)

32 (100%)
44 (100%)

North (total)

53 (70%)

23 (30%)

76 (100%)

South

35 (69%)

16 (31%)

51 (100%)

Frontier

21 (70%)

9 (30%)

30 (100%)

109 (69%)

48 (31%)

157 (100%)

Total

TABLE 3
HOUSE VOTE TO PASS, BY PARTY

Party

Yeas

Neas

Total

Democrats

85 (70%)

37 (30%)

122 (100%)

Federalists

13 (62%)

8 (38%)

21 (100%)

Other/Not knownl^3

11 (79%)

3 (21%)

14 (100%)

109 (69%)

48 (31%)

157 (100%)

Total

l°3The number in this category is particularly high due
to the problem of identifying party membership of some of
the obscure members of the Sixteenth Congress.
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Army is intriguing.

It would be natural to assume that the

Frontier would want the protection the Army offered. Instead
the Representatives from the Frontier districts voted as did
other Representatives to reduce the Army.

Perhaps the

people of the Frontier felt that their local militia would
be better suited to fighting the Indians and protecting
their homes than the Army, which normally was raised mostly
in the East.

Such a belief would be especially strong in

Alabama and Georgia in 1821 after the Army had to request
the help of the state militias in subduing the Seminoles in
Florida.

Even if such a bias existed, however, it would

only make sense to reduce the Army if the Frontier states
felt secure with their local protection.
A second reason for the Frontier's desire to cut the
Army was a fear that any new taxes to pay for the deficit if
the Army was not reduced would have to be largely borne by
themselves.

Writing to a friend, Major J. J. Abert

supported this view when he wrote that the Frontier states
"wished to avoid the possibility of taxing their lands . . .
and to effect this they have gull'd the Atlantic over into
our abandonment of the defenses of their towns."104

That

the Frontier states were worried about new taxes during an
economic downturn makes sense; an area dependent on capital
to expand and build an infrastructure would be even more
concerned than the rest of the country about a tax increase.

104Major J. J. Abert to Christopher Vandeventer,
January 25, 1821; quoted in Spiller, "Secretary", 281.
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Such a fear, added to a faith in the ability of the local
militia, could be enough for a section to vote for
reduction.
A second surprise in the uniformity of the vote against
the Army was that the South voted for reduction by a margin
of two to one.

John Hope Franklin's theory about Southern

militarism, first discussed in the introduction, does not
hold in this instance.

In fact, even though the main

proponents of the Army were from the South (Simkins from
South Carolina and Smyth of Virginia), many of the leading
members pushing for reduction were from the South as well
(Williams from Virginia, Fisher from North Carolina, and
Trimble from Kentucky).

On this question about the

military, the Southern Congressmen held a nearly identical
opinion with the rest of the country.
One reason why the voting percentage in the South was
so close to that of the other sections was that the Old
Republicans voted overwhelmingly in favor of the reduction.
The Old Republicans stayed true to their heritage of
believing in a small and unobtrusive government.

As Table 4

shows, while the Old Republicans voted overwhelmingly for
reduction, the rest of the Democrats voted much like the
Federalists and the House as a whole.105

Several Old

Republicans, most prominently Newton Cannon of Tennessee,
105The one Old Republican who voted against the
reduction was Hugh Nelson of Virginia. He was a close
friend of President Monroe and was known to be a reliable
reporter of House events to Thomas Jefferson. There is no
record of why he voted no on the measure.
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also had key roles in the reduction debate, and John Cocke
of Tennessee was on the House Military Affairs Committee.
The Old Republicans were the most distinctive voting bloc in
the reduction debate.

TABLE 4
OLD REPUBLICAN VOTE TO PASS HOUSE BILL 180

Yeas

Neas

Total

Democrat/
Old Republicans

14 (93%)

1 (7%)

15 (100%)

All other Democrats

71 (66%)

36 (34%)

107 (100%)

Total Democrats

85 (70%)

37 (30%)

122 (100%)

Federalists/Others

24 (69%)

11 (31%)

35 (100%)

That the Democrats and Federalists voted in such a
similar pattern (70 versus 62 percent) shows that party
affiliation was not a strong factor during the debate.
Considering that non-Old Republican/Democrats voted much
more like Federalists on reduction (66 versus 62 percent)
than their Old Republican colleagues (93 percent), the idea
of any kind of Democratic unity on the issue dose not seem
supportable.

This behavior seems to support the hypotheses

that lack of discipline in the Democrat-Republican Party
coupled with the weakness of the Federalists could also be
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seen as a sign of the weakening of the First American Party
System.
Unlike the House, the Senate of the Sixteenth Congress
was not necessarily convinced that either the Army or the
expenditures of the government had to be reduced.

The

forces favoring the Army were much stronger than in the
House and, as a whole, the Senate was reluctant to take up
the reduction debate.106

The House bill arrived in the

Senate on January 23 and was sent to the Senate Committee on
Military Affairs the next day.

The bill that came out of

that committee in late February was markedly different from
House bill 180.
The biggest change in the Senate version of the bill
was that it called for the retention of seven regiments of
infantry and four regiments of artillery (36 companies)
versus four infantry regiments and five artillery battalions
(20 companies) in the House version.1
107
6
0

The only way the

Senate could maintain these regiments and not greatly
increase the cost of the bill was to reduce the size of the
component companies.

This the Senate chose to do, thereby

reducing the number of privates in a company from 68 to 48
in infantry regiments and from 100 to 42 in artillery
regiments.108

With these cuts in the rank and file the

106Skeen, 150.
107Congress, Senate Document 77, passim.
108Ibid. With these reductions the Senate actually
ended up with smaller artillery companies, 42 versus 54,
than Calhoun had suggested in his report to the House.
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Senate version would end up costing only $20,000 more than
the House version while allowing several more regiments.
When Senate debate began on February 21 it was
generally restrained and typically followed many of the same
arguments that had been heard in the House.

The debate

itself was often cut short because of the coming end of the
session, just a matter of days away.

Several members did

defend the quartermaster and ordnance corps for their
"unexampled excellence" and Freeman Walker, a Georgia
Democrat, proposed an amendment to keep the ordnance and
artillery corps separate.

His motion lost by the close vote

of 18 to 19.109*
The speaker who took the most time in the Senate
debate, and who seemed the most vexed with the Senate
version of the bill, was New Jersey Democrat Mahlon
Dickerson.

Dickerson thought the Senate bill was fatally

flawed because it did not propose "an equal reduction of the
officers of the Army" in proportion to the reduction of the
Army itself.H O

Dickerson believed that the staff

realignment of 1818, even though generally well thought of
by almost everyone in and out of the military, had been
botched, thereby leaving the Army top heavy with officers.
After two days of parliamentary maneuvering Dickerson and
his allies tried to cut the Adjutant General's position and
reduce the one remaining Major General position to a
109Pebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 365.
H°Ibid.

'

367 .
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Brigadier.

Their attempts at the former floundered by a

vote of 17 to 20 while the latter failed even more
decisively, 16 to 24.111

With these defeats any attempts to

rework the Senate version collapsed and the bill was sent
back to the House, on a voice vote, on February 24, 1821.
When the Senate version of the reduction bill was
reported back to the House, the House Military Affairs
Committee made a few minor changes and sent it to the floor.
When members of the House started to balk at some of the
changes made by the Senate version, Henry Clay, who had only
recently taken his seat that session and had missed the
first debate, and Virginia Democrat Phillip Barbour pushed
the bill through with little opposition or debate.112*

The

only real dissatisfaction expressed was by Newton Cannon,
the Tennessee Democrat who felt that the number of regiments
should be reduced so the number of remaining officers could
also be reduced.

His proposal to

reduce the Army to four

Infantry regiments and two artillery regiments was narrowly
defeated 73 to 79.112

Final passage of the bill occurred

after the Senate agreed to a few minor amendments insisted
upon by the House.

The bill was signed into law, and the

Army reduced to just over 6,000 men, on March 2, 1821.114

111Congress, Senate Journal, 16th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Serial 41, 213; 214-15.
112Skeen, 150.
112Pebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 1242-43.
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Reaction to the final passage of the reduction law was
mixed.

President Monroe wrote to James Madison that the

"painful duty" of reducing the Army was finished but
throughout the debate he failed to intervene, nor did he
indicate now that he wished he had done so to make events
turn out differently.115

Secretary of War Calhoun was so

distressed by the act that he wrote to the National
Intelligencer. under the name of the great French
fortification expert Vauban, and suggested that the House
had acted "in a panic" to ensure retrenchment.

Calhoun felt

the policy to be "neither wisdom nor economy" and stated
that it would seriously hamper the Army's ability to defend
the country.116

The editors of the National Gazette and

Literary Register simply complained of the actions of the
House being "inscrutable to us" and called the whole
reduction effort "economical fury."117
The results of the reduction were quickly felt.
Brigadier Generals Henry Atkinson and Alexander Macomb were
reduced to Colonels, with Atkinson being offered the command
114Richard Peters and George Minot, eds., United States
Statutes at Large 10 vols.
(Boston: Charles C. Little and
James Brown, 1846-1861), 3:615.
115James Monroe to James Madison, May 19 1821, James
Monroe, The Writings of James Monroe, ed. Stanislaus Murray
Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York: AMS Press, 1969; reprint, New
York: G.P. Putnam's sons, 1899-1903), 6:179.
116National Intelligencer, April 10, 1821. Calhoun
admitted his authorship of the article in a letter to Virgil
Maxcy on April 11, 1821. See Calhoun, Papers, 6:41-42.
117National Gazette and Literary Register. January 25,
1821.
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of a regiment and Macomb given command of the Corps of
Engineers.

These reductions left Edmund P. Gaines and

Winfield Scott the two remaining Brigadiers, and Jacob Brown
as the Army's lone Major General (Andrew Jackson had left
the Army to become the military Governor of Florida).
Several thousand officers and non-commissioned officers
"were cast out of the service without any provision for
their welfare" while the rank and file was allowed to reduce
through attrition.
Unlike Army reduction, the history of other
retrenchment efforts in the Sixteenth Congress showed mixed
results.

An effort to fix and reduce the size of the Navy

quickly floundered.

After little debate one vote was taken

in the House to reduce the number of officers in the Navy
but it was defeated on February 8 by the vote of 63 to
87.119

The drj_ve to cut appropriations for other military

projects showed better results.

The fortification budget

for 1822 was cut from $800,000 to a guarter of that amount
and spending on new ordnance was cut entirely.120
The coalition that had been created to reduce the Army fell
apart entirely, however, when the debate turned to civilian
spending.

H S w i l l i a m Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United
States Army (New York: D. Appleman and Company, 1924), 158.

119Pebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 1062.
120Skeen, 151.
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Thomas Culbreth took the floor of the House during
February 1821 and requested that salaries of those on the
civil list of the federal government be cut by 20 percent.
Supporters of Henry Clay and DeWitt Clinton refused to
support the measure, however, especially after John
Campbell, an Ohio Democrat, linked such a cut to
Congressional salaries as well.121

without support from

these two factions those favoring reduction knew they could
not win and did not even bring the issue to a vote.

After

this rebuff the forces of government economy were fractured
and raised the issue no more.

Their only success was the

reduction of the Army.
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the Army
reduction of 1821.

The first, and most obvious, was that

Congress found it easier to cut the military establishment
of the country than to cut civilian employment.

The main

reason for this was that the military had only moderate
public support, with many citizens feeling that the duties
asked of the peacetime Army were not enough to require many
men.

A second reason is that very few civilians worked for

the federal government in 1821.

The total number of

civilian employees that year was 6,914, of which only 2,108
were not postal workers.I22

There simply was little cutting

to be done in the civilian work force.

121Ibid.; Risjord, 196.
122Census, 2:1103.
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It also was apparent that Congress, as a whole, was
more indulgent of the Navy than the Army.

While Naval

expenditures and strengths were comparable to the Army's in
the period, the Navy was never made to contemplate a fixed
Naval Peace Establishment.

The reason for this is two-fold.

Firstly, the Navy was often considered more important than
the Army in the nation's defense, for the Navy was the first
line of defense and had no civilian or militia counterpart
as did the Army.

Secondly, navies, by their very nature,

posed less of a threat than a standing army to a republican
form of government.
The reasons why the Army received major cutbacks, and
other departments did not, are not simple, however.
Certainly Michael Fitzgerald's thesis that the move to
reduce the Army was in large part a political contest
foreshadowing the 1824 Presidential election deserves some
consideration.

Both Crawford and Calhoun had Presidential

aspirations, and political infighting on the subject of
government expenditures happens even in the best of times.
However, to declare such tensions to be the main cause of
the reduction is to give short shrift to the many in
Congress who passionately cared about the governments fiscal
health.
In the end, the debate and votes in Congress on the
Army reduction showed one clear trend:

regional and party

differences played little to no role in the passage of the
bill.

The House vote by section is grouped between 67 and
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71 percent and by party between 62 to 70 percent.

The fact

that only the Old Republicans can be easily identified as
diverging much from the national norm in voting for
reduction had far less to do with the party or section of
the group's members than it did with their old-fashioned
views.
The lack of any other party or sectional breakdown on
the issue is certainly a surprise.

The parties and sections

traditionally supportive of the Army did not vote
differently than the rest of the political establishment.
In the midst of the unravelling of the First American Party
System the attitudes towards the Army in Congress also
seemed to be changing.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EVER INCREASING ARMY:

FRONTIER DEFENSE IN THE 1830s

After the retrenchment of 1821 was complete the United
States Army settled into a new routine, guarding the nation
with reduced manpower in a time of increasing
responsibility.

The loss of one infantry regiment and

nearly five thousand men would make the Army's task of
Frontier defense much harder to perform throughout the
1830s.
It did not take long for the difficulty of guarding the
Frontier with 6,000 men to become apparent to Secretary of
War Calhoun and the commanders of the Army.

In 1823 the

lack of manpower caused the Army to abandon Fort Dearborn
near Chicago.

The fort, an important supply and staging

area, was closed because it was no longer on the most
exterior line of the Frontier.

Calhoun was unhappy with the

fort's loss, calling the decision a choice "between two
evils" and the choice made "not absolutely good of itself,
but [the one] which has the fewest objections."1

Just two

^•Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of
the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest:
1815-1860 (Madison: The State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 1953), 23.
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years after the reduction of 1821 the Army was having to
make difficult choices in how to guard the Frontier.
During 1826 the men at Fort Crawford (at Prairie du
Chien, Territory of Wisconsin) had been moved to Fort
Snelling (near the present day city of St. Paul) because
Snelling was considered key to the defense of the upper
Mississippi.2

in the absence of any regular troops at Fort

Crawford serious difficulties occurred between the
Winnebagos and the white settlers around Prairie du Chien,
which the militia of the area proved roundly incapable of
stopping.

To keep the area peaceful the Army had to move

men back into the region, reoccupying not only Fort Crawford
in 1827 but Fort Dearborn in 1828 as well.3

These movements

further strained the Army's meager resources.
In 1828 the Commanding General, Major General Jacob
Brown, reported to Congress that he favored placement of two
infantry and two cavalry companies at each frontier post.
The main idea of the report was that the infantry would hold
the post while the cavalry would sweep the surrounding
areas, thereby pacifying them.4

The only flaw in the plan,

of course, was that in 1828 the Army had no cavalry units.
The Senate attempted to remedy this in 1830 by passing a
2Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of
the United States: 1789-1895 (Madison: The State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953), 108.
3Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The
United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (Toronto: The
Macmillan Company, 1969), 319-20; Prucha, Guide, 71.
4Ibid., 235.
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bill raising mounted troops but the House refused to take up
the bill and it died at the end of the session.5
The constant shifting of forces that occurred in the
late 1820s was not an efficient way to bring peace to the
frontier.

Almost everybody interested in the military

establishment in the early 1830s felt that some kind of
fixed, long-term plan was needed to bring stability to the
Army.

Lewis Cass, the Secretary of War after the start of

Andrew Jackson's Presidency in 1829, took reguests for such
a plan from both the House and Senate Military Affairs
Committees in 1830 and fashioned a proposal which

called

for the use of cavalry in much the same manner as Brown's
report did in 1828.67 The adoption of cavalry units would
solve the two main problems of frontier defense:

the

shortage of men and units imposed by retrenchment, and the
infantry's inability to control the behavior of the Indians.
Unfortunately for the Army, many Congressmen still opposed
any expansion, regardless of how many plans advocated it.
In this atmosphere, in December 1831, Missouri Senator
Thomas Hart Benton sponsored a bill "to authorized the
mounting of a part of the army of the United States."7

5Ibid., 239. Congress, The Register of Debates in
Congress, 14 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 18241837) 21st Cong., 1st sess., 272, 274. Hereafter cited as
Register.
6Prucha, Sword, 340.
7Congress, Senate, Senate Journal, 22nd Cong., 1st
sess., Serial 211, 31. Hereafter cited as Senate Journal.
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Benton, considered the "driving force" of the 1832
debate by many historians, was a Westerner who was not
afraid to complain to the Senate about the exposed condition
of the Frontier.8

Like others from the region, he was

concerned about the numerous small uprisings that had
occurred throughout the Northwest in the previous years.
Although there had not been a general Indian uprising the
settlers and Representatives of the region lived in fear of
one.

To make things more uncomfortable for those living on

the Frontiers, most had little faith in the ability of the
regular infantry to protect them.

It was these two factors:

fear of the Indians and a lack of faith of the effectiveness
of regular infantry in the region, that led to Benton's call
to mount part of the existing army.
Even though Benton did not seek to increase the Army,
merely to rearrange it, his bill was tabled after it had
been reported out of his Military Affairs Committee.

It is

probable that no further action would have been taken to
provide the Army with cavalry in 1832 except for effects of
the Black Hawk War then underway in Wisconsin.
The Black Hawk War, named for the Sac and Fox war chief
who led the Indians, started in July 1831 when Black Hawk
and several hundred of his warriors attacked a tribe of
Menomonies near Fort Crawford.

In a report sent to the

8Otis E. Young, "The United States Mounted Ranger
Battalion, 1832-1833," Mississippi Valley Historical Review
41 (December, 1954): 454.
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Department of War on July 31, 1831, the chief of the Indian
Bureau declared the situation a serious offence since the
two tribes had conducted a treaty of peace the year before
and because the Menomonies had been under the protection of
the United States flag when attacked.9

Black Hawk might

have led the attack in retaliation for a previous outrage
but that was not known at the time.10

Lewis Cass agreed

with his bureau chief, however, and stated so in his report
to Congress on the matter.

Cass said that "this aggression

. . . shows the necessity of employing upon the frontier a
corps of mounted riflemen, to be stationed at the most
exposed points" of the Frontier.H

Cass also warned that

infantry would be of little use against the Sac and Fox due
to the distances involved and suggested that if regular
cavalry was not provided to the Army the nation would be
"frequently compelled to adopt more measures more expensive
and inconvenient to us and more injurious to the Indians."12
Congress could observe the positive aspects of using
cavalry on the Northwestern frontier during the war.
Colonel Henry Dodge skillfully led a militia battalion of
mounted rangers during the war and caused the Fox and Sac
tribes many problems with his unit's speed and9
9Reqister, 22nd Cong., 1st sess., appendix, 18.
lOReuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Collections of the State
Historical Society of Wisconsin. 20 vols. (Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1888-1911), 12:226.
11Ibid., 14.
l^ibid.

82

aggressiveness.13

The work of Dodge and his men impressed

many in Congress who knew that the regular army had no such
capability.

The Congress, however, did not move quickly to

implement Benton's plan for several reasons.
important of these was cost.

Among the most

Cavalry had always been many

times more expensive than infantry and it was this issue
which insured that there would be no mounted troops after
the reduction of 1821.

A second reason to avoid cavalry,

and perhaps a more compelling one to many in Congress, was
that the Cavalry arm was considered to be much less
democratic, and even aristocratic, when compared to the
other arms.

Such attributes were not helpful in the

Jacksonian era.*
14

Congressional caution, based in large

part on these two points, continued throughout early 1832.
On June 9, 1832, the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs reported to the Senate a bill authorizing "the
President to raise mounted volunteers for the defense of the
frontiers."

After months of inaction the Congress roused

itself to provide mounted troops for the Frontier by passing
this bill in only six days.

It is difficult to isolate any

specific event in the Black Hawk War which could have
generated such a change, except that it lasted longer than
the generals and politicians had expected.

One writer has

13RUSell F. Wiegley, History of the United States Army
(New York: Macmillan Co, 1973), 159. The preference for
mounted troops was so great on the frontier that of the
1,600 men raised by early 1832 over 1300 were mounted. See
Thwaites, 12:233-4.
14Prucha, Sword, 240.
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suggested that "the train of causation which led to the
organization of the rangers can not be defined with
certainly."^5

Of course, unlike Benton's bill of the

previous December, the new bill called for mounted
volunteers instead of mounting a part of the regular army,
an important distinction which could explain the ease of
passage of the bill introduced in June.
The only member of the Senate to speak on the bill on
June 9 was the man who had reported it out of committee,
the Indiana Democrat, John Tipton.

Tipton, a Brigadier

General in the Indiana militia, warmly praised mounted
riflemen, describing them as "being better suited to a
border warfare than any other" type of unit.!5

Tipton

pointed out that the proposed volunteers would work better
than mounting a part of the Army because the regular
officers of the Army would have little knowledge about
either the country or the type of warfare the unit would
have to engage in.

Even though Tipton protested that "no

man can have a greater confidence in the skill and courage
of our Army than I," he also urged the passage of the bill
because the "inhabitants of the frontier would have more
confidence in being defended by their fathers, husbands and
brothers . . . than by comparative strangers."!71
7
*
5

15Young, 454.
!6Reqister 22nd Cong., 1st sess., 1069
17Ibid., 1069-70.
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Tipton also pointed out the unique status of volunteers
in peace time.

A battalion raised as requested in the bill

would have a curious dual nature.

It would be under the

direction of officers appointed by the President and would
be paid, equipped, and commanded as a Regular Army unit, but
it would also have to attract new recruits yearly since the
term of enlistment would run for only twelve months.

While

this system would make it hard for the unit to be cohesive
due to rapid turnover, it would allow the unit to be easily
disbanded if the situation called for it.

Many Congressman

approved of the plan because they hoped that the
disturbances on the Frontier would be temporary.!®
After Tipton's speech the Senate passed the bill to the
House, by a voice vote, without further debate.

The House,

in an unusual action, referred the bill to committee and
allowed it to the floor on the same day.

The debate which

ensued in the House was much like that in the Senate.
William Ashley, a Missouri Whig, suggested that the bill
should be amended to increase the term of enlistment in the
unit to a minimum of three years, that being the minimum
length of time needed to make a soldier.

Kentucky Democrat

Charles Wickliff and Ambrose Sevier, the delegate from
Arkansas, both discussed the folly of trying to train
infantry to use and care for horses, and both claimed that
such a plan would surely fail.19
18Ibid.,

1070.

19 Ibid., 3395-96 .
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a portion of the Army played virtually no role in the coming
debate; the issue was not considered seriously.
One member who was decidedly against any use of
regulars was Massachusetts Whig George Grennell.

Grennell

gave a fiery speech calling Regulars "dregs and outcasts of
society" and "men of evil habits and ferocious passions."
Grennell asserted that only the "substantial yeomanry" of
the country was needed to outwit the Indians and declared
that he was for simply sending in as many militia as might
be needed to put down the uprising.20

Grennell saw no need

for volunteers and certainly none for the hated regulars.
After little additional debate, the House amended the
size of the battalion from 500 to 1,000 men on the advice of
Joseph Duncan.

Duncan, an Illinois Democrat, was a Major

General of Militia and commander of all the forces from his
state involved in the fighting against Black Hawk in 1831.
Duncan also moved to amend the bill so as to allow militia
units to be used directly instead of becoming volunteers.
This amendment would have had the effect of repealing the
long standing law that militia could serve for only three
months.

Duncan felt that the one year enlistment, renewable

if needed, would provide all the protection needed on the
Frontier and would do so within the framework of the militia
forces.

After first agreeing to increase the size of the

battalion, the House agreed, 79 to 31, to accept only

20Ibid •t 3396 .
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militia troops.

The House then passed the bill back to the

Senate for its consideration.
After the weekend adjournment the Senate again debated
the bill on June 11, 1832.

Tipton made a speech calling for

the quick arrival of troops upon the Frontier.

Tipton

declared that, unlike some, he had no fear about the
discretionary power to call up troops given to the President
by the bill.

He felt assured that President Jackson would

act to have mounted troops on the Frontiers within thirty
days of the passage of the Act.

Tipton also renewed his

plea to let the Frontier states protect their own.

He

asked, "Do you gentlemen expect us to beg the lives of our
families upon our knees?"21
Tipton's fellow Democrat from the Frontier, Elias Kane
of Illinois, also thought that the rapid arrival of troops
upon the Frontier was crucial.

He knew that the House had

doubled the size of the battalion and that many in the
Senate would object to the larger figure but Kane still did
not think it was worth the time to amend the bill.

He

wanted the bill passed regardless of the type or quantity of
the troops provided.

William Hendricks, the other

Democratic Senator from Indiana, disagreed with Kane on the
need for speedy passage, however.

Hendricks proposed

amending the bill to provide a 600 man battalion with six
companies.

He was also the first speaker to declare that he

was not "legislating for the present emergency at all" since
21Ibid

1076.
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"that emergency had, in all probability, before this passed
away."22

Because of this fact Hendricks felt that

volunteers were the better choice to enforce the peace in
the Northwest.

Hendricks's approach differed widely from

Tipton's and Kane's even though they were all from the same
party and section and were after the same result, the
security of their constituents.
After Hendricks's speech the Senate next debated the
increase on June 14, with Tipton again speaking first.

By

this point Tipton was becoming upset that the bill had not
passed, even though the bill's progress had been extremely
rapid up to that point.

He complained bitterly about the

regular infantry not being able to bring the Indians to
battle even though they had over 1,200 men within forty
miles of Black Hawk just months before.

Tipton blamed this

failure on the large amounts of baggage the Regulars carried
and suggested that they were "sunshine soldiers" for their
craving of good living.23

To Tipton, this wasted

opportunity was just a further example of the inability of
infantry to control Indians upon the Frontier.
Soon after Tipton's speech Robert Hayne, a South
Carolina Democrat, made a speech supporting the bill and
making an overt attack on the militia, one of the country's
most revered institutions.

Hayne, a man who had been a

Colonel of a militia regiment in his own right, felt the
22Ibid., 1077.
23Ibid., 1084.
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militia and not the Regulars were responsible for Black Hawk
being undefeated since it was the Militia which was supposed
to embody the majority of any force once it had mobilized.
Hayne disliked the part time aspect of the Militia and his
contempt of the institution ran deep.

He stated that he

objected to these paper men, who appeared on the roll
transmitted to the Government as an efficient body, and
as such received their pay, while all their duty
consisted in going out once or twice a year on hunting
frolic into the country.242
6
5
It made sense to Hayne to use volunteers to defeat the
Indians on the plains since they would be organized and
trained for that one purpose.

To ensure such a course was

followed, Hayne moved to change the status of the troops
back to volunteers.
After Hayne's speech the Senate voted 30 to 11 to amend
the House amendment to include Hendricks's proposal for a
strength of 600 and Hayne's motion to use volunteers.2^
An analysis of the vote shows that even though
Congressmen from Frontier states were the primary advocates
of the bill in both Houses, the Senators from the Frontier
voted against the amendment far more often than Senators
from the other two regions (see Table 5).2^

24Ibid., 1086.
25 Ibid., 1087.
26Due to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the
formation of the Second Party system, especially in the
early 1830s, votes will not be broke down by party during
the debate of 1832. The regions in 1821 and 1833 are the
same except for the addition of Missouri to the Frontier.
See Appendix 2 for a complete listing of the regions.
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TABLE 5
SENATE AMENDMENT TO DECREASE BATTALION TO 600 VOLUNTEERS

Region

Yeas

Nays

Total

North

14

(82%)

3

(18%)

17 (100%)

South

8

(80%)

2

(20%)

10 (100%)

Frontier

8

(57%)

6

(43%)

14 (100%)

30

(73%)

11

(27% )

41 (100%)

Total

Those from the Frontier who voted for the amendment had
decided that it would be better to trust volunteers, formed
much like Regulars, for the defense of their homes.

Those

voting against the measure had slightly more disparate
reasons for wanting the House version. Some, like Kane,
simply wanted troops in the area as guickly as possible and
therefore favored the easily raised Militia.

Others favored

the Militia as the best force for putting down a disturbance
like the Black Hawk War.

In the end, however, the Frontier

Senators joined with their colleagues to approve the
battalion of volunteers.

Although not in a decisive manner,

the Frontier had chosen for an increase of the Regular Army
over Militia.
The vote totals for the Senators of the North and South
were again very similar.

Even though the Black Hawk War had

been raging for almost a year, and even though it probably
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would have been easier and quicker to raise militia
companies instead of starting over with an entirely new
force, these regions voted for volunteers.

The militia,

which had been considered sound enough to allow reduction of
the Regular Army in 1821, was passed over in favor of
volunteers in 1833.

Because unmounted Militia had been

ineffective in the attempt to subdue the Indians, a force
was created that if not exactly regular was modeled more
like the Army than the Militia.
After the bill had returned to the House it was passed
with little fanfare, on a voice vote, on the evening of June
15, 1832.27

The House, which days earlier had approved the

volunteers by a seven to three margin, did not address the
changes made in the Senate.

The few Representatives who

spoke on the subject simply declared that time was too short
to renew the debate.
k

-k

rk

The battalion of Mounted Rangers created by the Act of
1832 worked well enough to ensure that the unit would not
exist for very long.

Secretary of War Cass announced in his

November 1832 report to Congress that he was well pleased
with the performance of the mounted troops.

Cass also

reminded Congress that it would not have been necessary to
create the unit, nor would it have been necessary to move

27Richard Peters and George Minot, eds., United States
Statutes at Large 10 vols.
(Boston: Charles C. Little and
James Brown, 1846-1861), 4:533. Hereafter cited as Statutes
at Large.
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garrisons from the coast to the interior during the Black
Hawk War, if the Army had been composed of the right number
and type of regiments.28

By late 1832 Cass, and many in

Congress, felt that there was a need to keep mounted troops
of some kind in the Army permanently.
The first move to change the battalion into a more
regular unit came from the House Committee on Military
Affairs.

The chairman of the committee, Richard M. Johnson,

a Kentucky Democrat, complained that the organization of the
battalion appeared "to be very defective."*
20

Johnson's

voice held considerable weight in such a discussion for he
had been the commander of the last volunteer mounted Rangers
in the Army before 1832— the cavalry at the Battle of the
Thames in 1813.
The main problem the committee had with the Rangers was
one of cost.

The yearly cost of the mounted battalion of

volunteers was over $297,000.

Much of this money was spent

on the recruiting, eguipping and transport costs associated
with resupplying the unit with yearly volunteers.

Johnson

was especially dubious of using such volunteers when a
regular regiment of mounted troops would cost only $143,000
a year after it was formed.20

The volunteer mounted Rangers

were not disparaged in the report; it was simply that
28Reqister. 22nd Cong., 2nd sess., appendix 8.
20Congress, House, Mounted Rangers, 22nd Cong., 2nd
sess., House Document 17, Serial 236.
20Ibid.
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regular cavalry would be cheaper and easier to command than
the volunteer mounted rangers.

Because of this the

Committee reported a bill to the House entitled "An Act for
the more perfect defence of the frontier" calling for the
replacement of the mounted volunteers with a regiment of
dragoons.31

Part of the reason for the new bill was the

subtle difference in the different types of mounted troops.
Dragoons were meant to be used more like mounted infantry
while mounted rangers were scouting formations that would do
little full scale fighting.
bill was extremely brief,

The debate on the committee's
so brief and fragmentary in fact

that not all of the debate could have been included in the
Register. There is one item of importance covered, however.
The man who attempted to amend the 1832 act in the House to
include militia instead of volunteers also tried to amend
the 1833 bill.

On February 16, 1833, Joseph Duncan moved to

increase the battalion of mounted volunteers into a
regiment.

He said that he "did not believe they [the

dragoons] would be as efficient in service, or as acceptable
to the settlers on the frontier, whom this troop was
intended to defend."32
aside.

Duncan's motion was quickly brushed

This change in the House is surprising.

The body

that voted heavily in favor of militia over volunteers in
1832 decided that it would rather have a fully regular
regiment of dragoons instead of a volunteer force in 1833.3
1
31Register, 22nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1727.
32 i b i d .
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There had been a change in how the Regular Army was viewed
by many in the House.

One possible explanation for this

change was that the mounted rangers had served not only in
the Northwest but in the Western Department as well in
1832.^3

The need for mounted troops was different in the

two regions.

The West, with its far greater size, naturally

called for more mounted troops.

By 1833 the majority in the

House were willing to increase the Regular Army to help
protect the Western Frontier, and to keep peace in the
Indian territory, even though there was no imminent threat
to the region.

That the act creating the First Dragoons

passed with almost no debate in the Congress (neither House
ever made a formal division on the bill) or in the press
showed that the country would willingly increase the Army if
the circumstances called for it.3
34
3
*

*

*

On December 28, 1835, Major Francis L. Dade was nearing
the end of a Long and tiring journey.

Dade, with one

company from the Fourth Infantry Regiment and two companies
of artillery, was nearing Fort King in the north central
portion of the Territory of Florida.

Having been told by

his guide that they were nearing the fort, Dade relaxed his
march discipline.

Doing so was a tragic mistake, for in the

vicinity were large numbers of Seminole Indians angry at the
attempted, forced relocation of their people.
33Young, 467.
34Statutes at Large, 4:652.

Dade, unaware
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of the Seminoles' presence, marched his command into an
ambush from which no one survived.35
When news of the Dade massacre reached Washington
Regular Army strength in Florida was increased rapidly and
more than 4,000 militia from the nearby states were called
into service.

The early record of the regular infantry and

Militia troops was not good.

The formations had trouble

finding the Seminoles and even more trouble bringing them to
battle.

As one writer described the situation

A massacre would occur in one place while the troops
were in another. Seldom was the meager force in that
wide country able to catch up with a foe that was
capable of rapid disappearance.36
The situation did not please many in the capital.
Early in March 1836, Secretary of War Cass reported to
the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the "present
military force of the United States" was insufficient "to
garrison the fortifications of the seaboard and at the same
time give protection to the inhabitants residing in the
States and Territories bordering on the Indian Frontier."37
Cass's solution to the problem was to increase the Army by*
3

35wiegley, 161-2; Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A
Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 50.
36william Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United
States Army, (New York: D. Appleman and Company, 1924),
178 .
37congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of War, in
Compliance with a Resolution of the Senate, Relative to the
Numbers and Situation of the Indians on the Frontiers of the
United States, and a Plan for an Increase of the Army, 24th
Cong., 1st sess., Senate Document 228, Serial 281, 2.
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one artillery regiment and two infantry regiments and to
enlarge the companies from the base of 42 men per infantry
company and 45 for artillery to 59 and 84 respectively.
Passage of this plan would have increased the total number
of privates in the Army to 9,985, a 43 percent rise. 38

The

purpose of the plan was to provide a greater mass to the
Army.
Cass also saw other ways to make the Army better suited
to the nation's defense.

Reporting to the House Committee

on Military Affairs in January 1836, Cass emphasized the
need to reestablish the Frontier forts closer to the actual
Frontier and the need to link these forts with a strong
series of military roads.39

while such roads would help the

movement of all troops they would be particularly useful to
dragoons.

Cass did not call outright for more dragoons in

his report, but he did imply it.

For his new fortification

plan to work there would need to be more companies of
dragoons than the First Regiment could provide.

The

difference between the two reports could easily be caused by
the growing pressures the Army felt during the early part of
1836.

The calls for troops in Florida were increasing while

the Army was already spread dangerously thin.
Early press reactions to calls for an increase to the
Army were mixed.

The Richmond Whig strongly condemned such

38ibid., 4.
39congress, House, Protecting the Western Frontier,
24th Cong., 1st sess., House Document 401, Serial 294.
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moves as an attempt to use surplus revenue and insisted that
"war is always the first plausible pretext" to raid the
treasury.40
The editors of the National Intelligencer took a more
moderate view.

Even though they thought it best to have the

discussion on an Army increase occur outside the framework
of the Florida problems, they were
opposed, certainly, to maintaining a large standing
military force; but yet, we are not quite sure that
true economy as well as wise foresight do not require
some additions to be made to the effective force of the
Army.41
To accomplish this increase the editors much preferred
augmenting the companies already in existence instead of
adding more regiments.
An editorial in the New York Post in early February
found its editors much in agreement with those of the
Richmond Whig.

Their view was that some of the five

companies stationed in New York Harbor were no longer needed
to guard against French threats over the spoliations issue
and could be safely moved to Florida to allow the Army to
concentrate.

The paper was firmly against increasing the

size of the Army.42
On February 5, 1836, John Tipton sponsored a Senate
resolution asking the Secretary of War if the Army was

4°Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser, January 15,
1836 .

4lNational Intelligencer, January 26, 1836.
42new York Post, February 5, 1836.
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"sufficiently numerous for the duties they are required to
perform."43

Tipton claimed he did not want to be an

alarmist and did not expect to raise troops by the end of
the war with the Seminoles, but he thought it was time to
put the Peace Establishment on a "respectable footing."
Tipton went on to suggest that if there had been a proper
number of troops at Fort King and Fort Brooke in Florida,
Dade would not have been attacked and the Territory would
still have been in a state of peace.

Tipton also dismissed

the fears of the citizenry over a larger Army, saying he
knew that the people of the country would "look with a
jealous eye upon every step taken to augment our military
force" but that since "the army is their army; the money to
support it is theirs; the government is theirs," he expected
they would not complain if rightly informed about the need
for an increase.44

Little was done in the Congress,

however, until the Secretary of War reported back to the
Senate asking for three new regiments and larger companies.
As in 1833, the first move to increase the Army came
from the House Committee on Military Affairs.

Richard M.

Johnson, still the chair of the committee, moved a bill to
the House on April 21, entitled "An act for the better
protection of the Frontier."

Johnson, as the title of the

bill indicated, thought the real threat to the country lay
outside Florida, and suggested "the cloud which is gathering
43Reqister, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 386.
44Ibid., 2575.
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on our western horizon warns us to make immediate
preparation for the approaching storm."45

Johnson was

worried about the Indians along the Western Frontier, with
many times the potential strength of the Seminoles, rising
up and attacking settlers.

This fear was, in part, based on

the events of the Texas revolution which had unsettled the
entire Southwestern Frontier.

The bill he reported asked

for 10,000 volunteers, organized along the lines of the
Regular Army, to be raised for twelve months.

Because he

asked for volunteers Johnson ensured another debate on the
acceptability of volunteer, militia, and regular formations.
William Ashley, a Missouri Whig, suggested that what
was needed to perfect Johnson's bill was the inclusion of
another regiment of Dragoons to further protect the
Frontier.

Ashley did not discount the need for volunteers,

even mounted ones, but pointed out that after the year had
expired the Frontier would still need protection.

He felt

that the permanence of a second dragoon regiment was
absolutely necessary to ensure that the Frontiers remained
safe.46

Ashely moved to amend the bill to include such a

regiment and his motion passed without a division.
James McKay, a Democrat from North Carolina, proposed
to further amend the bill to allow only militia volunteers
as regulated by the Militia Act of 1795.

The motion, when

it carried, meant the House wanted President Jackson to be
45Ibid., 3324.
46Ibid., 3325.
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able to call out volunteers only as militia and only for a
period of three months.

The amendment also limited the

President's ability to call out the militia, letting him do
it only during an actual invasion or insurrection and not
before.

This amendment was a significant change, all but

rendering the volunteer portions of the bill inoperative.47
After McKay's amendment there occurred a long squabble
over the number and length of service of the volunteers.
Lewis Williams of North Carolina opposed adding 10,000
volunteers because it seemed like the creation of an entire
new Army.

Williams declared that if an Indian war loomed he

would vote for 100,000 men if necessary, but that the
circumstances of the moment called for no more than 5,000
men.
John Reynolds, an Illinois Democrat, a Major General of
Militia, and the commander of his state's forces in 1832
during the Black Hawk War, then spoke in favor of adding a
second regiment of dragoons.

Reynolds, even though a former

militia commander, was highly complimentary towards the
Army.

The problem, as he saw it, was that even though the

Army was as efficient as one in its position could be, it
still could not control events on the prairies without
cavalry.
After Reynolds's speech debate on the bill was delayed
until the next day when the New York City Democrat Churchill
Camberling gained the floor.
47 Ibid.,

3330

.

Camberling made a speech
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identifying the Mexicans as a possible adversary.

His

position, which drew sharp rebuttals from others in the
House, was that the Mexicans were hoping to agitate the
Indians of the Southwest in an attempt to trigger a war
between the Texans and Indians, in which the United States
could not avoid becoming involved.

Even though he arrived

at his position in an unusual way, Camberling supported the
passage of the proposed 10,000 volunteer troops.484
9
William Harrison, a Missouri Democrat, mentioned that
he was very glad that such a vital measure was receiving
support from the East and that he was "astonished, utterly
confounded, to see any opposition to the bill or to the
amendment" favoring the dragoon regiment.49

Harrison

reminded the House that there were over 30,000 Indian
warriors spread out on a thousand miles of Frontier.

The

Regular Army, he argued, would be hard pressed to keep the
peace in normal times and with a war going on in Florida it
was simply not possible.
The next speaker for the bill, Ransom Gillet, a
Democrat from Western New York, made an appeal for passage
based solely on sectional concerns.

Using a surprising bit

of logic, Gillet pointed out that the West had supported the
War of 1812 when the conflict was over Northeastern shipping
rights and that he hoped those areas would now support the
West.

Gillet also warned of a major and bloody war on the
48Ibid., 3334.
49Ibid., 3337.

101

plains if the bill was not passed.

After a short discussion

of the amount of money to be provided, the House passed the
bill out of the Committee of the Whole and adjourned.
On April 26, 1836, the House resumed debate on the
bill.

William Ashley made a plea for the second mounted

regiment, saying that providing less than that would be
"virtually saying to the people of the frontier; you must
take care of yourselves without the aid of the
Government."513
Democrat.

Echoing this view was Aaron Ward, a New York

Ward quoted the Quartermaster General, Thomas

Jesup, from his yearly report:
Five thousand men, of whom fifteen hundred should be
mounted, are necessary for the defense of this line
[upon the western frontier], and it can not be safely
trusted to less.53Ward admitted the expense of the bill might be objected to
but stated that "I have yet to learn that the blood of
American citizens is to be estimated by dollars and
cents.1,52

After Ward was done speaking, a motion by

Kentucky Whig John Chambers to amend the bill to simply
increase the size of the First Dragoons, was decisively
defeated and the bill was passed to a third reading.
After further debate of little interest, the House
voted decisively to pass the bill.55

The vote on the5
2
1
0

50Ibid., 3369.
51Ibid., 3372.
52Ibid.
52Ibid., 3375. The actual vote was 103 to not counted.
The other votes taken during the day showed a consistent
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seventh section, comprising the provision to raise the
regiment of Dragoons, was passed as a separate provision and
succeeded easily by a vote of 144 to 32.*
54

The bill, thus

amended, was sent to the Senate.
The attitude towards the Army increase was slightly
different once the bill reached the Senate.

On May 4, the

bill came to the full Senate from the Committee on Military
Affairs with only a few changes.

One of the changes was

important, however, since it changed the volunteers to non
militia formations serving twelve months.

After the

introduction of the bill Lewis Linn, a Missouri Democrat,
immediately drew the Senate's attention to the looming
adjournment scheduled in a few days and urged action before
that time.

William Preston, a fellow Democrat from South

Carolina, objected to a hasty resolution of the bill,
claiming that he had not enough information on the subject.
Preston also mentioned that it seemed as if certain members
were trying to move the Senate to action by using the fear
of war.55
Henry Clay, the influential Whig from Kentucky, was
even more direct than Preston, declaring that he did not
want to "interrupt the pacific relations of the Government
total of approximately 170 members voting indicating a
probable majority of 35 on the bill's passage, i.e., about
103 to 70.
54Ibid. Congress, House, House Journal, 24th Cong.,
1st sess., Serial 285, 872. Hereafter cited as House
Journal.
55 Ibid

1387 .
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and precipitate it into a war with Mexico."56

Clay made

clear his belief that the 10,000 volunteers could easily be
used in a land grab against the southern neighbor.

Clay

felt no need to provide the means for such a prospect.
After Clay finished his speech Thomas Benton chided him
for calling the bill a war bill.

Benton said he was

"repelled by the idea thrown out" by Clay and stated that
the bill did not look to the Texan Frontier but to the
Northwestern one instead.57

Benton also chastised those

Senators who were worried about the cost of the bill when
all the money to be spent for the volunteers was to come
from the treasury surplus that then existed.
The next speaker, Pennsylvania Democrat James Buchanan,
warned of the "one principle [which] had been established in
the political history of the country . . . never to
interfere with the internal policy or domestic concerns of
foreign nations."58

Buchanan wanted to stay out of the

"Texan war" but did favor sending forces to the Southwestern
Frontier if the Indians appeared rebellious.
After these speeches Benton regained the floor to
complain that some Senators seemed intent on creating a war
scare with talk of the Texas Frontier.

He said that the

"plan for increasing the Army grew out of the state of our
own affairs" and reiterated that to him the bill was a
56Ibid.
57 Ibid., 1389.
58Ibid., 1394.
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Northwestern measure.59

Benton also tried to move further

debate on the bill ahead of the debate on a different bill
but his motion to suspend the rules on the subject was
defeated.
When the Senate next took up the bill on May 18, 1836,
several of the Senators were upset at the long delay.
William King, an Alabama Democrat, pushed the Senate towards
a vote on the bill because he was afraid that the horrors
occurring because of the Seminoles in Florida could also
occur because of Creek unhappiness in his home state.

After

a short debate the bill was passed to a third reading and
received final passage on a voice vote.
When the House received the Senate's version of the
bill it quickly rejected it and called for a conference.
The major point of debate was on the nature of the 10,000
volunteers:

were they to be militia, covered under the

restrictive use provisions of the 1795 law (as the House
desired), or were they to be volunteers, raised for one year
and regulated only by the act itself and army regulation (as
the Senate wanted)?

One of the conferees for the Senate,

former Secretary of War Calhoun, thought the House version
was desirable since he doubted the constitutionality of some
of the provisions of the Senate version.

Calhoun objected

to the President appointing officers without the previous
advice and consent of the Senate.

As a part of the Army,

even if only temporarily, he felt the appointment of
59 Ibid., 1393.

105

officers should be accomplished in the same manner as were
Regulars.60
In the House discussion of the conference report the
Delegate from Florida left no room for doubt that he
considered the bill necessary for the defense of Florida.
Joseph White urged the House to acquiesce in the Senate's
view so troops could be provided for prompt duty against the
Seminoles.

White complained bitterly that the bill had been

held up because, "like every other that does not enlist the
passions of party," it remained unpassed "until the whole
frontier is now bleeding."61

White, who was originally in

favor of just a single regiment of mounted riflemen, now
urged further action on increasing the Army.

He was

satisfied that "the good sense of the American people will
justify an increase of the army to twenty thousand men" and
that three additional infantry and three additional
artillery regiments were needed.62

After White's urging,

the House did indeed pass the bill, accepting volunteers and
preserving the Senate's right to advise on which officers
were to be selected for the Regiment.

The Senate, led by

Calhoun, concurred and sent the bill to President Jackson,
who signed it on May 23, 1836.63*
3
6

60lbid., 1506-07.
61lbid., 3789-90.
62ibid., 3790.
63 Statutes at Large, 5:32.
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While most everyone was satisfied with the act
"authorizing the President of the United States to accept
the service of volunteers, and to raise an additional
regiment of dragoons or mounted riflemen," there were some
dissenters, one being the editor of the Charleston Mercury.
In an editorial on May 25, the editor asked if the
circumstances which prompted the bill still existed and if
there was a need to increase the Army.

Looking to the

Southwest he saw nothing to cause any alarm and he thought
that the threat from the Creeks in Alabama to be very small.
He admitted events in Florida were worrisome but thought
that the Army and militia had things well under control.
The position paper's editor was to be against the increase
simply because it saw no use for the volunteers.®^
Unfortunately the yeas and nays were not demanded on
any vote important to the passage of the 1836 increase, so a
statistical breakdown on the issue is not possible.

Review

of the debate, however, discloses that the members strongly
advocating the bill were generally from the Frontiers.

This

could also be said of the 1832 and 1833 increases as well
and it is possible that a majority of the Frontier
Representatives, especially those near Florida, would once
again have wanted militia volunteers instead of ordinary
volunteers, but this is not assured.

It is noteworthy that

both in 1832 and 1836 the motions to take the volunteers out
of militia units came from the House while the Senate held
^ Charleston Mercury, May 25, 1836.
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out for units comprised of individual volunteers.

With a

higher percentage of members from frontier states in 1836
than in 1832 or 1833, it might have seemed more logical for
the Senate to have asked for militia.

Without further

evidence, however, this question cannot be investigated.
One of the great strengths of the increase bill in 1836
was its highly vague nature.

At no time did the sponsors of

the bill ever specify why the increase was needed.

Even the

title of the bill merely mentioned the "frontiers," an
unhelpful term in a country surrounded by unsettled areas.
In the debate members suggested that the troops were bound
for various places:

to fight the Seminoles in Florida, to

overawe the Creeks in Alabama, to protect those on the Texas
Frontier from Indians stirred up by Santa Anna, and for the
Northwestern Frontier in general.

The multi-purpose nature

of the bill helped keep it from becoming a large party or
sectional issue in part because it could mean almost
anything to anyone.
"k

ic

Jc

After the passage of the 1836 Act the Second Dragoon
Regiment was formed and sent to the West while the
volunteers raised by the bill spent their one year in the
Florida region accomplishing little.

The Seminole War had

continued to go poorly for the Army in the early years of
the conflict.

By the end of 1836 over 23,500 citizens had

taken some part in the active campaigning against the
Indians and the strength of the regulars and militia in the
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territory was over 13,000.65

The situation had changed very

little by the start of 1838.
On December 19, 1837, the Richmond Whig carried an
editorial suggesting that Congress, in the new session,
would find that the war would occupy much of its time as it
struggled to discover the cause of the expenditure of over
eighteen million dollars "in a disgraceful war."66

The

editor also stated that he hoped a thorough investigation
would be undertaken before granting the expected twelve to
fifteen million more requested for the same purpose in the
coming session.
Even though they must not have enjoyed being reminded
of their failures against the Seminoles by reading about it
in the Whig, Army leaders would probably have agreed that
things had not gone well.

In a report to Congress, the

Adjutant General of the Army, Brigadier General Roger Jones,
admitted that "the regular force assigned to that service
[in Florida], at first inconsiderable, had from time to time
been increased to nearly

5

,0 0 0 ."67

Counting the Army,

active duty militia, and other forces in the state, the*
6

65John K. Mahon, The History of the Seminole War:
1835-1842 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967),
188 .
66Rjchmond Whig and Public Advertiser, December 19,
1837 .
67congress, Senate, Report from the Secretary of War;
in Compliance with a Resolution of the Senate, with
Statements of the Number of Troops Employed in the War with
the Seminole Indians. 25th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Document
226, Serial 316, 2.
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military establishment had over 8,800 men fighting the
Seminoles.

Jones also admitted to 175 men being killed in

the fighting and a “like number" of casualties due to the
climate since the Dade massacre.

Against these losses the

Army could show only 131 Indians killed and but 15
prisoners.68

it was this situation that Joel R. Poinsett,

the new Secretary of War in the Van Buren administration,
had to deal with when he took office.
Poinsett, a man with wide-ranging, if irregular,
military experience, was of the opinion that the Seminole
war had been mismanaged, partly due to an Army staff that
needed to be realigned.

Poinsett was especially upset at

the guality of the troops assigned to much of the fighting
in Florida.

Even though a former regimental commander of

militia, Poinsett did not care for short service men whose
"inadequate training rendered their efforts ineffective."6
69
8
In his first report to Van Buren, Poinsett suggested the
creation of a volunteer force recruited from neighboring
states.

These volunteers were to be recruited from the

militia with the only difference between the two forces
would being the length of service, years for the volunteers
instead of mere months for the militia.
There were several other changes that Poinsett proposed
in his first report as well.

He wanted to establish more

68Ibid., 4.
69G. A. Hurneni, "Palmetto Yankee: The Public Life and
Times of Joel Roberts Poinsett; 1824-1851" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of California at Santa Barbara, 1956), 244.
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forts along the exterior of the Western frontier because,
once again, settlement had outstripped the protection the
Army was able to provide.

Poinsett was in favor of

expanding the military road system to link the new exterior
forts with the existing ones, thereby strengthening the
region's overall protection.

Unfortunately such a plan

would have required 5,000 men to garrison these posts.70
With the Army's strength at 7,000 an increase would be
needed, especially considering that there were over 4,000
men in Florida.

Poinsett therefore proposed expanding the

Army's resources by adding three infantry regiments,
increasing the size of companies to 64, and adding a company
to each artillery regiment.7^

Altogether this called for an

increase of over 4,900 men.
The senior leadership of the Army agreed with
Poinsett's calls for an increased force.

The Commanding

General, Major General Alexander McComb, went even further
when he suggested doubling the size of the Army to nearly
15,000 men, the largest peacetime increase ever proposed up
to that time.

McComb would have used the majority of the

men to increase the strength of the garrisons in Florida.72

70Congress, House, Letter from the Secretary of War,
Transmitting Various Reports in Relation to the Protection
of the Western Frontier, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., House
Document 259, Serial 322, 2.
71Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of War,
1837, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Document 1, Serial 314,
2.

72Mahon, 226.
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Major General Scott, the Commandant of the Army's Eastern
Department, and the man with the responsibility for Florida,
asked for an increase of infantry regiments from seven to
twelve and an additional company in each Artillery
regiment.73
Other reports by senior officers throughout late 1837
and into 1838 pointed out the need for an increase in the
Army.

The Acting Quartermaster General, Colonel Trueman

Cross, reported to Congress in November 1837 that if "the
obligations are to be scrupulously fulfilled in good faith
. . . a military force of 30,000 men on the Western Frontier
would scarcely be adequate to enable the government to
discharge its duties."747
5 Colonel Cross, obviously a
political sage, stated that "expediency, I presume, would
not, tolerate" such a high number and wrote that 7,000 men
was the minimum force required for the frontier alone.73
In his report, the Chief Engineer of the Army, Brevet
Brigadier General Charles Gratiot, called for a total of ten
infantry regiments, ten artillery regiments, and two
regiments of dragoons for the defense of the country, a
total increase of nine regiments.76

73Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904; reprint, New York: Greenwood
Press, 1968 ), 159.
74Congress, American State Papers, Class V, Military
Affairs, 7 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 18321861), number 753, serial 022, 7:782.
75Ibid.
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A final report important to the impending debate on the
Army was sent to Congress by the Secretary of War in March
of 1838.

Poinsett was asked to supply the Senate with both

the numbers of volunteers and militia called out between
1832 and 1838 and the cost of using them.

The report stated

that in those six years the Government called a total of
43,885 volunteers to service.

By far the majority of these

men were used against the Seminoles (18,514) and the Creeks
(12,483).

There were also large numbers used during the

Black Hawk War (5,031), in the Cherokee country (3,926), and
on the Southwestern (2,803) and New York frontiers
(1,128),*
77
Poinsett included some interesting tables in his
report, showing the large gap between the average cost per
company of regulars versus volunteers, or militia.

The

following tables show that the regulars, if needed, had a
tremendous cost savings over the use of militia or
volunteers.78
Poinsett's report expressed two main points:

first,

that volunteers and militia were roughly twice as expensive
to use as regulars; and second, that during the 1830's
78Congress, House, Letter from the Secretary of War,
Transmitting Various Reports in Relation to the Protection
of the Western Frontier, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., House
Document 259, Serial 322, 9.
77Congress, Senate, Letter from the Secretary of War,
Transmitting Statements of the Comparative Expense of
Volunteers, Militia and Regular Troops. 25th Cong., 2nd
sess., Senate Document 271, Serial 328, 4.
78 Ibid., 7.
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TABLE 6
AVERAGE COST OF ONE COMPANY OF DRAGOONS

Time

Regulars

Volunteers

Militia

6 months

$13,573

$22,575

n/a

3 months

$6,786

$13,553

$12,079

TABLE 7
AVERAGE COST OF ONE COMPANY OF INFANTRY

Time

Regulars

Volunteers

Militia

6 months

$4,662

$7,287

n/a

3 months

$2,331

$4,987

temporary troops were needed fairly often.

$3,774

These facts

would logically support calls for an increase of the Army,
if for no other reason than to limit the cost of temporary
troops.
Obviously there were a great many military issues that
were to confront the Twenty-fifth Congress when it gathered
for its second session.

Historian J. Fred Rippy perhaps

stated it best when he wrote:
War with Mexico threatened; relations with England and
France were none too friendly; the situation was
menacing along the northern boundary; numerous hostile
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Indians threatened the security of a long western
frontier; the Seminoles of Florida were in arms; and
the Government had committed itself to the removal of
more than sixty thousand Red Men then residing east of
the Mississippx.79
It was going to be a busy session.
The first move to increase the Army in 1838 came from
Thomas Hart Benton, Democrat of Missouri, and longtime Army
supporter.

On January 24, 1838, Benton made a speech on the

floor of the Senate supporting the increase bill that he had
previously reported from his Committee on Military Affairs.
Benton stated that "there is no diversity of opinion in the
relation to the necessity of an increase of the Army" even
if there was some on how it was best accomplished.80

The

bill that Benton had brought from his committee was a simple
one.

It called for each infantry and artillery company to

have 100 privates (an increase of 58 men per company) which
would call for the total augmentation of the service by
6,148 privates, nearly doubling the line of the Army.
The Delaware Whig Richard Bayard also supported the
increase of the Army but in a different way than Benton.
His idea was both to increase the number of regiments and
increase company strength as well.

Bayard wanted to

increase the size of each company to 68 men and to add three
additional infantry regiments, an action which also would
79J. Fred Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1935; reprint, Durham:
Duke University Press, 1965), 171.
80Congress, Congressional Globe, 46 vols. (Washington
D. C.: Office of the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873), 25th
Cong., 2nd sess., 133.
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have added nearly 5,000 men to the Army.81

Unfortunately,

Bayard made no mention of where the three regiments he would
have raised would have been used.
The South Carolina Democrat William Preston wanted an
increase not only for the usual reason of frontier defense,
but for the simple fact that many companies were so small
and fragmented due to the demands and rigors of service that
they did not have enough men left to drill properly.

An

increase of company size would fix that problem.
Former Secretary of War John C. Calhoun also supported
the bill that Benton had submitted.

Since it was Calhoun

who, as far back as 1817, officially introduced the concept
of the expansible Army this is not surprising.

Calhoun

still felt that the officers of the Army were its most
important asset.

He stated that "experience has shown where

there are good officers, a tolerably good soldier could be
made in seven or eight months."82

It is ironic that in 1838

Calhoun voted to restore, and even increase, the companies
that he proposed reducing seventeen years before.
After Calhoun's remarks Bayard moved to recommit the
bill to the Committee on Military Affairs with instructions
to amend the bill along the lines of his own plan to
increase each Infantry and Artillery regiment to 68 privates
and create three additional regiments.

The motion was

soundly defeated (15 to 27) with several Senators who spoke
81Ibid.
82Ibid.
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in favor of the original bill (Calhoun and Preston among
them) joining those who did not favor any increase. 83

The

vote indicated that although the Senate might support an
increase it did not favor creating additional regiments.
The guestion was not simply a matter of the size of the
increase.

The final Senate version had a larger increase in

enlisted men than Bayard's amendment called for (6,148 to
approximately 5,000).

After Bayard's amendment was defeated

the Senate sent the bill to the House by a voice vote on
January 25, 1838.*
84
The bill to increase the Army was first reported to the
House of Representatives on January 30.

It was recommitted

nearly a month later because the Committee on Military
Affairs was still working on several of the provisions which
related to the staff of the army.

Due to these delays the

bill was not reported back to the House until June 26, 1838.
The version of the bill finally reported to the House
was different in several respects from the one sent over by
the Senate.

The House version was much more complex than

its counterpart and had several key changes regarding the
increase of the Army.

Instead of increasing all companies

to 100 men the House version increased the Infantry
companies to 80 (an increase of 38) and the artillery

88Senate Journal. 25th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 313,
124. Interestingly Benton, the reporter of the bill since he
was the Chair of the military committee, voted for the
recommital.
84Globe, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., 136.
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companies to 58 (an increase of 16).

The House Military-

Affairs Committee had also seen fit to add one company to
each Artillery regiment, giving them ten each, the same
number as the Infantry regiments, and to add an eighth
infantry regiment.

The revised bill called for the addition

of almost 2000 fewer men (4,268 to 6,148) than the bill from
the Senate while adding several units to the Army.

It

occupied a position neatly in the middle of the passed
Senate version and the proposed plan of Senator Bayard.
The first man to speak on the bill, New York Democrat
Issac Bronson, declared he would support the bill after
asserting that regulars were cheaper than militia or
volunteers by a margin of four or six to one.

Bronson,

echoing Poinsett's report to Congress on the subject, felt
that if the country was going to need more protection on the
frontier it should at least come as cheaply as possible.85
After Bronson's speech several Representatives
suggested ways to improve the bill.

The Missouri Democrat

Albert Harrison suggested the bill was "altogether
inadequate for the object contemplated" since it did not
raise a permanent rifle regiment.86

Harrison felt that a

clause in the bill allowing the President to convert an
existing infantry regiment for that purpose was not enough.
James McKay, a North Carolina Democrat and chair of the
Military Affairs Committee, wanted to add a second regiment
85Ibid., 482.
86Ibid.
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to the increase while the South Carolina Whig Waddy Thompson
only wanted to increase the Army by the 3,236 men provided
by expanding the companies.

Thompson was guite adamant

about not raising new regiments, declaring his "decided
opposition to any further increase of the Army than was
absolutely n e c e s s a r y 87
Democrat John Pope of Kentucky said he was also against
"raising a large military force under the influence of
imaginary danger" and declared that there was no need to
worry about the safety of either the Northern or Western
frontier.88

At the end of his speech Pope supported

Thompson's modest call for increasing the companies.

It is

worth noting, however, that a member willing to talk of the
"imaginary danger" which fueled the debate would also want
to increase the Army.

Pope's speech demonstrated the

underlying feeling in the Congress that some increase to the
Army was probably appropriate.
After debate on the bill resumed on June 28, 1838,
James McKay, with little additional comment, proposed an
amendment to include a second regiment of infantry in the
increase.

During the debate on the amendment several

members took the opportunity to state their differences with
the bill.

The banner of the militia was raised by long time

supporter Lewis Williams of North Carolina, who declared it
"the only kind of force for a Republic" regardless of the
87Ibid.
88Ibid., 483.
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threat.89

Williams was the only member of either House to

suggest seriously that the solution to the country's
military problems in 1838 rested with the Militia.

It is

indicative of the growing irrelevance of the institution
that this was so.

Williams favored no increase of the

regulars at all.
The Vermont Whig Horace Evertt agreed in part with
Williams even though it was for a different reason.

Evertt

thought the Army was ineffective and not worthy of
increasing because it was made up of mostly foreign born men
who were quite useless on the frontier.

He made clear his

intention to vote against not only the amendment but the
entire bill as well.

After Williams and Everett were done

speaking the House first defeated McKay's amendment on a
voice vote and then adjourned.909
1
When the House resumed debate on June 29, Albert
Harrison quickly moved an amendment to substitute the first
section of the bill.

His substitute attempted to replace

the increase of one company per Artillery regiment and one
Infantry regiment with two Infantry regiments.

The motion

was quickly and decisively d e f e a t e d . A f t e r the defeat of
Harrison's motion the House heard a motion by Massachusetts

89Ibid., 484.
90Ibid.
91Ibid., 485.
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Whig Nathanial Briggs to delete the one new regiment
authorized.92
The debate and voting on the Briggs amendment is
illustrative.

After a spirited debate, covering much the

same ground as in previous debates, the House voted to agree
with Briggs and deleted the regiment by a vote of 96 to 88.
After a long discussion on the staff of the Army the House
then adjourned for its daily break.

A second long debate on

the configuration of the staff occurred after the House
reconvened and a motion was made to reconsider the Briggs
amendment.

The motion to reconsider was passed, 103 to 88,

and during the reconsideration the amendment was defeated,
thereby restoring the regimental increase to the bill by a
vote of 95 to 104.

Unfortunately none of these vote totals

were recorded with a roll call.93

These votes are important

because they show the delicate balance that prevailed in the
House on the bill.

At least 88 members voted each time to

delete the regiment of infantry from the bill.

Whether the

Congressmen making these votes made up a cohesive bloc is
unknown.

It is also unknown if those voting against the

additional regiment of infantry were also against the entire
bill.

What is clear is that the House had achieved a fine

balance on the increase.

It is very possible that if the

bill had come from the Senate amended as Bayard had wanted,

92Ibid.
93Ibid., 486.

121

with an increase of three regiments instead of just one, it
would have failed to pass the House.
On July 2, several members continued the debate on the
bill by making impassioned speeches against the pay increase
for certain officers.

One member actually moved to amend

the title of the bill to include the words "[to increase]
the pay of the officers and privates and the patronage of
the President."94

The debate grew so heated that a motion

to reconsider the third reading was defeated by one vote, 94
to 95, again showing a solid core of those opposed to parts
of the bill.95

After this vote the House passed the bill to

the Senate, in a "severely amended" form where it was passed
without amendment and into law on July 5, 1838.96
The increase of 1838, like those in 1832, 1833, and
1836, was passed relatively quickly and without much
evidence of either party or sectional disputes.

The 1838

increase was also something of a war bill instead of being
an act to increase the Peace Establishment.

Because of the

Seminole difficulties some increase of the Army was probably
going to be made.

In this respect the differences between9
*
4

94Ibid., 489.
95House Journal, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 1212.
96prucha, Sword, 337; Statute at Large, 4:256. The
Senate found certain deficiencies concerning the staff in
the House version so bad that they passed a supplemental
bill which was signed into law two days after the original
bill. The Senate did not amend the House bill because it
was afraid the coalition to pass the bill would not stay
together due to "the present fluctuation of numbers in that
body" because of the coming end of the session. See
National Intelligencer, July 10, 1838.
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the Black Hawk and Seminole conflicts were more a matter of
size than of substance.

The bill was also an opportunity

for a new Secretary of War to rearrange the Army staff.

Of

the 87 new officers provided by the act 51 were going to the
staff.97

TABLE 8
PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO THE ARMY IN 1838

Plan

Poinsett's report

McComb
Scott

Regiment
increase

Company
increase

3 Inf.

1 company/
Art. Reg.

64

4900

--

--

6000

1 company/
Art. Reg.

--

2500

--

--

4900

--

100

6148

68

5000

-5 Inf.

Gratiot
Senate Comm, of
Military Affairs

3 Inf ./6 Art.
-

-

Bayard

3 Inf.

--

House Comm, of
Military Affairs
(final version)

1 Inf.

1 company/
Art. Reg.

97Coffman, 56; Rippy, 175.

Total
men per
company

Total
increase

80 Inf. 4268
58 Art.
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From the beginning of the session there was some
agreement about the need for an increase, but less agreement
on how to accomplish it.

All seven of the plans proposed to

increase the Army called for an increase of several thousand
men (see Table 8).

The senior officers of the Army

generally favored adding more regiments while Congress
generally favored increasing the size of companies.

Adding

more regiments meant greater flexibility in stationing
troops around the country since there would be more
companies available.

Regiments could be split up and

dispersed, but that rarely happened to companies (except for
some Artillery companies on duty in some of the smaller
forts on the Atlantic coast).

Of course the increase in

1838 was, in large part, meant to augment the Army in
Florida so such a distinction would be less important than
in other instances.

The compromise that resulted looked

much like the 1837 report of Secretary Poinsett.
It has been suggested that the reason for creating a
new infantry regiment was to provide more protection for the
Northern frontier while the rest of the increase was for
Florida and the Western Frontier.98

Such a contention,

while possible, is not necessarily correct.

There was

tension over the boundary of Maine and other disturbances
over the Canadian boundary in 1837 and 1838, but almost none
of the debate during the 1838 increase centered on this
topic.
98Coffman, 55.
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When over, the increase of 1838 provided much
justification for the concept of the expansible Army
advocated by John C. Calhoun in 1821.

The expansion

occurred during an ongoing conflict, with the greater part
of the troop increase being made in the established part of
the Army.

The increase would permit rapid augmentation of

the ability of the Army to prosecute the war.
*

*

*

The increases of the Army during the 1830s were
generally not of a contentious nature.

The Battalion of

Mounted Rangers raised in 1832 and the change of that
formation to dragoons the next year, the addition of the
Second Dragoons in 1836, and the general increase of the
Army in 1838 were all driven by the desire to meet specific
problems:

the danger of Black Hawk in 1832, the necessity

of dragoons for the western frontier in 1833 and 1836, and
the necessity for increasing Army strength in Florida in
1838 .
The sectional breakdown on the vote for the increase of
1832, and the speeches of the Congressmen on the others show
that the Frontier had a slightly different attitude toward
the increases for dragoons than the other sections.

The

Frontier was not unified, but was somewhat more likely to
want militia over volunteers and volunteers over regulars.
The local nature of militia and, to a lesser extent,
volunteers drove this desire.

By 1838, however,

few

advocated volunteers or militia to increase the Army.

The
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preference

for the regulars over volunteers or militia

meant one or both of two things:

first, that the increase

was expected to be permanent and that regulars were
appropriate due to their regular enlistments; and second,
that there was substantial agreement that in the long run
regulars were cheaper than volunteer troops.
The slow and steady increases of the Army throughout
the 1830s happened with little sectional or party dispute
largely because they were perceived as necessary.

When the

editor of the National Gazette wrote in 1838 that due to
unforeseeable circumstances, "an increase of the Army is
rendered obligatory," he could have been writing about the
treatment given by Congress to Army expansion throughout the
decade.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PEACE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 1840s

Unlike the 1830s, when the Peace Establishment of the
country was slowly but consistently increased, the
establishment of the 1840s was both decreased and increased,
depending on the needs of the moment.

Early in the decade

the Army of the United States continued the war in Florida
and fought a complex and often bitter war with Mexico which
required a large, though temporary, increase in manpower.
In 1848, while the Army was marching towards Mexico City, it
was comprised of 47,319 troops, nearly six times its
strength before the war.

The majority of these new troops

were volunteers raised only for the duration of the war.
Some of the increases of 1846, however, were meant as purely
peacetime measures.

These distinctions are important

because the measures clearly meant for the Mexican war are
outside the scope of this study while others enacted, often
simultaneously, with different concerns in mind will be
considered.

The line between a peacetime measure or wartime

measure is often inexact.

The increases of 1832, 1833, and

1838 could, in some ways, be considered war measures since
they were passed while the Army was engaged in pacifying
Indian tribes on different parts of the frontier.

The key

feature that separates the acts of the 1830s and the
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volunteer bill of 1846 was the permanence of the former.
The 1846 act providing the bulk of the men was clearly a war
measure:

it had no other purpose and the men it raised were

released once the war ended.
*

*

*

In 1841 the number of Regular troops stationed in
Florida reached an all-time high.

During April of that year

the strength of the regulars reached 5,076 men and it stayed
at about the same level well into 1842.1

The opportunity to

reduce the Army occurred in 1842 due to Colonel William J.
Worth's victory over the Seminoles.

Worth, when given

command of the Army in Florida in 1841, campaigned straight
through the summer months, destroying Indian dwellings and
crops.

The cost to Worth's men was high due to fever and

dysentery, but the cost to the Seminoles and their
subsistence way of life was higher.

By early 1842 the

Seminoles had broken up into small bands that were a muchreduced threat to the Army and citizens of Florida.2
Soon after Worth's successful campaign had concluded, a
variety of proposals were offered to reduce the expense of
the Army.

One report pointed out the high ratio of officers

to men in the Army.

The report observed that while the

organic law allowed only one officer to every 22.8 enlisted

^John K. Mahon, The History of the Seminole War: 18351842 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967), 293.
^Russell F Wiegley, History of the United States Army
(New York: Macmillan Co, 1973), 162-63.
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men, the Army had an overall ratio of 14 to l.34 The
problems of supernumerary officers and a large staff, issues
which had been raised in the 1830s when the Army was
expanding, were also discussed by those wanting to decrease
the Army.
A second report, produced by the House Committee on
Military Affairs, called for the reduction of both the line
and staff of the Army.

Written by the chairman of the

committee, the North Carolina Whig Edward Stanly, the report
proposed doing away with all centralized quartermaster
functions, reducing money for subsistence, eliminating many
of the special emoluments paid to the senior officers of the
Army, and slightly reducing the size of most companies in
the Army.4

The total savings of the proposal were modest,

only $716,917.5

In essence, the report called for a

moderate retrenchment of items considered not essential to a
smoothly running peace establishment.

The report was a

clear indication that many Congressmen expected an
opportunity to cut military costs.
3Congress, Senate, Report from the Secretary of War,
Showing the Average Monthly Strength of the Army, Including
the Military Academy, during the Year 1841, and the Expense
of the Same for the Same Period, 27th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Senate Document 247, Serial 398, 4.
4Congress, House, Organization of the Army, 27th Cong.,
2nd sess., House Report 904, Serial 410, 4.
5This total represented only 8.8 percent of the total
spending on the Army in 1841. By comparison the 1821
reduction cut spending over thirty percent. See Bureau of
the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 2:1084.
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The House and the Senate were poles apart, however, in
their views of military manpower policy at the start of the
second session of the Twenty-Seventh Congress.

Thus, the

first action concerning the Army in the Senate was an
attempt to increase its size.

On April 11, 1842, William

Preston, a South Carolina Democrat and the chairman of the
Senate Military Affairs Committee, introduced a bill calling
for the raising of two new infantry regiments and the
organization of a corps of horse artillery.6

Preston made

sure that the Senate understood that his measure was a
peacetime proposal.

He stated that the increase was desired

by Major General Winfield Scott, the new Commanding General,
for use on the frontier.

The infantry was to be used for

garrisoning posts while the mounted artillery would ride
with the dragoons.

The incongruity of raising the strength

of the Army at the end of a long war was never addressed by
Preston.

He surely must have known of the intention of the

House to look into ways to cut the cost of the Army.
Regardless, the Senate passed Preston's bill to a second
reading after which it was laid upon the table, not to be
taken up again.7
The first discussions in the House on the need to
reduce the size of the Army occurred on May 25, 1842, during
debate on the Army Appropriations bill for 1843.

James

6Congress, Congressional Globe. 46 vols. (Washington
D. C.: Office of the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873), 27th
Cong., 2nd sess., 385. Hereafter cited as Globe.
7Ibid., 416; 757.
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McKay, the North Carolina Democrat who supported the Army
increase in 1838 from his position as Chairman of the House
Military Affairs Committee, suggested the suspension of
recruiting new enlisted men until the Army reached a
strength of 8,000 men.
When McKay made a motion amending the appropriation
bill to that effect Milliard Fillmore, a New York Whig,
moved a point of order, citing the 53rd rule of the House
which stated that the reopening of an original issue during
debate on appropriations was not allowed.8*
0 The chair
1
overruled Fillmore, who then demanded a vote of the House to
uphold the point of order.

During the ensuing debate

several representatives supported McKay's motion.

Tennessee

Democrat Cave Johnson declared that since the troubles in
Florida were over, the country would be able to reduce the
Army "to the number necessary for peace."9

The speech of

Alabama Democrat Dixon Lewis might have best summed up the
position of those favoring reduction when he stated that he
was in favor of the amendment since he was in favor of
reduction and time in the session to accomplish it was
running short.

Even though Fillmore seemed on solid

parliamentary ground in his objection, the House upheld the
Chair, passed McKay's amendment by a vote 70 to 62, and sent
the bill to the Senate.^
8Ibid., 536.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., 537.
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When the Army Appropriation bill reached the Senate the
bill was split, with the appropriation portions going to the
Committee of Finance and the amendment proposing Army
reduction going to the Committee on Military Affairs.

While

the bills were in committee those favoring reduction were
warmly supported by an editorial in the Richmond Whig.
The editors of the Whig carefully chose their time to
write about the debate.

They addressed the subject on June

14, 1842, just as the Senate military committee was about to
complete its work.

At first the editorial praised those in

Congress who would "stay the increase of the class of drones
upon the body politic" and reduce the strength of the Army.
The editors suggested that the only true reason to have a
standing Army in peacetime was "to supply a new source of
patronage to the Federal Government," and they suggested
cutting the Army by half.11

One concern of the Whig was

that the resources of the country were not enough to provide
for the Army, especially the officers, who were part of a
"privileged class" and "unproductive consumers" of the work
of others.

A second, and perhaps more vital concern, was

the influence the Army had.

The editors wrote:

this opposition [to reduction], and the motives of it
thus openly avowed should ring a warning in the [ears]
of the people. If an Army of less than 12,000 and a
Navy comparatively small, can exert an influence upon
the press and Congress sufficient to control the
legislation of the country, and even cause the
Government to borrow money to augment their resources
and supply them with increased means for extravagance—

^ Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser, June 14, 1842.
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what may we not expect when the Army and Navy shall be
doubled.12
The Whig was stridently against an increase and for a cut in
the strength of the Army.
On June 21, 1842, the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs reported a bill that would have maintained the
number of regiments, but reduced each infantry company in
the Army from 80 to 50 privates.

Titled Senate Bill 283,

"An Act Respecting the Organization of the Army," the plan
would have reduced the Army by 2,920 men, leaving a total of
8,884.

In comparison the House plan would have disbanded

the Second Dragoons, reduced companies to 45 privates in the
Artillery regiments and to 40 in the Infantry regiments.
The overall reduction in the House version would have been
4,475, nearly 1,600 more than in the Senate version.I3
Debate in the Senate centered almost solely on peripheral
issues.

After voting on a few amendments of little

importance the Senate passed the reduction bill to the House
by a voice vote on July 1, 1842.14
After a delay of exactly one month the House began
debate on Senate Bill 283.

The first speaker, Edward

Stanly, the North Carolina Whig who started the reduction
effort, moved to repeal the entire act of 1838 which had
increased the Army.

Stanly was supported by fellow Whig

12ibid.
43Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 659.
14Congress, Senate, Senate Journal, 27th Cong., 2nd
sess ., Serial 394, 412. Hereafter cited as Senate Journal.
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Roger Gamble of Georgia who declared that the "Army was too
large for a peace establishment and, too small for a war
establishment."151
*
6
Another Whig, Thomas Campbell of Tennessee, stated that
the House had already settled the question of Army reduction
when the appropriation bill was sent to the Senate.
Campbell said he hoped that the House would stick to its
rights and demand the reduction it first asked for.

Ohio

Whig Samson Mason suggested amending Bill 283 to disband the
Second Dragoons as well as initiate the cuts asked for in
the original House version.16

Mason's proposal would have

had the effect of repealing both the 1836 and 1838 increases
to the Army.

Lott Warren, a Whig from Georgia, went even

further than Mason when he suggested the disbanding of both
dragoon regiments and the reduction of the rest of the Army
to 1821 levels.

Warren stated that such a reduction was

acceptable since the civilized tribes, including the
Cherokees and Choctaws, would provide better protection to
the settlers on the Frontier than the Army.^7

At this point

in the debate, there had been proposals ranging from cutting
the Army a few thousand men at the company level (Senate
version) to reducing the Army to the level of 1821.
Arkansas Democrat Edward Cross decried any talk of
reducing the dragoons and reminded the House that over
15Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 824.
16Ibid., 825.
I7 Ibid.
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60,000 Indian warriors were within striking distance of the
Western Frontier and that the region was still in need of
protection, even if things seemed peaceful at the moment.
Pointing out that "the only place for danger" was now
between the Red River in Texas and the northwestern corner
of Missouri, Cross asked if any Representative would want
only infantry to be available for duty in such a region.18
On August 2, after a day's recess John Edwards, a
Pennsylvania Whig, set the tone for much the rest of the
debate when he said that if peace was at hand then it was in
the interest of the nation to reduce the Army.

He also

stated that "he would go for giving any point protection
which was not secure" because that was the responsibility of
the government.19

To protect the Western settlements

Edwards thought it would be necessary to have dragoons on
the plains.

Edwards, therefore, favored moderate reduction

in the companies but not disbanding any regiment.

Such a

line of thinking slowly gained strength in the House
Committee of the Whole.
Cave Johnson disagreed with Edwards and moved to strike
all but the enacting clause of the Senate Bill and insert
sections formally repealing the 1836 and 1838 increases.
Johnson also "deprecated the giving a party complexion to
the debate," declaring that those for reduction were only

18Ibid.
19Ibid., 838.
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looking after the welfare of the country.20

Johnson's

amendment was easily defeated by a voice vote, however, and
the debate resumed.
John Reynolds, an Illinois Democrat, suggested that
some members of the House shied away from cutting the Army
since it would be ruinous to the officers involved.
Reynolds, the Governor of Illinois and commander of the
state militia during the Black Hawk war, disagreed with such
thinking and let it be known that he favored making some
cuts in the number of officers in the Army.2^After another recess the Committee of the Whole spent
most of August 3, 1842, arguing whether to make the Second
Dragoons a regiment of mounted rifleman, a change that dealt
more with the equipment of the troops than the cost
involved.

After this debate the Committee passed the bill

and sent it to the Senate calling for the reduction of all
companies in the Army to 42 privates but leaving the Second
Dragoons untouched.

After passage Cave Johnson, hoping to

get even more reductions, attempted to get the Committee to
reconsider the vote but was soundly defeated 65 to 116.22
When the bill was taken up by the House on August 4,
1842, a surprising thing happened.

20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22 Ibid., 840.
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House passed, 99 to 59, an amendment by Cave Johnson calling
for the disbanding of the Second Dragoon Regiment.23
There is little evidence as to why the House would vote
against the reconsideration on the third but would vote to
disband the Second Regiment of Dragoons on the fourth.

It

is unlikely that a swing of 82 votes occurred spontaneously,
but there is no known reason for the shift.

Of course the

possibility of powerful arguing in the Congressional rooming
houses the previous night is always a possibility.

The

details of the vote to disband the Second Dragoons are
presented by region in Table 9 and by party in Table 10.

As

Table 9 shows the Frontier was the only region which favored
the retention of the Second Dragoons.

The ability of

dragoons to move quickly on the plains, an ability often
brought up during the debates, must have influenced the
representatives of the region into voting for the measure.
The regional vote shows that the South voted over three
to one against the dragoons while the North voted against
the Regiment by a much closer three to two margin.

The

Southerners were probably much more comfortable since the
Seminoles had been rendered ineffective but the disparity of
the vote indicates that the South was hesitant over keeping
a large regular army.

John K. Mahon suggests that the

23congress, House, House Journal, 27th Cong., 2nd
sess., Serial 400, 1210. Hereafter cited as House Journal.
Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 844-5. The House Journal
lists the vote as 100 to 70 while the Globe lists it as 100
to 69. Amazingly the raw data in both forms show the actual
vote as being 99 to 59, an amazingly large error.
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TABLE 9
HOUSE AMENDMENT TO DISBAND SECOND DRAGOON REGIMENT,
BY REGION

Region

Yeas

Nays

Total

North

57

(59%)

39

(41%)

96 (100%)

South

36

(77%)

11

(23%)

47 (100%)

6

(40%)

9

(60%)

15 (100%)

99

(63%)

59

(37%)

158 (100%)

Frontier
Total

TABLE 10
HOUSE AMENDMENT TO DISBAND SECOND DRAGOON REGIMENT,
BY PARTY

Region

Yeas

Nays

Total

Whigs

63

(67%)

30

(33%)

93 (100%)

Democrats

33

(53%)

29

(47%)

62 (100%)

3 (100%)

0

(0%)

3 (100%)

59

(37%)

158 (100%)

Others
Total

99

(63%)

reason why so many Southerners voted against the bill was
that a large Army was favored by the high tariff men of the
North and that many Southerners had genuine concerns about
the cost of an ever growing army.24

Mahon also suggested
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that many in the Northeast voted for the Second Dragoons
because keeping the Regiment would be useful in the ongoing
Webster-Ashburton Treaty negotiations.

While a plausible

explanation, the debates on the bill indicate no such
thinking on the part of the men of the Northeast.2
25* For
4
whatever reasons the large Southern vote against the
Dragoons ensured that the amendment would pass.
A review of the vote by party indicates that the Whigs,
in control of the House for the first time during the
Twenty-Seventh Congress, carried 33 of the 40 vote majority
for the amendment.25

The measure was not an outright party

bill, for 30 Whigs still voted for the Regiment and the
Democrats were nearly evenly split, but it was Whig votes
which put the issue beyond doubt.
After the House had voted to disband the Second
Dragoons it voted 123 to 62 for passage of the bill, and
sent it back to the Senate.27

When the Senate considered

the bill the next day it received a recommendation from the
Committee of Military Affairs to reject the entire bill and
ask for a conference with the House.25

24Mahon, 311.
25Ibid., 312-13.
25See Appendix 2 for a breakdown of the party structure
in the Twenty-Seventh Congress.
27House Journal. 27th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 400,
1210.

25Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 848.
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The Conference Committee met on the reduction issue and
quickly worked out a compromise.

The House agreed to have

the Appropriation bill stand alone and to have all reduction
efforts focused in Senate Bill 283.

The committee agreed

that all companies in the Army would have 42 privates,
except for the dragoon regiments which would have 50
privates per company.

The committee also agreed that the

Second Dragoons would become a rifle regiment instead of
being disbanded.29

The compromise passed the Senate on

August 18, 1842, by a vote of 29 to 7 and, even though it
spared the Second Dragoons (albeit as a cheaper rifle
regiment), it passed the House the following day by a vote
of 97 to 63.30
The retrenchment of 1842 cut the authorized strength of
the Army from 12,539 men to 8,613.

Actual strength dropped

from a peak of 11,319 in 1841 to 8,509 in 1845 and was not
to rise again until the start of the Mexican War in 1846.31

^9 ,
854. The Second Dragoons were restored as a
mounted unit by "An Act to repeal so much of the act
approved the twenty third of August, one thousand, eight
hundred and forty-two, as requires the second regiment of
dragoons to be converted into a regiment of rifleman,"
passed on April 4, 1844. Richard Peters and George Minot,
eds., United States Statutes at Large 10 vols.
(Boston:
Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1846-1861), 5:654.
Hereafter cited as Statutes at Large.
30senate Journal. 27th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 394,
584; Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 901. The House roll call
is not recorded. Statutes at Large, 5:512.
3^William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United
States Army (New York: D. Appleman and Company, 1924), 191.
Census, 2:1142.
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*

*

*

The United States Army suffered a tumultuous year in
1846.

Because of disputes with Great Britain over the

boundary and occupation of Oregon and with Mexico over the
annexation and boundary of Texas, the Army looked
particularly small and ineffectual at the start of the first
session of the Twenty-Ninth Congress.

The two military

committees soon attempted to change this with partly
conflicting bills, listed in Table 11.

TABLE 11
BILLS INTENDED TO INCREASE THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
INTRODUCED DURING THE 29th CONGRESS

House/Number

Name

Senate 29

A bill to provide for a Regiment of mounted
Rifleman, and for establishing military
stations on the Route to Oregon.

House 23

A bill to protect the Rights of Americans in
the Territory of Oregon, until the termina
tion of the joint occupation of the same.

House 38

A bill to authorize an Increase in the Rank
and File of the Army of the United States.

House 145

A bill providing for the Prosecution of the
existing War between the United States and
Mexico
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House Bill 23 and Senate Bill 29 were both designed to
provide more military protection for American citizens in
Oregon.

In this sense the bills were peacetime measures,

cautionary in nature, and were introduced early in the
session.

The other two bills, House Bills 38 and 145, were

different.

House Bill 38 asked for the increase of all

companies to 100 men each and was passed only after war had
been declared.

House Bill 145 called for 50,000 volunteers

and provided the majority of the volunteer regiments raised
for the war.

The bill also served as the declaration of war

between the two nations.

These latter two bills were

clearly wartime measures, acted on only after fighting had
broken out.

House Bills 38 and 145 will therefore be

treated sparingly in this work.

It is important to point

out, however, that the coming war with Mexico affected all
the Army bills in the session.

All three bills that were

finally enacted were passed within a week of the declaration
of war signed on May 13, 1846.
The need to have some sort of increase for the Army was
apparent to many in Washington in December of 1845.
Secretary of War William L. Marcy reported to the Senate
Military Affairs Committee in that month that an increase of
company strength to at least 64, and perhaps 84 men, was
desirable.32

Marcy wanted the men to strengthen the3
2

32Congress, Senate, Documentation in Relation to the
Expediency of Increasing the Military Defenses of the
Country, 29th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Document 225, Serial
474, 1.
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"seaboard and northern and western frontiers" and thought
the lack of protection for these regions to be so bad that
an interim call for 50,000 volunteers was needed.

Marcy

pointed out that there were only 480 men on the Northern
Frontier due to the worrisome problems with Mexico and also
proposed two new Regular regiments for the posts in the
Rockies.33
The same day that Marcy reported to the Senate Military
Affairs Committee that an increase of the Army was needed
(December 29, 1845), the Committee reported a bill to the
Senate for the creation of an additional Cavalry regiment
and a string of forts along the route to Oregon.34

After

spending a week languishing in the Committee of the Whole
the bill was sent to the Senate for its consideration.

As

the Chairman of the military committee, Missouri Democrat
Thomas Hart Benton was the first to speak.

Benton asserted

that the bill "was reported as a peace measure, and had no
reference whatever to war, or to the rumors of war which
agitated the whole world," and that the bill "grew entirely
out of the present defenceless state of" the Frontier.35
Benton asked that the Senate refrain from discussion about
foreign relations during the debate since such a discussion

33Ibid., 2. For an excellent overview of the military
situation of the United States in early 1846 see, Ivor D.
Spencer, The Victor and the Spoils: A Life of W. L. Marcy,
(Providence: Brown University Press, 1959), 142-49 passim.
34G.lobe. 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 108 .
35Ibid., 153.
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would not apply to the bill.

The only negative comments on

the efforts to add a mounted regiment occurred on January 8,
when Kentucky Democrat John Crittenden guestioned Benton on
the cost of the forts to be constructed.

After receiving

assurances that the forts would cost no more than $50,000,
Crittenden dropped his objections.

The bill then passed the

Senate and was sent to the House on a voice vote.3
38
7
3
6
While the Senate was working on a bill to add a mounted
regiment to the Army the House was working on a bill to add
two mounted regiments.

On January 2, 1846, the House

Committee on Military Affairs sent House Bill 23 to the
Committee of the Whole, asking not only for two regiments
but an increase in money spent on fortification.

After

several days of debate the bill was tabled and eventually
the ideas it represented were embodied in Senate Bill 29.37
Once the Senate had passed the bill to add a third
cavalry regiment the public press took notice of the issue.
The Charleston Mercury, regardless of Benton's statement in
the Senate, linked the increase with a possible war with
Britain.

The editor wrote that:

gentleman seem to think on one side that this thousand
men is enough to conguer all North America, and on the
other that so serious an addition to our already
tremendous military force will convince Great Britain
that she must prepare for a mortal struggle.38

36Ibid., 162.
37 ibid., 124.
38Charleston Mercury. January 8, 1846.
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The Mercury ended its editorial by admitting that a regiment
used simply as internal police might make some sense but
that the present atmosphere did not easily allow for an
increase.
The Richmond Whig took a much more negative view of any
Army increase than did the Mercury.

Commenting on the

debate to raise two additional regiments, which was
occurring as the House debated House Bill 23, the editor
wrote that the debate had seen "much clamorous profession
and loud vaunting--much demagogism, much pretended courage,
and much real fear of the people. "39

The Whig thought that

a war with Britain over Oregon would be calamitous and urged
"caution and patience" in a dispute that the paper felt
would require 20,000 additional soldiers once fighting
started.40
President Polk and Secretary of War Marcy had a problem
while the bills to increase the Army were winding their way
through the various committees and Houses of Congress.

Both

men wanted to increase the Army but both were afraid of
being charged with war mongering if they pushed too hard for
passage.*
4!

Because of this Polk failed to directly address

the issue in several messages to the Senate.4^

Part of

^ Richmond whig and Public Advertiser, January 9, 1846.
4^ibid., February 20, 1846.
41Spencer, 149.
42james K. Polk, The Diary of James K. Polk, 4 vols.,
Ed. Milo Milton Quaife (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & CO., 1910;
reprint, New York: Kraus Reprint CO., 1970), 2:300.
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their problem was solved when, on March 17, the Senate asked
President Polk to comment on the need to increase the
military or naval force of the country due to problems in
foreign relations.

Polk replied one week later by

suggesting that an increase "both by land and sea" was
necessary.

Quoting George Washington, Polk urged Congress

to "remember also that timely disbursements to prepare for
danger, freguently prevent much greater disbursements to
repel it."43

As for the situation in Oregon, Polk stated

that Britain was making preparations that could only be
considered warlike and that no matter how sincere the desire
of peace might be in that country the armaments could be
used against the United States.

Referring to Mexico, Polk

called relations with the southern neighbor "unsettled" and
noted that "demonstrations of a character hostile to the
United States" continued to be made.4
44
3

Polk thought the

majority of the Army needed to be based in the south but
that other areas of possible conflict needed to be protected
as well.

An increase of the Army was the only way to meet

both these goals.
On April 7, 1846, Ohio Democrat Jacob Brinkerhoff
reported Senate Bill 29 from the House Committee of Military
Affairs with several amendments.

The most important of

these changed the regiment raised by the bill into a regular
43J. D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National
Literature, Inc., 1897), 5:2277.
44Ibid.
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rifle regiment but allowed the President to have the option
of mounting the regiment if he felt it was necessary.454
*
6
There was a wide array of opinion in the House as to the
best way to increase the Army, not all agreeing with the
work of the military committee.

After Brinkerhoff's speech

most of these ideas were discussed.
Frederick Stanton, a Tennessee Democrat, wanted to
increase the Army by two cavalry regiments instead of the
one rifle regiment that had been proposed.

Considering

unmounted troops to be a waste of money, Stanton favored no
increase if troops of this type were offered.45

Another

Tennessee Democrat, George Jones, disliked the whole bill.
He felt the rationale for any increase was to get Western
men who could ride and fight the Indians into the Army.
Jones suggested that no Westerner would join the Army for a
bounty in peacetime but would readily join once war broke
out.

The solution, according to the Tennessean, was to make

the proposed regular formations into volunteers and recruit
the men needed after fighting had started.4^
The next speaker in the debate, Jefferson Davis of
Mississippi, wanted a quick passage of the bill.

Davis was

fearful that the Army would not have enough men to protect
the emigrants to Oregon when they started to move across the

45Globe, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 629.
46Ibid.
47Ibid., 630.
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plains in May.

Davis pointed out that giving the President

the authority to mount regiments currently in the Army would
not satisfy the situation since all the regiments already
had been assigned different duty.48
After an adjournment of a few days the House resumed
debate on the bill on April 10, 1846.

Mississippi Democrat

Jacob Thompson wanted the House to disagree with
Brinkerhoff's amendment (asking for an unmounted rifle
regiment) since he did not think the Senate would agree to
it.

Thompson also told the House that the bill was not a

war bill and that "for twenty years the West had required a
police such as the bill proposed."49

Disagreeing with

Thompson was John McClernand, a Democrat from Illinois.
McClernand thought it was foolish to propose any permanent
increase with the bill.

He saw the problems on the plains

as a temporary inconvenience and favored dealing with the
situation without increasing the Army.

Attempts to rush

through such an increase McClernand labeled as
"demagogism."4
50
9
4
8
When his turn to speak came Jacob Brinkerhoff suggested
a new line of thinking.

Brinkerhoff stated that he thought

that infantry was the correct form for the new regiment
since it would not be used freely on the plains but instead
in the new posts to be authorized by the bill.
48Ibid., 631.
49 ibid., 653.
50Ibid., 654.
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thought the vital part of the bill was not the Army increase
but the posts which would protect the emigrants on their
trek across the continent.51

But since the entire Army was

already assigned to some particular duty and the troops
provided in the bill were to be the ones assigned to the
posts it only made sense, according to Brinkerhoff, to
provide for infantry instead of cavalry.
After Brinkerhoff's speech the time set for debate on
the bill expired.

The first to offer an amendment was G. W.

Jones, a Georgia Democrat.

Jones suggested that volunteers

be accepted for two years but his motion was defeated.
Felix McConnell, an Alabama Democrat, then gave a short
speech against the Army and facetiously moved an amendment
to increase the Army by 21 regiments.

There were also

several attempts to increase the regiments provided for in
the bill to two.

All these amendments failed, usually by

guite large margins.525
3
After a day's recess the House again took up motions
pertaining to the bill on April 11, 1846.

After some

maneuvering as to whether officers should only be selected
from among supernumerary officers already in the Army, the
House voted 138 to 38 to pass the bill to a third reading
and 90 to 54 to pass the bill and send it back to the
Senate.55

Unfortunately, the roll call vote survives only

51Ibid.
I

52Ibid., 654-658.
53Ibid., 658.
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for the vote to pass the bill to the third reading.
Presented in Tables 12 and 13, a breakdown of this vote
shows several trends.

Table 13 shows there is almost no

differentiation in the party vote.

Whigs were slightly more

likely to vote for the increase than Democrats (84 percent
TABLE 12
HOUSE VOTE TO PASS SENATE BILL 29 TO A THIRD READING,
BY PARTY

Region

Yeas

Nays

Total

Democrats

87 (78%)

24 (22%)

111 (100%)

Whigs

46 (84%)

9 (16%)

55 (100%)

4 (80%)

1 (20%)

5 (100%)

137 (80%)

37 (20%)

171 (100%)

Others

Total

TABLE 13
HOUSE VOTE TO PASS SENATE BILL 29 TO A THIRD READING,
BY SECTION

Region

Yeas

Nays

Total

North

81 (84%)

15 (16%)

96 (100%)

South

46 (72%)

18 (28%)

64 (100%)

Frontier

10 (91%)

1 (9%)

11 (100%)

Total

137

(80%)

38 (20%)

171 (100%)
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to 78 percent) but the difference is small.

The regional

vote, however, shows the Frontier voting heavily for the
bill, in part because the region felt that it was exposed to
danger from the turmoil in Texas.
What is different from previous discussions on
increasing the Army is the lack of discussion about
supplying the nation with volunteers instead of Regulars.
The issue was raised only once, and then by a Southerner,
Jones of Georgia.

Such a lack of interest in increasing the

Army in a way traditionally more acceptable to those on the
Frontier is important.

One possible explanation for this

lack of interest was that the troops raised by the bill were
to be used, not along the frontier, but far in advance of
it.

The route to Oregon would be a hard place to station

volunteers and an ideal place to use regulars.

Those from

the Frontier would accept regulars without concern on these
grounds.

It is also interesting to note that the North,

once again, supported the increase more readily than the
South.

Both regions did pass the motion by overwhelming

margins but the South did so by the smaller percentage.
After the vote by the House to pass the bill and send
it back to the Senate on April 11, little action was taken
on the measure until after a series of startling
developments.

Tensions on the Southwestern frontier had

continued to mount with both the Mexican and American
governments placing increasingly numerous military units on
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the Rio Grande.

On April 26, 1846, the clash that many

worried about but few expected occurred.

Polk and his

cabinet were united on what needed to be done; the power "to
enable the President to prosecute the war" must be
granted.54

The President quickly sent to Congress what

amounted to a war message.

He stated, in part:

I recommend that authority should be given to call into
public service a large body of volunteers to serve not
less than six to twelve months, unless sooner
discharged. A volunteer force is, beyond question,
more efficient than any other description of citizen
soldiers.555
6
After a single day of debate the bill associated with the
President's message was forced out of the Military Affairs
Committee.

With patriotism and anger over the Mexican

attack both running high those opposed to any rash actions
were swept before the tide of feeling.

Only two days after

the President's message had been sent to the Congress, House
Bill 145, providing for the "Prosecution of the Existing War
between the United States an the Republic of Mexico", was
passed by overwhelming margins; 174 to 14 in the House and
40 to 2 in the Senate.55
Partly because of the state of war it had just declared
the Congress decided to pass "pell mell" every other piece
54Polk, 2:356.
55Globe, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 783.
56Ibid., 795, 804. There were twenty members in the
House and three in the Senate who simply refused to vote on
the measure. All fourteen no votes in the House were cast
by Northern Whigs led by former President John Q. Adams of
Massachusetts. See Sellers, 415-7.
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of military legislation before it.57

First to receive

attention, and passed the same day, was a measure to
increase every company in the Array to 100 privates for the
duration of the war and to decrease all companies to 64 once
hostilities had ceased.58

The effect of this bill was to

increase the postwar army by several thousand men since most
companies had been comprised of 42 privates since 1842.
This bill was passed a war measure, but it would have long
term implications for the peace establishment.
Senate Bill 29 (raising a mounted rifle regiment and
establishing military posts on the route to Oregon),
previously passed by both Houses and being reviewed by the
Senate Military Affairs Committee, was discharged from the
committee after the President pro tempore broke a 22-22 tie
on reconsidering the House amendments.

The bill was quickly

moved through the Senate and President Polk signed the bill
on May 19.59
The increases of 1846 are remarkable because they were
settled in the confusion of the first foreign war the
country had fought in a generation.

While the bill to

provide a third mounted regiment was passed after war had
been declared there appeared to be every chance that the
measure would have passed without the war.

During the

57Sellers, 418.
58Statutes at Large, 9:11.
59Ibid., 9:13. House Bill 23, a similar attempt to
provide protection to the settlers in Oregon, was tabled in
the House because it was thought the Senate Bill was better.
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debate on the bill it was widely understood that regular
troops were the best way to provide protection on the route
to Oregon.

Even on the frontiers the preference for the

volunteers had diminished except when discussing problems of
an immediate or overwhelming nature.

Fear of the Regular

Army seemed to be on the decline.
While some of the 1846 increases to the Army were meant
for the Peace Establishment, the attempts to increase the
Army in 1847 and 1848 were purely measures to augment the
Army during the Mexican War.

As such, they are outside the

scope of this study because they do not involve the
peacetime establishment.
After the Mexican War had run its course the Regular
army was quickly reduced as the volunteers of 1846 and the
regulars raised in 1847 were sent home and the regular
companies were reduced to 64 men each under the authority of
the "Act to authorize an Increase of the Rank and File of
the Army of the United States which had been passed May 13,
1846.60

The Army quickly fell from its wartime high of over

47,000 in 1847 to 10,744 in 1849.

Soon after the war ended,

however, many in Congress thought the Army needed to be
expanded to face the changing demands of the frontier.
One Congressman who clearly saw the need to expand the
Army was the Democratic Senator from Mississippi, Jefferson
Davis.

Davis, who had served as the Colonel in the famous

First Mississippi Volunteer Regiment during the war, was the6
0
60Statutes at Large, 9:11.
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chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee during the
Thirty-First Congress.

Davis wrote Secretary of War George

W. Crawford in early 1850 suggesting the increase of the
Army by two additional cavalry regiments to allow easier
patrol of the new territories acquired from Mexico.61
Although nothing came of Davis's suggestion until much
later, his support for an Army increase was to continue.
On the first day of May 1850 Davis moved to postpone
the prior order of the day to take up a bill entitled "An
Act to increase the Rank and File of the Army, and to
encourage Enlistments."62

The Senate allowed the motion,

passed the bill, and sent it to the House with no
substantial debate.

The bill's main purpose was to allow

the President to authorize the increase of any company on
the Western frontier to a strength of 74 privates, an
increase of ten men.

Traditionally the Army's companies

were only a fraction of the strength they were allowed.

Due

to death, desertion, and the difficulty of supplying
frontier posts with new men, frontier companies were always
undermanned.

Allowing such companies to recruit to 74

privates would allow them a better opportunity to remain
near full strength.

In essence the plan was to allow the

Army to recruit at more than 100 percent for the companies
on the frontiers.*
61jefferson Davis, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, eds.
Haskell M. Monroe, et al., 7 vols. to date (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana University Press, 1971-), 4:355.
6^Globe, 31st Cong., 1st sess., 884.
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When the bill reached the House the Representatives
several efforts were made to get the bill taken up out of
order but these attempts were consistently defeated.63

The

bill was finally debated, in its order, on May 23, 1850.
The first speaker in the debate, South Carolina Democrat
Armistead Burt, supported the increase because he thought
that death and desertion typically caused the loss of one
quarter of the men recruited.

The one condition that Burt

applied to his support for the bill was that no officers
could be added to the Army.6
64
3

TABLE 14
AUTHORIZED, ASSIGNED, AND AVAILABLE STRENGTH OF THE U. S.
ARMY, BY REGIMENT TYPE, 1850

Type of unit

Authorized

Assigned
Fit for duty
(% of authorized)

Mounted
2 Dragoon
1 Mounted rifle

2,100

1,799 (86% )

1,155 (55%)

Infantry
8 regiments

4,464

4,094 (92%)

2,793 (61%)

Artillery
4 regiments

2,802

2,716 (97%)

1,998 (71%)

Total

9,372

8,599 (92%)

5,946 (63%)

63Ibid., 1010.
64Ibid., 1045-46.
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Humphrey Marshall, a Kentucky Whig, gave a closely
argued speech citing the need for the bill.

His arguments,

summarized in Table 14, dealt with the actual strength of
the Army compared to its authorized strength.

Marshall

pointed out that the bill would solve the problem of the
Army not being able to assign enough men to the various
units (and improve on the Army's total of 92 percent
assigned) even if it could not keep those assigned fit for
duty.

It should be noted also that the artillery units,

which generally served on the eastern coast, had a much
better manpower situation than units that served on the
frontier, the infantry and mounted troops.
After adjourning for the day the House passed the act
on May 24, 1850, by the comfortable margin of 107 to 59.
roll call for the vote was recorded.65

No

The two Houses

quickly passed a compromise bill and the Act was signed into
law by President Taylor on June 17, 1850.6
66
5
The increase of 1850 is best described as a technical
adjustment to the Army's structure.
and with little debate.

The bill passed easily

If fully enacted the Army would

have seen an increase of nearly 1,500 men.

The increase did

not drastically affect the size of the Army to that extent,
however; it only grew from 10,744
11,376 in 1853.

in 1849 to a high of

The importance of the act was that Congress

recognized, and moved to fix, one of the problems facing the
65Ibid., 1081.
66Statutes at Large. 9:438.
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Army after the Mexican war.

Other, more basic problems,

would have to wait for a later time.
k

k

k

The decade of the 1840s does not easily lend itself to
any broad conclusions about party and sectional views on the
proper form of the regular army.

The two major peacetime

bills during the decade, decreasing the Army after the
Seminole War and the addition of a third cavalry regiment in
1846, did show that party influence was not strong on this
issue.

In 1842 the Whigs voted heavily for the reduction

while Democrats did so by a small margin.

In 1846 the two

parties voted almost identically for the third mounted unit.
As a whole, party allegiance was not important in deciding
the proper size of the Army during the decade.
The region in which a Congressman lived in also played
a minor role in determining how his vote was cast.

The

Frontier was the only region to vote against the reduction
in 1842 and its near unanimity for the 1846 bill was far
stronger support than from any other region.

The North and

South opposed the Frontier on the 1842 reduction bill, and
it passed with a healthy majority in both sections.

While

all sections agreed to increase the Army in April 1846, the
South had the weakest support on the issue followed by
North.

One of the intriguing items to come out of the study

of the decade's major Army bills was that the South
consistently voted as the region least in favor of a large
regular army.
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One possible reason for such a regional breakdown in
the 1840s was that the Frontier was changing, as was what
was needed to protect it.

The Frontier during the 1840s was

different then in the previous decade.

It had moved from

the wooded northwest, trans-Mississippi region, and the
swamps of Florida to the great plains. Where volunteers
could be used on the 1830s Frontier they could not be used
effectively in the 1840s because the areas which needed
troops were now far beyond the settled sections of the
country.

Frontier Congressmen thus reduced their

traditional reluctance to use regulars in their region.
There are less clear reasons as to why the South was
generally less in favor of the regulars than the other
regions.

The lack of an ongoing threat in 1842 only

partially explains the strong anti-Army Southern vote in
1842.

The South's less than enthusiastic support toward the

peacetime provisions of the 1846 bills is interesting in
comparison to the fervor it showed in passing the war
provisions against Mexico.

Southern support for the peace

establishment was still soft even as the nation readied for
war.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE FOUR REGIMENT INCREASE OF 1855

In the middle of August 1854, a young Brevet Second
Lieutenant, James Lawrence Gratten, was sent from Fort
Laramie, Wyoming, with twenty-nine men to question members
of the Brule tribe of Sioux Indians about a cow that had
wandered away from a group of Mormon emigrants.

What

happened next was a matter of debate which reached all the
way to Washington, but when the incident was over Gratten's
command had been killed to the last man and the Congress was
once again debating whether an increase of the Peace
Establishment was necessary.1
Regardless of the degree of Indian unrest on the
Frontier, the need for some increase in the size of the Army
in 1855 was at least arguable.

The strength of the active

Army at the end of 1854 was 10,894, the same approximate
number since 1846 and, indeed, almost 1,500 fewer than in
1840.

The United States had, of course, grown considerably

larger during this period.

The population had jumped 36

percent between 1840 to 1850 (17.1 to 23.2 million people)
and would continue at this rapid pace until

1860.2

The

1-The best account of what came to be known as
"Gratten's defeat" is located in David S. Lavender, Fort
Laramie and the Changing Frontier (Washington D.C.:
Divisions of Publications, National Park Service, 1983).
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Laramie and the Changing Frontier (Washington D.C.:
Divisions of Publications, National Park Service, 1983).
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territory of the country had increased at an even greater
pace, 69 percent, between 1845 and 1853 (1.79 to 3.02
million square miles).

A case could be made that even if

the country had an appropriate defensive force in 1838,
1846, or even 1850, it might not have had one by 1855.
There was another problem that made defending the
Frontier more difficult in 1855.

As usual there was a

disparity between the number of men authorized the Army and
the number available for duty at any one time.

One

historian states that in 1850 the difference between actual
strength and authorized strength was 2,164 officers and men,
or nearly 17 percent of the total.*
3

A second writer

suggests that although 13,821 men were authorized to the
Army in June 1853, only 10,417 were on duty, and due to
sickness or other reasons, just 6,918 were at their posts
and available for duty--slightly more than half the total
authorized strength.

These men had to be enough to garrison

fifty-four posts on the Frontier.4
^Extrapolating the rate of increase for the entire
decade of the 1850s, it is probable that the population of
the United States was between 27 and 27.5 million people in
1855 .
3Warren W. Hassler, With Sword and Shield: American
Military Affairs, Colonial Times to the Present (Ames: Iowa
University Press, 1982), 144-45. Robert Coffman suggests
that the Army averaged a deficit of eighteen percent in
authorized versus available strength in the period before
the Mexican War with a slight improvement thereafter. See
Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American
Army in Peacetime. 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), 42.
4Robert Marshal Utley, Frontiersman in Blue: The
United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York:
Macmillan Co, 1967), 19.
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Many government officials thought that there was a lack
of men on the frontier in 1855.

President Franklin Pierce

felt that any expansion of trade and commerce reguired an
increase of both the Army and the Navy.5

Pierce's Secretary

of War, Jefferson Davis, and many in the military were also
pressing for an increase the Army's size.
In a letter to Charles J. Faulkner, the Chairman of the
House Committee on Military Affairs, discussing the need for
a new fort in Minnesota Territory, Davis wrote that "at the
present time there is neither money to construct nor men to
garrison" such a fort and that "it was mainly to give
security to such exposed sections of the country that the
increase of the army was asked for in my late annual report
[1853]."6

The proposed fort at Pembina continued to be a

thorn in Davis's side for the same reason; a lack of troops
prevented the garrisoning of a post everyone thought should
be manned.

The Delegate from the Minnesota territory, Henry

M. Rice, wrote Davis in January 1855 asking "for a single
company of dragoons, light artillery, or even infantry if
the others can not be spared."7

Once again Davis had to

5Roy Franklin Nichols, Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory
of the Granite Hills. 2d ed. (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1958), 220.
^Jefferson Davis to Charles J. Faulkner, June 30 1854,
Congress, House, Military Post Near Pembina River,
Minnesota, 33rd Cong., 1st sess., House Report 291, Serial
744, 2.
7Henry M. Rice to Jefferson Davis, January 19, 1855,
Letters received by the Office of the Adjutant General,
1780-1917, Record Group 94, National Archives, microcopy M567, reel 525, frame 252.
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reply that he had not a single company to establish the
fort.8
The lack of men in the Army caused Davis nearly
constant embarrassment in his relations with Congress and
the Army through 1855.

Rice plaintively asked if the

twenty-three men, the muster of an entire company stationed
at Fort Ripley, could be reinforced, especially since the
nearest post to it was Fort Snelling several hundred miles
away.9

Davis replied that

this is one of many like calls for troops, the
necessity for which is in many cases alike
palpable, but the power to comply with them is
wanting.10
As was his habit when dealing with the various members of
Congress, Davis closed his letter to Rice by suggesting that
the only way Minnesota would get more troops was if Congress
increased the size of the Army.

This was an excellent way

to link the problems of the individual Congressman with the
needs of the Army, but it did little to make anyone happy.
Davis faced shortages of men in other regions of the
country as well.

In a long and often churlish exchange of

letters with Brevet Major General John E. Wool, then
commanding the Department of the Pacific, Davis chided Wool

8Davis to Rice, January 23, 1855, ibid., frame 257.
221 .

9Rice to Davis, June 12, 1854, ibid., reel 504, frame

l^Davis to Rice, January 19, 1855, Letters received by
the Office of the Secretary of War, 1791-1889, Record Group
107, National Archives, microcopy M-6, letterbooks, reel 35,
page 362.

163

for asking for more troops to be sent to his department even
though Wool should have known none would be available.

At

one point Davis wrote to the General:
Your own knowledge of the numerical strength of the
Army, and the demand for troops upon the frontiers,
could only, in the contingency of an increase of the
Army by an Act of Congress, permit you to hope for a
larger force than had previously been ordered to
your command.il
When Wool continued to complain that he did not have the men
necessary to keep the Indians and settlers away from each
other, Davis could only exhort Wool "to prevent disaster by
vigilant attention to movements among the Indian Tribes and
by the judicious location of the troops."!2

Davis was not

unsympathetic to Wool's predicament but was once again
limited in what he could do.

He wrote to the beleaguered

General that "another regiment has been for some time needed
and when it is in the power of the Department to furnish one
it will be done."l3

The Secretary of War could do no more

than offer advice for he had no troops to spare.

Hjefferson Davis to Brevet Major General John E. Wool,
March 1, 1854, Congress, Senate, Presidential Message
Communicating Instructions and Correspondence with Major
General Wool on Operations on the Pacific Coast, 33rd Cong.,
2nd sess., Senate Executive Document 16, 52.
l2Jefferson Davis to Brevet Major General John E. Wool,
January 12, 1854, Ibid., 7-8. See also Jefferson Davis,
Jefferson Davis. Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers,
and Speeches, ed. Dunbar Rowland (Jackson, Mississippi:
Mississippi Historical Society, 1923; reprint, New York:
AMS Press, 1973), 2:322-23.
l^Davis to Brevet Major General John E. Wool, May 3,
1854, Orders and Endorsements sent by the Secretary of War,
1791-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, microcopy
M-444, letterbooks, reel 2, page 448.
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Among the higher ranking men in the Army the need for
increasing its strength seemed all but self-apparent.

The

Commanding General, Brevet Lieutenant General Winfield
Scott, told the House Committee on Military Affairs that the
increase of the Army by four regiments was "highly
necessary" and that
This is the minimum force that is essential to be
added to the Army to protect the frontiers against
the hostilities of Indians, the present force, on
the frontiers being entirely inadeguate for that
purpose.141
6
5
Scott also suggested improving on the 1850 increase by
allowing all companies to recruit to 100 privates instead of
allowing only Frontier companies to recruit to 74.15
After hearing from General Scott, the Committee on
Military Affairs asked most of the Department heads in the
Army for their views on possible expansion.

Brevet Major

General Thomas S. Jesup, the Army's Quartermaster General,
flatly stated that the Army was "totally inadequate to the
duties devolved upon it" and that any other country in
similar circumstances would require 50,000 men to do the job
that the Army was now performing.

He went on to say that

"every man . . . added by this section of the bill, will be
required for the defense of our extensive frontiers."4^

14Congress, House, Increase and Better Organization of
the Army, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., House Report 40, Serial
808, 2.
15Ibid., 3.
16Ibid., 9.
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The only high ranking officer interviewed by the
committee who did not think it necessary to provide the Army
with both infantry and cavalry in 1855 was Colonel John J.
Abert, Chief of the Topographical Engineers.

He felt that

five infantry regiments would be more useful than a mix of
infantry and cavalry and that the cost would be cheaper.I7
Overall, however, the senior officers in the Army felt that
an increase in the size of the Army was needed to protect
citizens adequately.
Unlike military leaders, the journals of the day did
not see the increase of the Army as a major issue in early
1855.

Many of the nation's leading newspapers did not even

address the issue of increasing the Army while it was being
debated in the Congress.

Those that did had mixed views on

the subject.
One paper that did address the issue was the New York
Herald.

Even though fiercely anti-administration, the

editor of the Herald came out for the increase.

He stated

that early opposition to the bill was "more of a personal
character" and did not "extend to the principles
involved."1®

As the final days of the session neared the

Herald ran a story that quoted Major Ben McCullough, whom
the paper called an Indian fighter and Texas Ranger, as
saying that "the regulars are best suited to the stations--1
*
7

17 Ibid.
^ New York Herald. January 25, 1855, 185.
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the volunteers for war."19

The Herald then questioned

whether the "blood of hundreds of our hardy pioneers" could
be left neglected and the Indians left unpunished for their
crimes.

Discussing the appeals of the territories for more

protection, the paper asked, "Are the legislators deaf to
the appeals to humanity?"20

The Herald was clearly pushing

for what the paper considered a needed increase in the
strength of the Army.
A rival to the Herald, The New York Daily Times (later
the New York Times) felt somewhat differently.

While not

strongly against an increase, the paper did give some
attention to a speech of a leading Congressional figure
against the measure, Senator Sam Houston of Texas.

The

paper stated that Houston was willing to "see nothing taken
for granted when new schemes of territorial management and
for increasing the standing Army in time of peace are
broached."21

The paper felt that Houston's caution was

understandable and praiseworthy.
The Whiggish National Intelligencer at first reported
that the schemes discussed in Congress for the increase of
the Army would meet with "almost universal concurrence."22
Later the paper published several unsigned letters dealing
with military issues.

For the most part these letters were

19Ibid., March 1, 1855, 417.
20Ibid.
21New York Daily Times. March 1, 1855, 4.
22National Intelligencer, January 4, 1855.
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heavily in favor of increasing the Army even though they
were also adamant that the artillery should not be reduced
in the process.23

Overall the National Intelligencer was

also for an increase.
The Congressional debates of 1855 can not be fully
appreciated without understanding the changes that had
occurred in the War Department and the Army in the previous
years of the Pierce administration.

These changes were

almost entirely the work of one man, Jefferson Davis.
When Jefferson Davis accepted Franklin Pierce's offer
to be his Secretary of War, the President-elect gained a man
one historian described as "one of America's ablest
peacetime secretaries."242
*
5

Other writers have described his

tenure as "innovative"23 and Davis as "a reforming secretary
on the model of Calhoun."23

For his own part Davis felt

himself to be highly gualified to hold the position.

After

graduating from West Point (class of 1828) Davis had served
on active duty for seven years before serving in the House
of Representatives on the Committee on Military Affairs. At
the start of the Mexican War he resigned to lead the 1st
Mississippi Rifles and served ably until being wounded in
action.

After returning to Mississippi Davis was appointed

23Ibid., January 25, 1855; February 6, 1855.
24Hassler, 145..
25Clement Eaton, Jefferson Davis (New York:
Press, 1977 ), 84.
26 Wiegley,

190.

The Free
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to the Senate in 1847 where he served on the Senate MilitaryAffairs Committee.

Davis's self-assurance in military

matters was to have a great impact during the Pierce
administration.

He was not without his detractors, however.

As one biographer of Winfield Scott suggested, Davis "was
profoundly conscious of military gifts less apparent to his
contemporaries."27

Regardless of how he was viewed, Davis

was an important man in any military debate.
When he sent his first report to Congress as Secretary
of War in December of 1853, Davis laid out a broad and
comprehensive plan to reorganize his Department and the
Army.

He proposed to raise the pay of enlisted personnel in

an attempt to keep men in the service longer; add one
additional regiment of dragoons, two regiments of riflemen
and a company of miners and sappers; create a retirement
list for officers; increase officer pay; overhaul the
Military Academy by adding an additional year of
instruction; fund multiple new coastal fortifications and
interior improvements; change the system for regulating the
government armories; and test the use of camels in the
Southwest desert.28

jn his second report Davis further

reguested that Congress make two artillery regiments into
infantry and do away with the distinctions between line and2
7

27Charles Winfield Elliott, Winfield Scott: The
Soldier and the Man (New York: Macmillan Co, 1937), 649.
28congress, Congressional Globe. 46 vols. (Washington
D. C.: Office of the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873), 33rd
Cong., 2nd sess., 30-36. Hereafter cited as Globe.

169

staff positions.29

All in all it was an impressive list of

reforms that Davis submitted to the Thirty-Third Congress,
probably the most wide-ranging army reform ever proposed up
to that time.

The problem for Davis was that by early 1855

he had only been able to convince Congress to pass the pay
increase for the enlisted troops.

As one historian has

noted, "most of Davis's reform ideas met with a cold and
negative response" in Congress.
In early 1855 Davis presented a reorganization plan for
the Army that "completely revised traditional military
thinking on the modes and methods of army organization and
operation."31

Davis was, simply put, trying to implement a

new strategic plan for the Army in the West.32

Robert Utley

29Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., appendix, 1. With his
attempt to increase the infantry at the expense of the
artillery Davis ran afoul of Winfield Scott. Scott told the
Committee on Military Affairs that Davis and he disagreed on
the change and that in the end Davis "had more confidence in
my opinion, with reference to artillery, than he had in his
own." The change was never initiated but the topic became
an item of contention in a long running Davis-Scott feud.
See Congress, House Report 40, 8.
3C)Larry Gara, The Presidency of Franklin Pierce,
American Presidency Series, Donald R. McCoy, Clifford S.
Griffen, Homer Socolofsky, general editors (Lawrence,
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 63. For a more
favorable view of Davis's ability to achieve what he wanted
from Congress see Hudson Strode, Jefferson Davis: American
Patriot, 1808-1861, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1965),
273 .
31john Muldowny, "The Administration of Jefferson Davis
as Secretary of War" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1959),
88.

32William C. Davis, Jefferson Davis: The Man and His
Hour (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 234-35.
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described the situation on the frontier in the 1850's bysuggesting that
A highly mobile enemy skilled in guerrilla tactics
demanded either a highly mobile counter guerilla
force or a heavy defensive army large enough to
erect an impenetrable shield around every settlement
and travel route in the West.33
Davis decided to create a mobile fighting force which would
be able to confront the Plains Indians on their own level,
by using highly skilled light cavalry.

It was for this new

force that Davis reguested the additional regiment of
dragoons in 1853.34

as

Davis visualized it, the new,

larger, cavalry formations would stay in encampments in the
winter months and emerge in the spring to challenge the
Indians on the plains.

Due to a lack of cavalry nothing

like this had ever been tried before.

Davis very much

wanted the chance to implement such a policy.
When everything was considered, an increase of the Army
was only one small part of what Davis wanted to accomplish
in 1855.

It was indeed "of a routine nature, "35 but one of

vital importance to Davis and the Army.
Jefferson Davis was not the type of man to idly allow
one of his projects to be decided without trying to
influence events.

When the Washington Union, a pro-

33utley, 9.

34General Scott agreed with Davis, at least partially,
on this point.
In 1853 he had suggested an additional
regiment of mounted rifleman. See Congress, Senate,
Commanding Generals Report, 1853, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
Senate Executive Document 1, Vol. 2, Serial 691, 95.
35Muldowny, 1.
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administration newspaper, suggested that "there is no lack
of troops for the protection of the frontier" Davis wrote to
the editor, A.O.P. Nicholson, and scolded that such an
article "appearing in your paper" is "an embarrassment to
the administration in its efforts to obtain the necessary
increase of the Army."36

Davis also showed a willingness to

inject himself into the everyday affairs of the legislative
body of which he had once been a member.

In a letter to

Charles Faulkner, Davis asked the head of the House
Committee on Military Affairs
how
for
for
and
the
own

would it do, to separate the several measures
increase of the army, for the increase in pay,
the retired list, and for the organization . . .
move each through separately, as amendments of
army [appropriations] bill and try each on its
strength and carry such as we can?37

Whether or not the original idea came from Davis is unknown.
What is known is that the issues were indeed split and
handled separately.
On December 27, 1854, the House sent to the Senate,
with little fanfare or debate, the Army Appropriations bill
for the year ending 1856.38

House bill 562 was then sent to

the Senate Committee on Finance where it languished for
36oavis to A.O.P. Nicholson, October 28, 1854,
Jefferson Davis, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, eds. Haskell
M. Monroe, et al., 7 vols. to date (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
University Press, 1971-), 5:93. See also, Davis,
Constitutionalist, 2:387.
37i,etter from Davis to Faulkner, January 25, 1855,
Davis, Papers, 5:98.
38congress, House, House Journal, 33rd Cong., 2nd
sess ., Serial 776, 117. Hereafter cited as House Journal.

172

nearly a month despite the efforts of James Shields, a
Democrat from Illinois and a man who had served as a Major
General of Volunteers in the Mexican War, to move it to the
floor of the Senate.

Only after Shields gave a passionate

speech stating that "we are in imminent danger of an Indian
war.

The Indians are forming . . . and something ought to

be done to stop it" did the Senate vote 24 to 13 to debate
the bill.39
Shields, and many others in the Senate, felt that the
Army Appropriations bill for 1856 was important even though
it did not call for an increase in troop strength in its
original form.

House bill 615, "a bill for the Increase and

Better Organization of the Army and for other purposes," had
been sent to the Senate on December 18 and had been stalled
in the Committee on Military Affairs.

This bill was part of

Jefferson Davis's attempt to reorganize the Army.
contained three main provisions:

It

first, to increase the

number of regiments; second, to reorganize the staff and
bureaus; and third, to provide a retired list for officers.
The proposition of a retired list was a particularly irksome
issue to some members of Congress and there had been calls
in the Senate to have the issues stand separately.

As

Thomas Rusk, a Democrat from Texas, colorfully put it in
reference to the bill, "each of those subjects should stand

3^Globe^ 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., 377.
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on its own bottom."40

Thus House Bill 615 had not moved out

of committee.
This situation changed drastically, however, when
President Pierce sent a message to the Senate and House on
January 16, 1855, not long after Gratten's defeat.

The

President, while transmitting the annual report of the
Secretary of War to Congress, called for the "employment of
volunteer troops . . . [as] the only practicable means of
providing for the present emergency."41

He went on to say

that although the volunteers were to meet only a "special
demand," such an emergency "serves to illustrate the urgent
necessity of an increase of the Regular Army."42

By not

only calling for volunteers but also an increase in the
Regular Army as well, Pierce caused confusion throughout the
debate to come.

Shields, wanting to give the President what

he reguested, then did an unusual thing.

To expedite the

raising of volunteers Shields amended the annual
Appropriations bill on January 25, 1855, to include 3,000
mounted volunteers to serve for eighteen months and 500
Indians to act as mounted rangers and scouts.

A separate

section asked for commissioners who would negotiate with the
Indian tribes in an attempt to reach a peaceful4
2
1
0

40Ibid., 168.
41James D. Richardson ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of
National Literature, Inc., 1897), 6:2830-31.
42 Ibid., 6:2831.
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settlement.43

Shields's amendment touched off a heated

debate that reexamined the issue of how best to protect the
expanding white influence on the plains.
The first reaction to Shields's amendment was violent
objection by Lewis Cass, a Democrat from Michigan, to any
attempt to use Indians against one another even though he
was for "any additional strength" needed to defend the
country.44

Shields readily receded from the provision for

Indian scouts, explaining he had only included it to please
the administration and that he did not think the issue
unduly important.45
Shields then stated several reasons why an immediate
increase was in order.

He pointed out that the area in

which Indian troubles were likely contained 180,000 Indians,
with between 6,000 and 8,000 warriors, and that the military
had only 1,855 officers and men stationed in the area.
Shields did not think such a number was "even a sufficient
police force" and he agreed with the Secretary of War that
without a show of force "nothing on earth could prevent a
general Indian War."46

Shields then brought up the issue

that was to be heard repeatedly in the debates, whether
volunteers or regulars would be best for the coming
campaign.
43Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., 393.
44 Ibid., 395.
45Ibid.
46Ibid.
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Shields, citing his own experience at leading both
types of troops, explained to the Senate that for fighting a
battle volunteers were as good as any soldiers, but he was
unsure they were the right force to deal with a problem when
the object was to deter a war instead of fight one.

Shields

supported the volunteers in the end, however, because it was
what the administration requested.47
After Shields ended his speech, John Bell, a Whig from
Tennessee, made several comments disagreeing with Shields.
He disputed the numbers of Indians that Shields said were
involved in the difficulties and claimed that "we have
always exaggerated the number of Indians in the frontier."48
Bell then suggested that since "the close contiguity of the
races excites passion which lead to disturbances," it would
be better to try to understand the problem first instead of
rushing to use force to settle the difficulties.49

Bell did

not think that a call for volunteers was wrong, just
premature and perhaps too costly.

He also was in favor of

some kind of increase in the regular force due to the
general expansion of the Indian Frontier.
The next man to speak, R. M. T. Hunter, a Democrat from
Virginia, proposed an increase of two regiments of regulars
and 500 rangers, in place of Shields's original amendment
(calling for 3000 volunteers for eighteen months), as being
47Ibid., 396.
48Ibid., 397.
49Ibid.
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both cheaper and better.50

Shields replied that although an

increase in regulars would be needed eventually, the length
of time to organize new units would take too long and that
volunteers would be needed to fill the gap.

He then went on

to ask if Hunter would support the increase of four
regiments of regulars reguested by the Secretary of War in
the President's message of January 16.

Hunter replied he

would not because it was his opinion that such a bill would
likely die in the House, much like a similar bill of the
previous session, thereby leaving the frontier with no
increased protection.51
When the Senate next took up the bill on January 29,
Shields did several things indicating he might have had a
change of mind on the increase.

First he withdrew the

section of his amendment dealing with Indian commissioners
and then he allowed Hunter to substitute his two regiment
and 500 ranger proposal in place of his own original call
for 3,000 volunteers.

Shields next amended Hunter's

substitute by calling for four new regiments, two each of
cavalry and infantry.52

Shields had gone from proposing an

all volunteer increase to proposing an all Regular one.
famous Democrat from Texas, Sam Houston, vigorously
disagreed with Shields's plan.

50Ibid., 399.
51Ibid.
52Ibid., 437.
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Houston, a member of the Committee on Military Affairs,
was the leading colorful figure in the Thirty-third
Congress.

In his amazing career Houston had served in the

Congress of two nations (the United States and the Republic
of Texas), had been President of Texas, Governor of
Tennessee, lived with and fought against several Indian
tribes, and had been proclaimed a member of the Cherokee
nation while a trader in the Oklahoma Indian territory.
Houston quickly made plain his opposition to the Shields
plan by declaring that "every instance" of Indian hostility
was provoked by whites.53

Houston thought that the Fort

Laramie difficulty ("Gratten's defeat") was an isolated
problem and reminded his fellow Senators that before the
incident the entire frontier "all the way to California [had
been] in peace."54

Houston was unhappy because new

regiments were expensive, and he did not believe that
regulars could fight Indians on the plains anyway.

As

Houston put it:
how can they [the Army] protect us against the
Indians when the cavalry have not horses which can
trot faster than active oxen and the infantry dare
not go out in any hostile manner for fear of being
shot and scalped?55
The plan Houston gave as an alternative relied on policing
the Frontier with Texas-style mounted rangers and courting
the Indians with trade.
53Ibid.
54Ibid., 438.
55Ibid., 440.

Houston wanted battalions made up
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of 250 rangers to patrol the plains and of 500 infantry on
the Mexican border to police the Indians and guard the
frontier.

He also wanted to establish trading houses on

the plains with a small guard of just twenty-five men to
encourage trade and friendly relations with the Indians.
For the emigrant routes Houston would have guard companies
of 250 men to escort each group of settlers, which he would
limit to about 1,000 each.

A problem with Houston's plan

was that even he did not know exactly how many of the
battalions he had outlined would be needed.

Added to the

fact that Houston was proposing an entirely new type of
formation, it is not hard to understand why his plan had
little support.

Houston saw his plan as one where it would

be "wiser to send a few wagons with presents" to the Indians
"than to send an army."56

in some ways Houston's arguments

echoed those of John Bell, the important difference being
that Houston did not favor any expansion of the Army.
The next speaker, the other Whig Senator from
Tennessee, James C. Jones, admitted surprise that Houston
would oppose his own administration on the issue and that
Hunter partially did as well.

Jones then guoted Davis's

opinion that the increase asked for in his 1853 annual
report would have been enough to forestall bloodshed.

Jones

chastised those in the Senate who thought it their duty "to
know and understand the whole guestion" of frontier defense

56Ibid

•

t

440-41.
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better that Davis.57
Houston's plan.

Jones was particularly scornful of

Assuming three emigrant groups on two

routes every year, Jones figured Houston's plan would
require 1,500 men without protecting any particular place.
Simply guarding emigrant trains did not make sense to Jones,
and he warned that a plan like the one favored by Houston
could require 10,000 men to execute.
On January 30, Thomas Rusk cautioned the Senate that to
ask too large an increase would mean the loss of the whole.
Interested in the politics of the possible, Rusk, like
Hunter, asked for two regiments of mounted rifleman and 500
rangers and declared his intention to vote against the
Shields amendment.58

Hunter then pointed out that the 500

rangers were only a short-term solution to the problems
expected in the coming spring.

After the crisis had passed

and the regulars were ready, the rangers could be
released.59
William C. Dawson, a Whig from Georgia, thought it no
argument to say that an increase of four regiments could not
pass the House.

Pointing out that two-thirds of the

Congress were "administration men" he asserted that
it is a strange condition of things to see me
standing here today, sustaining the measures of the
President and the Secretary of War, while their

57Ibid., 441-42.
58Ibid., 459-60.
59 Ibid., 460.
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friends oppose them on grounds strange and extra
ordinary.15"
Hunter did not want to let Dawson's comment pass and
suggested the Whig had become "a new made administration
man" and declared that he, for one, would not blindly follow
the administration.51

Dawson replied that he was not an

administration man, and had no desire to be one, but that on
this issue he felt the need to accept the President's
urging.

Thomas Rusk then chided Dawson for not

understanding the interests of the frontier states since he
would not
give us this protection, because he says we must go
the whole figure [four regiments], or get nothing,
we must, as good party men, come up to the
recommendations made by the President6
62
1
6
0
Rusk then gloomily added that he did not think that an
increase of four regiments would pass even during the
present emergency.

As a counter to Rusk's argument Shields

suggested that "if we provide now for only two regiments and
a fraction, we shall get no more for sessions to come."62
There was a clear divergence of opinion in the Senate of how
much of an increase was needed, and possible, at the time.
During the previous exchange the Whig from Maryland,
James A. Pearce, pointed out that although there were barely
more than 1,000 men in the Department of the East, outside
60Ibid., 461.
61Ibid., 464.
62Ibid., 465.
62Ibid., 466.
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of Florida, he would support an increase in the West so long
as the troops were Regulars.

Pearce had figures showing

that the yearly cost of two regiments each of cavalry and
infantry (approximately 3,154 men) would be 2.19 million
dollars while the cost for 3,000 volunteers for a year would
be over 3.4 million.

Since Pearce expected further trouble

on the Frontier he thought the cost of the new regiments
would be justified through the years.64
When John Bell discussed the Army expansion on January
30, his position had changed somewhat since he had spoken
five days earlier.

He still did not think the "emergency"

was so pressing that volunteers were needed but he had
warmed to the idea of expanding the Regular force.
gave several reasons why he favored an increase.

Bell
One was

that he distrusted the Mormons and wanted an occupying
regiment in Utah at all times.

A second was the large

amount of territory that needed patrolling, over 10,000
miles of borders alone by 1855.65
The next speaker, John B. Weller, a Democrat from
California, called for an increase of the Army of "at least
four regiments."66

Weller suggested that there was no

difference of opinion in the Senate as to the need for some
kind of increase in the military force of the country, only
on how it should be carried out.
64Ibid., 463.
65Ibid., 468.
66Ibid., 495.

182

The next day Sara Houston once again addressed the
Senate and pointed out that even though increases had been
asked for each of the previous three years, no problems had
occurred until what he derisively called the "crippled cow
incident. "67

Houston then went on to predict that the

increase asked for by Shields would cause a general war that
would take five years to end, stop emigration to Oregon, and
cost up to fifteen million dollars.
In response to these assertions, Augustus C. Dodge, a
Democrat from Iowa, produced a letter from an unnamed
correspondent which reported that Governor Cummings of
Nebraska had called for two territorial regiments of
volunteers and that it was expected that he was to ask that
they be taken into Federal s e r v i c e . if this was true,
Dodge pointed out, then Houston's statements that all was
well on the frontier could not be accurate.

Dodge then

accused Houston of tailoring his speeches on Army expansion
toward "that section of the country in which he does not
live" in an attempt to gain popularity.

That the Whigs were

not engaged in any outward partisan display pleased Dodge,
but he worried that "now-a-days scarcely any measure can be6
*
7

67 Ibid.
^Augustus Dodge was the son of Henry Dodge, a fellow
senator from Wisconsin and commander of the mounted ranger
battalion formed in 1832 and the First Dragoons formed the
following year. The younger Dodge, like his father, had
served in the Black Hawk war in 1832.
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proposed that is not, in some mode or other, brought into
the whirlpool of politics."697
0
On the last day of Senate debate on House ill 562
Shields pointed out that the War Department had asked for
volunteers only until regular regiments could be created.
He felt that not much would be lost if only regulars were
used since it would not take much longer to raise and eguip
them than volunteers.

Lewis Cass then suggested that it was

no coincidence that the Secretary of War and the head of the
Committee on Military Affairs (Shields) agreed on such an
important matter.

Cass, a former Secretary of War under

Jackson, also lauded Jefferson Davis's ability and said,
"The opinion of such a man ought to have weight, and it has
weight with me."79
After the remarks by Cass a vote was taken on the
Shields amendment (four regiments) to Hunter's substitute
(two regiments and 500 rangers) and it passed by a vote of
31 to 20.71

Once the vote on Shields's amendment had been

taken several Senators expressed reservations about the
bill.

William Gwin, a California Democrat who voted against

the amendment, said he had done so because he felt the bill
would be rejected in the House and then held up in the
ensuing conference committee.

Albert G. Brown, a Democrat

69Ibid., 500.
70Ibid., 511.
71Ibid., 515; Congress, Senate, Senate Journal, 33rd
Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 745, 184. Hereafter cited as
Senate Journal.
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from Mississippi who had voted for the bill, stated that byignoring the President's call for volunteers, the Senate
"would assume a very high responsibility."72*
Brown was so upset that no volunteers were authorized
by the bill as it stood that he moved to reopen the issue.
Quoting Davis as saying that Regular forces could not be
organized in time to repel the expected springtime problems,
Brown asked the Senate how it could have felt it had done
its duty without providing for the coming emergency.

Brown

then proposed an amendment that would raise not only the
four new regiments but up to 3,000 volunteers for the
protection of the plains as well.
John M. Clayton, a Whig from Delaware, then declared
that if Brown's amendment was adopted then there would be no
increase in the regular Army at all.

Clayton was against

the volunteers for he felt that regulars, "under the command
of wise and experienced officers," were best suited to the
task ahead.72

Shields then suggested that the ambiguity

about the regular versus volunteer issue in the President's
message had occurred because Pierce had no expectation that
the Congress would act so quickly.

Brown nonetheless

persisted, and his amendment was defeated 13 to 35.74
After Brown's amendment was defeated Shields tried to
amend the bill to include a retired list (part of the still
72Globe, 515.
72Ibid., 519.
74Ibid., 520; Senate Journal, 185.
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delayed House bill 615) and a pay increase for officers.

He

withdrew it after there were questions as to whether the
motion was in order.

The rest of the debate, covering minor

items not of great interest, passed quickly and at the
request of Sam Houston the vote on the third reading of the
bill was taken and recorded as 32 for and just 7 against.75
The Senate then voted for final passage of House bill 562,
with amendments, on a voice vote.
A review of the three Senate votes on Army expansion
indicates important sectional differences.

Table 15 shows

the breakdown by region on the vote on Shields's amendment
to increase the Army by four regiments.76

On this vote the

*

North and Frontier states each split evenly on the issue.
The South, therefore, was the deciding factor in the first
vote.

Interestingly Brown, one of only four Southerners to

vote against the Shields amendment, stated one reason why
some of those in the frontier states were concerned with the
bill's passage--the fear that regulars could not be trained
and equipped soon enough to be of any use in protecting
settlers the following spring.

The Frontier and Northern

sections had no consistent positions on the increase.

It

was Sam Houston from Texas, after all, who was the leading
spokesman for alternative methods to pacify the plains while
John Weller from California preferred regulars.
75Globe, 525; Congress, Senate Journal, 33rd Cong., 2nd
sess., 185.
76For the breakdown of which states are in which region
in 1855 see Appendix 2.
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TABLE 15
SENATE VOTE TO INCREASE THE ARMY BY FOUR REGIMENTS

Region

Yeas

New England
Mid-Atlantic
Midwest

Nays

4 (40% )
4 (66%)
4 (57%)

Total

6 (60%)
2 (33%)
3 (43%)

10 (100%)
6 (100%)
7 (100%)

North (total)

12 (52%)

11 (48%)

23 (100%)

South

15 (79%)

4 (21%)

19 (100%)

4 (44%)

5 (55%)

9 (100%)

31 (61%)

20 (39%)

51 (100%)

Frontier
Total

Northern Freesoilers (Brainard, Chase, Gillette, Sumner)
voted consistently against any expansion of the Army (or for
volunteers), while many others from the North took the view
that an increase was absolutely needed.
The second vote, that on Brown's amendment to add
volunteers to the bill, was supported only in the Frontier
states.

Everywhere else it was decisively defeated.

16 shows the vote by region.

Table

The Frontier states clearly

felt the need for more protection than the Senate had
voted.77

Unfortunately for them they could not come near to

77The two Frontier senators who voted against the
measure were Sam Houston and Robert W. Johnson of Arkansas.
Houston disliked volunteers because he thought they were
more likely to inflame than calm the situation. Johnson's
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putting together a coalition to support the measure.

The

North, on the other hand, was disinterested in using
volunteers at this point in the debate.

With this vote

those in the North who opposed any increase of the Army and
those who wanted more regiments in the regular Army combined
to deny any use of volunteers.

TABLE 16
SENATE VOTE TO ADD VOLUNTEERS

Region

Yeas

Nays
9 (100%)
5 (84%)
7 (100%)

Total
9 (100%)
6 (100%)
7 (100%)

New England
Mid Atlantic
Mid West

0 (0%)
1 (16%)
0 (0%)

North (total)

1 (5%)

21 (95%)

5 (100%)

South

5 (29%)

12 (71%)

17 (100%)

Frontier

7 (77%)

2 (22%)

9 (100%)

13 (27%)

35 (73%)

48 (100%)

Total

One interesting point is that of the twenty senators
who voted against increasing the Regular Army (nay votes

position is largely unknown but he was the Chairman for the
House Committee on Indian Affairs in the 31st and 32nd
Congresses and might have also felt the Indians to be
blameless for the problems on the plains.
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in Table 15) fourteen also voted against Brown's suggestion
to include volunteers while only three voted with Brown.78
These fourteen Senators should be seen as the heart of the
anti-increase faction in the Senate.

Of the fourteen, nine

were from the North and five were New Englanders while four
were Southerners and only one, Houston, was from a Frontier
state.79

New England was the only section in the Senate

that did not support an increase in the number of men under
arms in some way.

The Midwest was only slightly in favor of

the increase of the regular Army and had three Senators who
opposed any expansion.

In fact the North's support for the

expansion of the Army was tepid at best in the Senate.

The

Frontier states clearly wanted an increase guickly and
generally saw volunteers as the most timely, if not the
best, solution.

The South did support expansion in the

Senate even though the region was not a solid bloc.
As many speakers in the Senate debate pointed out, the
expansion of the Army was not really considered a party
issue.

On Democrat Shields's amendment to increase the

regular army, 75 percent of Whigs but only 59 percent of
78Those voting against volunteers were Brainerd FS-VT,
Bright D-IN, Butler D-SC, Evans D-SC, Fessenden W-ME,
Gillette FS-CT, Houston D-TX, Hunter D-VA, Rockwell W-MA,
Seward W-NY, Stuart D-MI, Sumner FS-MA, Toucey D-CT, Wade WOH. Atchinson D-MO, Broadhead D-PA, and Rusk D-TX voted
with Brown, while Adams, Gwin and Sebastian did not vote.
790f these fourteen only six went on to vote against
the final passage of House Bill 562 while four voted for
passage. One reason for this apparent change could be that
since the bill was an appropriations measure, with many
different issues, some members might not have wanted to
reject the entire bill simply because of the increase alone.
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Democrats supported the administration (overall the measure
received 61 percent).

On Democrat Brown's amendment for

volunteers, Democrats supported the measure only slightly
more than Whigs 31 to 25 percent (27 percent overall).
These figures show little or no difference between the two
main parties in the Senate on the expansion issue and should
not be considered significant.

Only the few Freesoilers,

who voted against any increase, seem to have had any
regularity on the issue.
The debate on the Army Appropriations bill of 1856
reached the floor of the House of Representatives on
February 9, 1855, when John S. Phelps, a Democrat from
Missouri, moved the bill out of the House Ways and Means
Committee to the Committee of the Whole on the State of the
Union.88

The Committee of Ways and Means had reported the

bill with a suggestion to cut the increase of regiments
found in the Senate amendment from four to one.

The bill

lay tabled in the House for several weeks as other business
was conducted and it was not until February 27, 1855, that
the first speech on the subject was made.
Speaking first on the Army bill in the House was the
former Missouri Senator and Democrat, Thomas Hart Benton.
Benton quickly made it clear that he did not favor what he
called an "intended permanent increase for a temporary
exigency."8
81
0

He derided the concept of an "Indian Army" as

80House Journal. 507.
81Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., App., 334.
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impossible and suggested that the real purpose of the
increased Army was to invade Cuba.82

Even if there was a

need to protect settlers on the plains Benton thought that
regular troops would be ill-equipped for the job due to a
lack of knowledge of Indian ways.

Benton also thought that

the quality of men in the Army would be a problem in any
case.

He strongly suggested that the performance of the

Army revolved around material rewards and that many regulars
had "no public spirit, no patriotism" and would do poorly
trying to control Indians.83
Benton then presented his own plan to deal with any
potential problems on the plains, calling for eight
battalions of mounted rangers, numbering approximately 300
men each, to be raised for a period not to exceed three
years.

The rangers were to move continuously during the

campaigning season and not tie themselves down to any fixed
base of operations.

In many ways Benton's concept resembled

Houston's, but Benton was more concerned with helping
settlers already on the plains, while Houston was more
preoccupied with emigrants moving to the northwest.

Benton

wanted to link the efforts of the settlers, who would be
familiar with the area, with the better trained and equipped
82Cuba was a touchy subject in Congress, especially for
those from the South. Benton was intimating that the
Southern states would use the new regiments in an attempt to
conquer Cuba to provide more land for cotton production and
the furtherance of slavery. No other Congressman, North or
South, made such a reference during the debate even though
the idea had been mentioned at other times.
83Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., 339.

191

rangers.

He assured the House that the addition of local

influence into any military operation would bring about more
peaceful solutions.

To go along with this "armed settler"

concept Benton wanted to award 320 acres of land to anyone
with five years' residence in the areas needing
protection.84

In conclusion, Benton pointed out that a

similar 1832 Florida law had worked to great effect during
the Seminole problems in the 1830s.
After a couple of days spent on other matters, the
House returned to the Army bill on March 1.

Charles J.

Faulkner, the chairman of the House Committee on Military
Affairs and a Virginian Whig, complained that the House did
not spend enough time discussing army affairs and that such
a lack of debate was "a monstrous violation of propriety."858
6
Faulkner continued to blame the House for its lack of action
while complimenting part of his party:
I spoke of the press--and in this connection it
gives me pleasure to commend the elevated and
patriotic tones which the leading Whig press of
the country has assumed upon the question.
It
exhibits a just discrimination in vindicating the
Executive from responsibility for the recent
outrages upon our frontiers, and in casting blame
where it should fall— upon Congress, but more
especially upon this House of Congress.88
Faulkner himself wanted an Army increase commensurate with
the increase in the size of the Union and also because of
the 211 reported deaths due to Indian problems in the
84Ibid., 341.
85Ibid., 1010.
86Ibid.
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previous twelve months.

Using strong language, Faulkner

stated that the four additional regiments were "the minimum
force necessary" and that any delay in the increase would be
"highly reprehensible and . . . deplorably fatal."87
Faulkner did not think the United States had an adeguate
Army and, at one point, suggested that a 50,000 man Army
would be more appropriate than the one of 15,000 to be
created by the act.
Faulkner also spent a great deal of time explaining to
the House why Regulars would be more valuable than
.volunteers in the emergency.

His first argument was simply

that the President wanted Regulars and that is what he
should get.

He also warned that the Senate was firmly

against volunteers and that if the House voted for them
nothing would be done to address the problems facing the
plains.

A third reason was that, unlike Benton, Faulkner

felt that Regulars would "be more circumspect than
volunteers" and that passions would be better controlled
with impartial troops.88

Faulkner also felt it was better

for professional soldiers to protect the citizens since they
had a covenant to do exactly that.

A fifth reason was one

both sides of the issue were interested in, expense.
Faulkner suggested that calling up 3,000 volunteers for a
year would cost the Federal Government almost $4 million
dollars while the four new regiments would cost but $2.5
87 Ibid., 1011.
88 Ibid., 1013.
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million.

He also pointed out that several New Mexico

volunteer companies that had served the previous year had
cost six times the average of regular companies.

Faulkner

thought that repeatedly using volunteers to deal with
emergencies was both shortsighted and wasteful.
Strongly opposing most of Faulkner's arguments was John
Phelps.

Phelps, citing the deaths of 300 citizens and 60

regulars during the previous twelve months,^9 wanted some
relief for the plains immediately.

He did not care about

Senate opposition or give credence to arguments that
volunteers were not up to the job.

His overwhelming desire

was to ensure that there was an armed force on the plains in
the spring of 1855 capable of dealing with any Indian
uprisings.
One particular sore spot for Phelps was that he
believed the Army consisted mostly of men from the eastern
part of the country, most foreign born.90

Phelps doubted

that from his Missouri district "you could enlist twenty men
to serve for five years in the Army."91

Phelps doubted that

the Regulars would be effective in fighting Indians on the
89ibid. There is no indication in the debates as to
why Faulkner's and Phelps's numbers on this subject
disagree.
9°in this Phelps was right. During the 1850s, 66
percent of the men recruited by the Army were foreign born.
This was up from 36 percent in the thirties and 40 percent
in the forties. The majority of the men enlisted did indeed
come from the Northeastern cities. In 1855 1,444 enlisted
from New York while only 291 did so from Tennessee and
Louisiana combined. See Coffman, 137-144, passim.
91Ibid., 1014.
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plains because of the lack of experienced riders and
marksmen.
Phelps also disputed Faulkner's claim that volunteers
would be more expensive.

First he stressed the temporary

nature of the volunteer increase.

According to Phelps, once

the country had the four regiments "fastened upon it, we
will never be able to dispense with [them]."929
3
Phelps felt that the continued cost of the new
regiments would be an unwanted burden long after the need
for them had expired.

In a more subtle argument, Phelps

objected to the estimate of two and a half million dollars a
year as the cost of four Regular regiments.

Phelps pointed

out, and probably correctly, that the figure did not account
for various hidden training and recruitment costs not
normally included in the cost figures for regulars.

He used

figures from the Seminole war to suggest that, at times, the
cost of volunteers could be slightly lower than regular
troops.

Still Phelp's main concern was to get forces into

the field quickly.

Ending his speech he said,

Protection promised in September will not do.
Protection promised next year will not do.
Protection is needed against the ravages which are
expected to be perpetrated this summer upon those
who will travel upon the plains.92
With that, Phelps suggested a substitute to the amendment
offered by the House Ways and means Committee, calling for

92 Ibid.
93Ibid., 1016.
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3,000 volunteers, furnishing their own horses, for a period
of twelve months.
After Phelps offered his substitute the House heard
from a member with a totally different point of view, Mike
Walsh.

A Democrat from New York City, Walsh stated that he

wanted to send neither Regulars nor volunteers into the
plains to secure peace with the Indians and wished instead
to send agents who were "honest, humane, and magnanimous
men."949
5 Walsh thought that the history of relations with
the Indian a shameful thing and suggested he would have been
happy to leave the remaining western land under Indian
control.

He realized that this was not realistic, however,

so he supported the increase of the Regular Army to protect
the innocents who would be caught in the inevitable problems
due to western expansion.

Walsh reversed the usual argument

in favor of using volunteers— that they would know the
Indians well--by suggesting that this would cause problems
since "the Indians know them too."95
James L. Orr, a South Carolina Democrat, partially
agreed with Walsh's comments when he suggested that
volunteers were more apt to commit atrocities since their
officers were not able to control them effectively.

To Orr

the possibility of an "Indian hunt" was always present when
volunteers were used.

94Ibid., 1027.
95Ibid.

He also worried that the Indians were
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generally treated poorly but he was much more willing than
Walsh to use force to protect the settlers.969
7
The Mississippi Democrat, William T. S. Barry, actually
suggested increasing the Army by five, rather than four,
regiments.

He felt that volunteers would be less useful

than regulars because "they volunteer not for peace but for
war" and that "they go out, not to come home with bloodless
laurels."97

Barry also stated that he was also for treating

the Indians kindly as long as no citizen was put in danger
because of it.
One of the few independents in the Congress was the
next to speak.

Caleb Lyon (from New York) was unsure that

Regulars would be able to deal effectively with plains
Indians and was afraid that any guick influx of untrained
men in the region would spark problems.

He favored using

volunteers.
As might be expected, the Delegate from the Oregon
Territory was adamant for the increase.

Joseph Lane called

for six new regiments to be "permanently in service,
permanently on duty" and bluntly stated that the frontier
could not be settled without passage of the bill.

Lane did

not want protection for his constituents, but also wanted
revenge upon those who had "massacred, tomahawked and burned

96 Ibid.
97Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1028.

197

to death" his friends, and he called on Congress to provide
that capability.98*
James McDougall, a Democrat from the neighboring state
of California, took a different view from Lane.

He wanted

only 500 volunteers on the theory that immediate relief was
preferable to waiting.

As for Regulars, he said that

our present Army was not formed for the present time
and for a Republic as expanded as our own, and it
does not answer for the present necessities of the
Confederacy."
The next speaker, Charles Skelton, a New Jersey
Democrat, did not have a problem with increasing the regular
Army but he wanted the increase to be limited so that there
would be no accumulation of "a load of lumbering
officers."100

At this point Lane jumped back into the

debate to tell the House that such an amendment would be
harmless since there would be war as long as there were
Indians and that the officers raised would always be needed.
After several attempts to have the Committee of the
Whole House rise, the Alabama Democrat George S. Houston
suggested a compromise amendment.

He wanted not only one

new cavalry regiment (as was thought sufficient by the House
Ways and Means Committee) but 2,000 mounted volunteers and
an increase in line companies from 64 to 90 men.

"ibid.
"ibid., 1029.
100Ibid.
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to Houston's figures such an act would increase the Array by
5,200 men.101
When Faulkner attempted to speak on Houston's amendment
several members cried "No!," and "Vote it down," and, by
voice vote, the House did just that.

The chair then asked

for a vote on the Senate amendment to the bill (asking for
four regiments) and it was passed, also on a voice vote.
Several members then asked for a division (in particular the
Iowa Democrat Bernhart Henn) but the chair had already
recognized someone else who wanted the floor to amend a
separate part of the bill.

Because of this oversight no

vote was recorded on the motion to increase the Army in the
Committee of the Whole.
The rest of the debate on House Bill 562 passed quickly
in the committee and on March 2 the House itself considered
the Senate amendments.

After considering several other

issues the House first voted to amend the Senate amendment
to increase the Army by including a Brigadier General.

The

House then voted to adopt the new amendment by a vote of 121
to

60.^02

The breakdown of the vote among the regions is

contained in Table 17.

l01Ibid. The number of men expected by increasing
company strength was 2,500, with the new cavalry regiment
generating an additional 700 men.
102iphe House Journal gives the vote as 121 to 60, House
Journal, 513. The Globe states the figure as 121 to 61,
Globe, 33rd Cong., 2 sess., 1064. According to the raw data
in both sources the true total is 120 to 61.
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TABLE 17
HOUSE VOTE TO INCREASE THE ARMY BY FOUR REGIMENTS

Yeas

State

Nays

Total

New England
Mid-Atlantic
Midwest

16 (70%)
35 (65%)
20 (52%)

7 (30%)
19 (35%)
18 (48%)

23 (100%)
54 (100%)
38 (100%)

North (total)

71 (62%)

44 (38%)

115 (100%)

South (total)

38 (73%)

14 (27%)

52 (100%)

Frontier

11 (79%)

3 (21%)

14 (100%)

120 (67%)

61 (33%)

181 (100%)

Total

Unlike in the Senate, where the region that disliked the
Army increase the most was New England, in the House it was
the Midwest.

Only three states (that cast more than three

votes) voted against the amendment, with two of these, Ohio
and Indiana, being from the Midwest (the third was Maine).
In general the North was once again less likely to vote for
the increase than was the South.
As in the Senate, party discipline in the House was not
particularly strong.

More Democrats than Whigs voted for

the measure, both proportionally (70 to 61 percent) and
absolutely; but the difference was still small when compared
to variation by region.

However, if party and section are

combined, as in Table 18, a slightly sharper picture of who
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supported the measure emerges.

As Table 18 shows, the

combined effect of party and section made Southern Democrats
much more likely to vote for the Army expansion than
Northern Whigs.
TABLE 18
HOUSE VOTE TO INCREASE THE ARMY BY PARTY AND SECTION

Yeas

Section/Party

Nays

%Yea

Northern Whigs

23 (55%)

19 (45%)

42 (100%)

Northern Democrats

48 (68%)

23 (32%)

71 (100%)

Southern Whigs

11 (69%)

5 (31%)

16 (100%)

Southern Democrats

27 (75%)

9 (25%)

36 (100%)

All Whigs

34 (59%)

24 (41%)

58 (100%)

All Democrats

75 (70%)

32 (30%)

107 (100%)

0 (0%)

2 (100%)

2 (100%)

Frontier

11 (79%)

3 (21%)

14 (100%)

North

71 (62%)

44 (38%)

115 (100%)

South

38 (73%)

14 (27%)

52 (100%)

Total

120 (67%)

61 (33%)

181 (100%)

Freesoilers

The reverse is not true as Northern Democrats voted nearly
identically to Southern Whigs, showing, perhaps, a cross
pressure between the party and section a Congressman
represented.

It needs to be pointed out, however, that even
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Northern Whigs narrowly supported the measure, as did every
group in the House except for the two Freesoilers.
After the House had sent its version of the 1856 Army
Appropriations Bill to the Senate the controversy
surrounding the bill did not disappear.

After the first

conference committee the House rejected the compromise even
though the Senate receded on five of the six points of
contention.

The problem that upset the House was not

related to the increase of the Army, however, and after two
further attempts at a conference the House finally agreed to
a compromise on the final point.

In the rush to conclude

the business of the session the final vote to pass the
conference version of the bill was accomplished by a voice
vote in both houses.103
The four regiments raised in 1855 did not, as most in
the Congress expected, end up on the plains or in Oregon.
In fact one historian suggests that the majority of the new
strength ended up in the Department of Texas.I®4

one

company of the newly formed Tenth Infantry did become
involved in the punitive campaign against the Brule
Sioux.1^5

The campaign was not one urgently needed to

safeguard the plains however, and the whole affair came off
as a bit of an anticlimax.

In the campaign's only*
5
4
0
1

lO^utley, 13n. Richard Peters and George Minot, eds.,
United States Statutes at Large 10 vols.
(Boston: Charles
C. Little and James Brown, 1846-1861), 10:635.
104Utley, 71.
105Globe, 34th Cong., 1st sess., appendix, 17.
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engagement the Brule lost eighty-six killed and over seventy
wounded and captured (many of the latter women and children)
while the soldiers from Fort Kearney lost but five killed
and seven wounded.106
It would seem fair to suggest that the increase to the
Regular Army was generally supported, if sometimes by small
minorities, in all regions in the country in 1855.

It would

also be appropriate to point out that the South and Frontier
states were more willing than the North to add to the
Regular Army.

The North supported the enterprise coolly and

if votes from the region would have been needed in any great
number the measure could have failed.
John Muldowny has stated that in general, Congressmen
from the Northwest, West, and Southwest favored Jefferson
Davis's reforms while those from the Northeast and South
opposed them.107
entirely true.

For the increase in 1855 this is not
In fact the increase was one of the few

Davis proposals about the Army that met with much success
during his term.
One reason is that it was easy to understand how the
increase in territory after the Mexican War would
necessitate the growth of the Army.

With the lag of seven

years between the end of the war and the increase, however,
a direct link between the two events cannot be firmly
established.

Indian hostilities along the emigration

106Lavender, 79.
107 Muldowny, 97-8.
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routes, the threat of the Mormons in Utah, the dearth of
troops in the Department of the East, and the unreliability
of volunteers were also used to justify the increase.

These

arguments point out that 1855 could have seen a change in
the way the Congress dealt with the United States Army.
There was no reason why the country could not have changed
its policies to ensure protection of the plains.

The mass

migration along the Oregon Trail was a different situation
than had been faced before and it was possible to envision a
new defense arrangement.

In large part then, the increase

passed because most Congressmen felt comfortable with the
protection it would provide the citizens of the country.

It

also passed because few felt it necessary to block the
increase for political reasons.

Considering the atmosphere

of the times that in itself was remarkable.
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CONCLUSION

The general trend between 1821 and 1855 was to increase
the strength of the Army.

As Appendix 1 shows, the Army

increased by 176 percent (from 5,733 men to 15,911 men)
during the period.
two ways.

Such an increase can be accounted for in

First, the Army of 1821 was too small for the

duties it was assigned.

Calhoun's problems of manning the

frontier started almost immediately after the 1821 reduction
took effect and, as the addition of the First and Second
Dragoon Regiments showed in 1833 and 1836, more troops were
needed on the Frontier.

A second reason for the upward

trend was the growth in the size of the country.

Between

1821 and 1855 the territory of the nation grew by 69 percent
(from 1,787,000 to 3,020,000 square miles).1

While several

leading figures in the period, chief among them John C.
Calhoun, felt that external threats were important, the size
of the United States Army was "fixed by the requirements of
the westward movement rather than the menace of a foreign
power."2

The new territory, different in many ways from the

regions settled by 1821, required not only more men, but men
trained and equipped in different ways.
^'-Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 2:1114.
2Robert Marshal Utley, Frontiersman in Blue: The
United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York:
Macmillan Co, 1967), 2.
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One check on the growth of the Army throughout the
period was Congressional unwillingness to spend heavily on
defense.

Robert Utley suggested this occurred because of

"the inability of most Congressmen to face up to the fiscal
realities of territorial growth" and that such "parsimony"
affected both "the size of Army and its logistical
support."3

The Congress consistently gave the Executive

branch less than what was requested between 1821 and 1855,
on many occasions even refusing to take seriously plans to
increase the Army.

The decreases of 1821 and 1842 were both

driven in large part by concerns over the state of the
Treasury and occurred even as the Commanding General was
requesting a larger, not smaller, Army.

The Army grew in

size after 1821 because the need for more protection on the
Frontier was a stronger factor than the Congressional desire
to keep the cost of the Army down.
Which party a Congressman belonged to seemed to have
little impact on how he would view proposals to increase or
decrease the size of the Army in the period.

Party

allegiance played only a minor role in deciding the
individual bills considered and none at all when discussing
the entire period.

In 1821 the Democrats were slightly more

likely than the Federalists to support reduction (66 versus
62 percent), but it was a group of Democrats, the Old
Republicans, that voted by the greatest percentage to cut
the Army.

After the 1830s, where the confusion during the

3Ibid., 1 1 .
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formation of the second party system made identifying
Congressional affiliation difficult, the 1840s showed the
parties agreeing on both the decrease of 1842 and the
increases of 1846.

The role of parties in the debates was

somewhat important during the individual votes although
which party was more in favor of the Army depended on the
year.

The Democrats were much less in favor of the 1842

decrease (53 to 67 percent), while the Whigs were much more
in favor of adding to the Army in 1846 (84 to 78 percent).
Finally, in 1855 Democrats favored the increase of the Army
more than the Whigs (70 to 59 percent).

As was suggested in

the introduction, the role of party played only a minor role
in the period.
There were also debates where sectional location had
little to do with how a Congressman voted.

The 1821 vote

showed a remarkable consistency in which all three sections
voted identically for the decrease being considered.

The

role of section mattered in the 1830s, not on the main issue
of increasing the Army but on the secondary issue of what
kind of troops to provide.

As was discussed in Chapter

Three, frontier Congressmen were more interested in militia
and volunteers, troops from their region, than in regulars.
In the introduction, the possibility that the Frontier
would favor a large Army more than the North or the South
was discussed.

This holds true only for the Frontier after

1838 and for the Senate only during 1855.

As the Army

became more involved with activities away from the settled
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parts of the Frontier after the late 1830s, Frontier
Congressman began to support more regulars.
lasted up to 1855.

This support

The South gave erratic support to the

Army throughout the period, however.

Only in 1855 did

Southern Congressmen support the Army more than Northern
ones and then only by a 73 to 62 percent margin.

There was

little difference between the two sections throughout the
period.
In the debates and votes on the proper size of the
peace establishment, section and party differences meant
little.

Not only were the percentages between the various

groups usually similar, but also at no time did any section
or party vote against the prevailing sentiments of Congress.
This was true even when there were important sectional and
party guestions at stake, such as the Missouri Compromise
(Sixteenth Congress) and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (ThirtyThird Congress).
Many outstanding figures spoke on the Army issue
between 1821 and 1855.

Chief among them were the two best

nineteenth century Secretaries of War, John C. Calhoun and
Jefferson Davis.

Calhoun, who served as Secretary of War

longer than any other man in the era, took little part in
the issue after he left office.

Davis took a different

approach, serving on the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs both before and after his time in the Cabinet and
advocating Army expansion up to the eve of the Civil War.
Also important in the debates was Thomas Hart Benton, the
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Frontier's leading voice for the Army for many years while
serving mainly in the Senate but also in the House.
Curiously, all the important figures identified with the
Army question were Army supporters.

Also of note were the

number of outstanding men who had little or no input on the
issue.

None of the Presidents in the period, with the

exception of James Polk, put much effort into the issue,
letting their Secretaries or Congress take the lead.
Congressional giants Daniel Webster and Henry Clay also took
little note of the debates.

Such disinterest points out the

lack of importance many saw in the issue.
There remains much work to be done in the area of Army
and Congressional relations between 1821 and 1855.

It would

be possible, through research in state archives, to get a
clearer picture of the party affiliation of Congressmen in
the 1830s (and to a lesser degree those few members not
identified in the Sixteenth Congress).

It would be

interesting to determine whether any of the factions then
forming themselves into the parties of the second party
system took extreme views on the issue.

It would also be

useful to make a much closer inspection of the materials in
the National Archives, two areas in particular:

the

proceedings of the two Committees on Military Affairs and
the other committees which dealt with the issue and the
letterbooks of the Secretary of War, his key officials, and
important military commanders.

Due to time and distance

constraints only the most cursory examination was made of
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these items.

There also remains much work that could be

done in the collections of the different Congressmen and
high-ranking officers who usually attract little attention
but who would be very interested the size of the Army.
Other military topics in the period suggest themselves
as needing study, the most important being a study of the
militia.

From the debate on the Regular Army it seemed as

if the trust in the militia suffered a sharp decline after
1821.

The reasons for this seem unclear and further study,

especially if directed towards the guestion of section,
could shed further light upon John Hope Franklin's
suggestion that the South had a deeper commitment to local
military tradition.
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APPENDIX l1

Strength of the United States Army; Selected Years 1789-1861
Year

Strencrth

1789
1794
1801
1802
1807

718
3,813
4,051
2,873
2,775

1808
1809
1811
1812
1813

5,712
6,977
5,608
6,686
19,036

1814
1815
1816
1817
1820

38,186
33,424
10,231
8,446
10,554

1821
1822
1823
1832
1833

5,773
5,538
6,117
6,268
6,579

1834
1835
1836
1837
1838

7,030
7,337
9,945
12,449
9,197

1839
1843
1845
1846
1848

10,691
9,102
8,509
27,867
47,319

1849
1850
1854
1855
1858
1861

10,744
10,929
10,894
15,911
17,678
186,845

^Russell F. Wiegley, History of the United States Army
(New York: Macmillian Co, 1967), 566-7.
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Sections in Congress; 1821-1855
1821
North (10)
Maine
Connecticut
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Vermont
Rhode Island
Delaware
New JerseyNew York
Pennsylvania

South (5)
Virginia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Kentucky

Frontier (8)
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Tennessee
Mississippi
Louisiana
Alabama
Georgia

The following House districts are also included in the
Frontier region:1 the 17th, 19th, and 20th Massachusetts
(in present day Maine); the 12th, 18th, and 21st New York;
the 5th Kentucky; the North Carolina 12th.2
1833, 1836
North (1CM
Maine
Connecticut
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Vermont
Rhode Island
Delaware
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania

South (5)
Virginia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Kentucky

Frontier (9)
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Missouri
Tennessee
Mississippi
Louisiana
Alabama
Georgia

^The raw data for determining which districts were to
be placed in differing regions than the rest of their states
comes from maps and data in Stanly B. Parsons, William W.
Beach, and Dan Hermann, United States Congressional
Districts (New York: The Free Press, 1982) and Kenneth C.
Martis, ed., The Historical Atlas of United States
Congressional Districts (New York: The Free Press, 1982).
^No Vermont nor New Hampshire districts were moved
during this Congress since all Representatives in the two
states were elected on general tickets. New Hampshire
continued this practice throughout the period.
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The following House districts are also included in the
Frontier region in 1833: the 5th, 6th, and 7th Maine; the
4th and 5th Vermont; the 19th, 20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th
New York; the North Carolina 12th.
The following House districts are also included in the
Frontier region in 1836: the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Maine
the 4th and 5th Vermont; the 13th, 14th, 18th, 25th, 28th,
32nd and 33rd New York; the North Carolina 12th.
1838, 1842
North (12)
Maine
Connecticut
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Vermont
Rhode Island
Delaware
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana

South (7)
Virginia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Kentucky
Tennessee
Mississippi

Frontier (7)
Illinois
Michigan
Missouri
Alabama
Georgia
Arkansas
Louisiana

The following House districts are also included in the
Frontier region in 1836: the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Maine
the 4th and 5th Vermont; the 13th, 14th, 18th, 25th, 28th,
32nd and 33rd New York.
1846
North (13)
Maine
Connecticut
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Vermont
Rhode Island
Delaware
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois

South (9)
Virginia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Kentucky
Tennessee
Georgia
Alabama
Mississippi

Frontier (7)
Michigan
Iowa
Florida
Missouri
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
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1848

North (14)
Maine
Connecticut
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Vermont
Rhode Island
Delaware
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan

South (11)
Virginia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Kentucky
Tennessee
Georgia
Alabama
Mississippi
Florida
Louisiana

Frontier (5^
Wisconsin
Iowa
Missouri
Arkansas
Texas

1855
North (141
Maine
Connecticut
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Vermont
Rhode Island
Delaware
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan

South (11)
Virginia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Kentucky
Tennessee
Georgia
Alabama
Mississippi
Florida
Louisiana

Frontier (6)
Wisconsin
Iowa
Missouri
Arkansas
Texas
California
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APPENDIX 31

Size of companies in the United States Army; 1785-1855
Year

Infantry

Artillery

Cavalry

1789
1790
1792
1794
1796

60
66
70
80
52

60
66
70
52
52

52

1798
1799
1800
1802
1808

60
92
62
64
68

52
48
52
64
66

70
92
52

92

66

68

1812
1813
1815
1821
1832

100
90
68
42
42

100
90
100
45
45

100
90

68
68
68

1833
1836
1838
1842
18463

42
42
80
42
100

45
42
58
42
100

60
60
60
50
100

1848
18504
1855

64
74
74

64
74
74

64
74
74

Rifles

100*
2

1-For an excellent source on the size of companies
before 1838 see Congress, Senate, Report from the Secretary
of War; in compliance with a Resolution of the Senate, with
Statements of the Number of Troops Employed in the War with
the Seminole Indians, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Document
226, Serial 316.
2The companies cited are from the Battalion of Mounted
Rangers for 1832 and the various cavalry and dragoon
regiments thereafter.
3The
13, 1846)
provision
companies

Act to Increase the Rank and File of the Army (May
increased all the companies to 100 with the
that after hostilities with Mexico had ceased all
would be reduced to 64 men.

4The Act to Increase the Rank and File of the Army
(June 17, 1850) increased only those companies actually in
service on the western frontier.
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